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INTRODUCTION
George Berkeley’s (1685-1753) views on language, meaning, and signs have 
many facets and, accordingly, have been considered by scholars from a number 
of perspectives, concentrating on his conceptions of signification, analogy, 
‘visual language’, etc.
At the same time, there are few comprehensive studies of the early develop­
ment (1707-1708) of Berkeley’s understanding of the meaning of words and 
other signs. The most detailed studies (in English) of that short but significant 
period in Berkeley’s thought regarding semantics have been offered by Bertil 
Belfrage and David Berman. Berman’s reading of Alciphron (1732) is closely 
related to these studies and follows the same pattern of interpretation.
My concern in this thesis is to examine, firstly, Belfrage’s and Berman’s 
accounts of the early development of Berkeley’s views on the meaning of words 
and other signs, that is, the development from strict cognitivism to an emotive 
theory of meaning as they conceive it. (Their understanding of ‘cognitivism’, 
‘emotivism’ and other relevant conceptions shall be explained in the course of 
the presentation and examination of their position.) Secondly, I want to examine 
Berman’s reading of Alciphron, dialogue VII, and consider it in connection with 
his and Belfrage’s analysis of Berkeley’s early writings.
By and large, these accounts form a coherent whole, which I shall refer to as 
the non-cognitivist interpretation of (the relevant passages in) Berkeley’s works 
which, according to these scholars, reflect his non-cognitivist or emotivist 
understanding of the meaning of certain terms, signs, and utterances. Central 
and crucial in this respect are passages dealing with certain religious discourse, 
more precisely, terms and utterances concerning the Christian mysteries such as 
the eternal rewards and punishments, the Holy Trinity, and the Incarnation. 
Belfrage and Berman claim that Berkeley held such discourse to be non- 
cognitive (non-descriptive, non-informative), and, in addition, ascribed an 
emotive meaning to it in his final position.
The non-cognitivist interpretation, I believe, and hope to show, is funda­
mentally mistaken. So my approach in this thesis will be mainly critical. How­
ever, in the course of my criticism various nuances of Berkeley’s thought and 
writings will emerge.
The thesis is based on my papers included in this volume, but the present 
analysis of the non-cognitivist interpretation is more detailed, and, accordingly, 
my argumentation against it is expanded and more systematic.
In the first chapter of the thesis I shall expose in detail Belfrage’s and 
Berman’s accounts of Berkeley’s early development as well as Berman’s 
reading of Alciphron. I shall try to point out the essential similarities and the 
marginal dissimilarities between their reconstructions of Berkeley’s develop­
ment from strict cognitivism to an emotive theory of meaning.
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The chapter is divided into five sections. In each of the first three sections, I 
shall focus on Belfrage’s and Berman’s reading of one or more of Berkeley’s 
writings, which, according to them, give evidence of his view on meaning at a 
certain stage, or reveal a certain aspect, of his early intellectual development. 
The first section is concerned with the paper Of Infinites (1707) and the sermon 
on On Immortality (1708), the second with the Philosophical Commentaries 
(1707-1708), and the third with the Draft Introduction (1708). In the fourth 
section I shall outline Berman’s account of Alciphron, dialogue VII. After that, 
in the fifth section, I shall summarize the main points of the whole non- 
cognitivist interpretation.
In the second chapter I shall offer detailed objections to, and produce textual 
evidence against, this interpretation, following the structure of the first chapter.
Finally, I shall present my conclusions about the account Berman and 
Belfrage have given of Berkeley’s relevant works and views. The conclusions 
also embody my observations concerning the latter.
References to the Philosophical Commentaries (Berkeley 1976) will cite the 
entry number, those to the Draft (Berkeley 1987) the folio number. All other 
references to Berkeley’s works are from the standard edition, Berkeley 1948-57 
[Works]. References to Alciphron will in addition to the volume number and 
page number also cite the dialogue number and section number.
CHAPTER 1. 
EXPOSITION OF THE NON-COGNITIVIST 
INTERPRETATION
1.1. The doctrinal clash between the paper Of Infinites (1707) 
and the sermon On Immortality (1708)
Belfrage and Berman hold that the early development of Berkeley’s views on 
meaning contained a significant doctrinal shift. They believe that the shift took 
place in a short period of time, that is, between 19 November 1707, when 
Berkeley read his short paper Of Infinites before the Dublin Philosophical 
Society, and 11 January 1708, when he delivered his sermon On Immortality in 
the Trinity College Chapel. According to Belfrage’s reconstruction, Berkeley 
changed his mind concerning the issue of meaning after being criticized, during 
the actual discussion of the paper Of Infinites, by ‘an audience of educated Irish 
Anglicans’ (Belfrage 1985: 118). Berman, for his part, suggests, more confi­
dently, that the change was occasioned by comments from two prominent 
churchmen and philosophers, William King and Peter Browne (Berman 1986: 
604).
Belfrage and Berman take in effect the shift to have been so sudden and 
radical that they prefer to call it, respectively, a ‘clash on semantics’ and ‘se­
mantic revolution’.
The view on the meaning of terms supposedly held by Berkeley before and 
whilst reading the Of Infinites is termed ‘Lockean’ or ‘cognitivist’ by these 
scholars. This, ‘Lockean’ position amounts to the principle that all meaningful 
signs (including words, names, terms) stand for ideas. In the Of Infinites, they 
observe, it is enunciated in the following extract (Berman 1986: 603; Belfrage 
1985: 119; 1986a: 320):
’Tis plain to me we ought to use no sign without an idea answering if, & ’tis 
as plain that we have no idea of a line infinitely small, nay, ’tis evidently 
impossible there should be any such thing, for every line, how minute soever, 
is still divisible into parts less than itself; therefore there can be no such thing 
as a line quavis data minor or infinitely small.
(Works 4: 235-236, emphasis added)
Berkeley’s target in the paper is the mathematical doctrine of infinitesimals; the 
passage just quoted is intended to show that we have no ideas of ‘quantitys 
infinitely small’ or ‘infinitesimals of several orders’ and thus ‘there can be no’ 
such quantities (ibid).
Belfrage’s and Berman’s readings of the passage diverge slightly, but they 
agree in essence. According to Belfrage, Berkeley is concerned here (in fact, in 
the whole paper) with the issue of ‘the proper use of terms in valid demonstra­
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tions’, and, more narrowly, with the problem whether ‘infinitesimal’ is a mea­
ningful term. So, given the Lockean semantic principle, it appears that the 
term/concept is ‘descriptively empty’ and should be rejected, along with de­
monstrations based on it (Belfrage 1986a: 320). Berman points to Locke’s 
distinction (embraced by Berkeley) between ‘two conceptions of infinity: (1) 
that of an “endless growing idea” and (2) that of a positive, completed idea or 
“standing measure’” , the first being called ‘infinity’ and the second ‘infinite’. In 
the paper, the first conception is deemed legitimate, the second illegitimate, 
since, Berkeley says, ‘we have an idea of the former, but none at all of the later’ 
(Works 4: 235; Berman 1986: 604).
On the whole, both commentators claim that in the paper ‘infinite’ is taken 
to be a meaningless, or, illegitimate or descriptively empty term, as they call it.
In the sermon, however, the term is used to express Berkeley’s own position 
on immortality (Works 7: 11). Berman says: ‘here he [Berkeley] happily uses 
certain words which he knows do not stand for ideas’ (Berman 1986: 603). So 
the illegitimate term is being ‘happily’ used by Berkeley himself some weeks 
after reading the cognitivist paper, in which the term is regarded as meaning­
less.
In Belfrage’s opinion, as noted above, what is at issue is not just the using of 
the (illegitimate) term ‘infinite’. He argues that the sermon contains ‘a de­
monstration in which the reference to “infinite eternal bliss” — that “we have 
no idea o f’ — is crucial to the whole argument’ (Belfrage 1986a: 320, emphasis 
added). Whereas in the paper Berkeley argues ‘that a demonstration based on 
such a descriptively empty term is invalid’ (ibid.). Thus in both cases the gene­
ral problem to be considered is the (proper) use of terms in (valid) de­
monstrations.
Despite the minor differences in interpretation, the two commentators jointly 
declare that in the sermon the austere cognitivist view on meaning has been 
abandoned. This is what they call ‘clash on semantics’ or ‘semantic revolution’.
Belfrage and Berman also concur with each other that the motivation behind 
this dramatic change of mind must have been theological. For, in their view, 
after reading the paper and considering the criticisms of the ‘educated Irish 
Anglicans’, Berkeley realized that the strict, Lockean, cognitivist view on, or 
theory of, meaning undermines the meaningfulness of some religious discourse. 
‘If the word “infinite” is meaningless, and if there is no legitimate notion of a 
positive infinity’, Berman asks, ‘then how can we say that God is infinite or that 
the mysterious joys of heaven are infinite?’ (Berman 1986: 605). Given 
Berkeley’s cognitivist semantic principle, Belfrage, for his part, raises these 
questions: ‘how are we to understand non-descriptive propositions in Scripture’, 
‘what descriptive [cognitive] meaning does a proposition about inconceivable 
things have?’ (Belfrage 1986a: 321). Berman notes that Berkeley, advancing the 
Lockean theory of meaning, ‘seemed to be playing into the hands of [John]
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Toland’, a freethinker, who had used the Lockean theory to ‘undermine belief in 
Christian mysteries’ (Berman 1986: 605; 1994: 15; cf. Belfrage 1985: 118).1
The sermon, Berman and Belfrage state, provides a preliminary solution to 
these problems, and marks an important change in the early development of 
Berkeley’s linguistic thought. Berman’s and Belfrage’s accounts of what preci­
sely the solution was differ again to some extent. What we find in the sermon, 
Berman asserts, is a ‘new non-Lockean, non-cognitive semantics’ or ‘a non- 
cognitive view of statements about religious mystery’, which is an intermediate 
position between the early cognitivism and the later emotive theory of meaning 
first advanced in the Draft Introduction. The non-cognitive view entails just that 
non-cognitive terms (e.g. ‘infinite’), that is, such that do not stand for ideas or 
inform, can be legitimately or meaningfully used, as in the expression ‘infinite 
eternal bliss’ in Berkeley’s sermon. In addition, Berman notes, Berkeley comes 
close here to ‘theological representationalism’, a position held by Browne and 
King.2 That is to say, Berkeley admits that we have no ‘determin’d idea’ of 
heavenly pleasures because they transcend our cognitive capacities (Berman 
1986: 605; 1994: 12-13, 16-17; Works 7: 13).
Despite the lack of determinate ideas, Berkeley assures, on this reading, we 
ought to believe St. Paul’s ‘empty tho emphatical description’ of Heaven:
’tis wt eye hath not seen nor ear heard neither hath it enter’d into the heart of
man to conceive.
(Works 7: 12)
Contrary to the doctrine put forward in the Of Infinites, then, here some non- 
cognitive discourse is adopted as legitimate and meaningful. ‘Berkeley also 
seems to have moved in the Sermon to a more pragmatic, Kingean approach to 
theological language’, Berman finally remarks,— ‘the word “infinite” is 
meaningful if it is used to mark off one thing from another’ (Berman 1986: 605; 
1994: 17).
Belfrage, relying on the same textual evidence, contends that in the sermon 
Berkeley expressed an entirely new position that he soon rejected and never 
returned to. He namely considered the ‘non-cognitive propositions in the Scrip­
ture’ as ‘metaphysical descriptions’ that ‘were supposed to refer to things out­
side the scope of human knowledge’, these things being ‘in principle ob­
servable’ (Belfrage 1986b: 643). That is to say, St. Paul’s promise of future 
rewards as well as other relevant non-cognitive propositions in Scripture are 
‘empty descriptions’ and thus meaningless to us, human beings, yet ‘true 
descriptions’ to blessed souls in heaven and non-human observers (such as 
angels). ‘Metaphysical descriptions’ (or, ‘metaphysical propositions’) cogniti­
vely meaningless for us, one could say, describe transcendent heavenly things
1 For a recent account of the views of freethinkers (including Toland) and their 
opponents (including Berkeley), see Rivers 2000, vol. 2, ch.l.
2 For a closer examination of that position see Berman 1982: 156-161.
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observable to higher spirits and the souls of the blessed, and thus are true and 
meaningful for them (See Belfrage 1986a: 321-323). This way of thinking, 
Belfrage concludes, led to absurd consequences, ‘which Berkeley did not accept 
either before or after that sermon’ (Belfrage 1986b: 643). For, from the view 
taken in the sermon it follows that one should believe in the existence of some­
thing without knowing at all what it is or having an idea of it, that is, to believe 
in something unknown, which is a position rejected by Berkeley both in his 
published works and the Philosophical Commentaries (Belfrage 1986a: 323- 
324).
To conclude. On Berman’s reading, the sermon represents but an 
intermediate (non-cognitivist) position between the strict cognitivism of the Of 
Infinites and the emotive theory in the Draft Introduction. For Belfrage, on the 
other hand, the sermon entails a distinctive position to be found nowhere else in 
Berkeley’s writings. Unlike Berman, Belfrage suggests that the main relevant 
issue to be considered both in the paper and the sermon is the (proper) use of 
terms in (valid) demonstrations.
I want to stress that despite the differences in detail, Berman’s and 
Belfrage’s interpretations of the sermon coincide as regards to Berkeley’s 
understanding of the relevant religious terms and propositions such as the word 
‘infinite’ in religious contexts or the promise of heavenly rewards by St. Paul. 
According to their proposal, these terms and propositions were considered by 
Berkeley, in the sermon, to be non-cognitive, or, to have no cognitive meaning, 
in the sense that they do not stand for ideas, or, do not impart any knowledge.
1.2. The doctrinal clash 
in the Philosophical Commentaries (1707-1708), 
Notebook A
The ‘clash’ or ‘revolution’ in the development of Berkeley’s early semantics, 
Belfrage and Berman maintain, is also reflected in the Philosophical Commen­
taries. ‘In the earlier notebook [Notebook B ]\ Berman says, ‘the Lockean 
theory of meaning was very important to him’ (Berman 1994: 13). ‘Thus,’ Ber­
man continues, ‘towards the end of this notebook (entry 378) he sets out a 
fifteen-step demonstration, which begins’:
+ 1 All significant words Stand for Ideas
Belfrage points out that the view on infinitesimals presented in the Of Infinites 
is clearly stated in the Commentaries too, and it is related there to the Lockean 
conception of meaning. In the paper, Belfrage explains, Berkeley argued from 
the two principles brought forward in Notebook В and styled ‘axioms’ by him 
(Belfrage 1987: 52):
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Axiom. No reasoning about things whereof we have no idea. Therefore 
no reasoning about Infinitesimals.
Axiom. No word to be used without an idea.
(356; cf. 421-422)
The ‘clash’ or ‘revolution’, though, is manifested in the later notebook [Note­
book А]. Belfrage divides all entries of that notebook into two sections: ‘the 
Lockean entries (400-696)’ and ‘the later entries (697-888)’ (Belfrage 1985: 
117). In the former, he contends, Berkeley ‘accepted the semantic rule that 
terms which do not denote particular ideas are empty, meaningless terms’ 
(Belfrage 1985: 120-121).
For Belfrage, the ‘clash on semantics’ is clearly discernible in the develop­
ment of Berkeley’s understanding of the ‘concept of number’ and ‘nature of 
demonstration’ within Notebook A. Therefore he offers a comprehensive 
account of that drastic change in Berkeley’s views in the field of mathematics. 
He observes that, in ‘the Lockean entries’, the ‘semantic rule’ applies to 
‘mathematical concepts’, too. Thus numbers are taken there to denote ideas, or, 
‘particular things “conceiv’d [...] as consisting of parts wch may be distinctly & 
successively perceiv’d’” (460; Belfrage 1985: 121). In the later entries, how­
ever, numbers are ‘considered to be mere words or signs.’ They are regarded as 
having ‘an instrumental, non-descriptive, meaning when used as signs’ 
(Belfrage 1987: 53; 1985: 121-122; see entries 762-768). Terms or signs used 
instrumentally, Belfrage says, ‘do not denote ideas’. This is an important 
remark since he argues the same concerning Berkeley’s later conception of the 
emotive use of language, which is but ‘one form of non-descriptive use of 
language’ along with the instrumental (Belfrage 1985: 121). Neither instrumen­
tally nor emotively used terms (signs) stand for ideas, on this reading.
Here we have then a shift parallel to the one Belfrage claims to have found 
by juxtaposing the paper Of Infinites and the sermon On Immortality.
For Belfrage, as expounded above, the shift concerned the issue of ‘the pro­
per use of terms in valid demonstrations’, one view being taken in the paper, an 
essentially different one in the sermon. Similarly, Belfrage claims, in the earlier, 
Lockean entries of the Commentaries it is held that in demonstrations we have 
to ‘define the words we use & never go beyond our ideas’ (584, cf. 551, 595; 
Belfrage 1985: 122; 1987: 54). This is, then, precisely what Berkeley demands 
in the paper: in a valid demonstration, no term is to be used ‘without an idea 
answering it.’
In the later entries the earlier conception is abandoned. Demonstrations in 
arithmetic and algebra do not entail ‘comparing of ideas’, these sciences being 
‘purely verbal’ (767-768, 803). Thus, Belfrage concludes, in the later entries 
Berkeley ‘has come to look upon a mathematical demonstration as a mere 
“computing in signs’” , which is Berkeley’s view in the later, published works 
(See Principles, sects. 120-122, Works 2: 96-97; Ale. УП. 14, Works 3: 307-
(354)
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308). In the latter, mathematical demonstrations are seen as ‘convenient scien­
tific instruments’ (Belfrage 1985: 122-123; 1987: 53-54).
So, both in the sermon On Immortality and later entries of Notebook A, the 
earlier Lockean strictly cognitivist semantics is rejected, on Belfrage’s account. 
For now Berkeley allows that (at least some) terms (signs) which do not stand 
for ideas can be properly used in valid demonstrations.
The sudden rejection of the strict cognitivism, Berman and Belfrage 
consider, is clearly evidenced by two significant entries in Notebook A, to wit, 
696 and 720. By entry 696, they claim, Berkeley was still a cognitivist, rejecting 
all terms that do not stand for determinate ideas or significations as 
meaningless. In Berkeley’s words, they are ‘Gibberish, Jargon & deserve not 
the name of Language.’ Here, in the ‘last radically Lockean entry’, the position 
expressed in the O f Infinites as well as earlier entries of the Commentaries, is 
forcefully stated. In entry 720, however (along with the sermon, and other later 
entries of the Commentaries), the strict cognitivism is repudiated. For now 
Berkeley allows a certain kind of non-cognitive propositions — those 
concerning revelation and mystery — to be legitimate.
In Belfrage’s view, entry 720 contains a distinction between two radically 
different kinds of propositions: cognitive (informative) and non-cognitive (non- 
informative). The former kind (termed ‘Matters of Reason & Philosophy’) does 
have a cognitive meaning, on this reading, the latter (‘Matters of Revelation’) 
does not. Here the latter category of propositions is left ‘out of consideration’, 
but in the Draft Introduction the emotive theory is applied precisely to it 
(Belfrage 1987: 56).
While Belfrage does not see any significant doctrinal similarity between the 
view exposed in entry 720 and that of the sermon (the startling doctrine of 
‘metaphysical descriptions’ being unique in Berkeley’s works), Berman links 
the two together. In entry 720, he says, ‘Berkeley has reached, or nearly 
reached, the non-cognitive position of the first sermon.’ And there, he 
continues, Berkeley ‘appears to be following the advice contained in entry 720’ 
(Berman 1994: 13; 1986: 603). That is, in the sermon the relevant, non- 
cognitive propositions in Scripture are not subjected to the Lockean, cognitivist 
account of meaning. Yet the ‘specific emotive component’ of the new, non- 
cognitivist semantics is first formulated in the Draft Introduction (Berman 
1994: 17; 1986: 605).
With respect to entry 720, Berman also reflects on the issue whether the non- 
cognitive propositions in question were taken to be true by Berkeley. This, in 
turn, hinges on the question whether, given the non-cognitivist semantics, they 
‘have sufficient cognitive content to be true’ (Berman 1994: 161). Berman 
concludes that the description of those propositions as concerning ‘things out of 
our reach...altogether above our knowledge’ as well as the comparison with 
‘words spoken in a language that we do not understand’ implies that ‘they can 
have no cognitive content for us’ and thus cannot be true for us. On the other 
hand, he remarks, the final sentence of the entry suggests that ‘such propo­
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sitions can have cognitive content and can be true, if only in the next life’ 
(Berman 1994: 162).
I wish to point out that Berman’s reading of entry 720 is close to Belfrage’s 
account of the ‘“metaphysical descriptions” in the first sermon’ inasmuch as in 
both cases the ‘non-cognitive’/ ‘non-descriptive’ propositions in Scripture are 
seen as being cognitively ‘empty’ or meaningless for us and possibly meaning­
ful and true for those in Heaven.
To sum up Berman’s and Belfrage’s position. The ‘clash’ or ‘revolution’ in 
the early development of Berkeley’s views on meaning is discernible not only 
in the paper O f Infinites and the sermon On Immortality, but also in the 
Philosophical Commentaries. The early Lockean cognitivism, or, the doctrine 
that every meaningful word (term, sign) stands for an idea, applies both to terms 
in natural language and mathematical conceptions. The last strictly cognitivist 
entry is 696. Thereafter a non-cognitivist position on the meaning or use of 
signs appears. The strict cognitivism is now repudiated and, Belfrage contends, 
a more pragmatic notion of mathematical conceptions is adopted. Signs in 
arithmetic and algebra do not denote ideas, on that account, and yet they are not 
meaningless since they can be used instrumentally. In entry 720 a particular 
kind of propositions — non-cognitive propositions in Scripture — is presented 
as remaining untouched by the strict cognitivism. The latter propositions have 
no cognitive meaning, give no information whatsoever to human beings and are 
not true fo r them. At that stage of his development Berkeley already viewed 
such propositions to be legitimate, but he did not yet ascribe an emotive 
meaning to them. In Belfrage’s view, both the instrumentalism and emotivism 
are forms of non-cognitivism and thus interrelated in Berkeley’s later non- 
cognitivist position.
1.3. Draft Introduction (1708)
1.3.1. The emotive theory of meaning
It is first in the Draft Introduction that the ‘theory of emotive meaning’, 
‘emotive theory (of meaning)’, ‘emotive theory of religious utterances’ or 
‘account of emotive language’ is in Berman’s and Belfrage’s opinion advanced. 
The appearance of the theory, they believe, marks a significant step forward not 
only in Berkeley’s intellectual development, but also in the history of 
philosophy in general. ‘Berkeley’, Berman states, ‘was the first modem 
philosopher to formulate and support the theory that words have legitimate uses 
which do not involve informing or standing for ideas.’ Whereas the sermon On 
Immortality and entry 720 of the Commentaries reflect only the ‘negative, non- 
cognitive’ aspect of the theory, Berman continues, in the Draft Introduction, 
‘the whole theory is clearly presented’ (Berman 1994: 144-145). Belfrage, for
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his part, thinks that it is ‘the first emotive theory of meaning in the history of 
ideas’ (Belfrage 1985: 120; 1986b: 644).
The core of the new doctrine is supposedly formulated in the following 
passage:
Farther [From which it follows, that crossed out] the Communicating of Ideas 
marked by Words is not the chief and only End of Language, as is commonly 
Suppos’d. There are other Ends [viz crossed out] as the raising of some 
Passion the exciting to or deterring from an Action the putting the Mind in 
some particular Disposition. To which the former is in many cases barely 
subservient and sometimes [entirely crossed out] ommitted when these can 
be obtain’d without it as, I think does not infrequently happen in the familiar 
use of Language.
(25)
The passage, Berman says, entails a description of the ‘three non-cognitive 
functions of language’, to wit, the evoking of (1) emotions (passions), (2) dispo­
sitions, and (3) actions. Thus, in addition to the common, cognitive function of 
language — the evoking of ideas or informing — three more, non-cognitive 
functions are allowed. In the Draft, Berman insists, Berkeley gives an emotivist 
account of the mystery of afterlife in terms of the theory (Berman 1994: 145— 
146). I shall return to this point in the next subsection (1.3.2.).
Belfrage offers a more specific and formalistic account of the emotive 
theory. In his commentary on the Draft he defines the cognitive meaning of an 
expression in terms of its correlation ‘with a (possible) image-picture [i.e. an 
idea] of some particular thing’ (Belfrage 1987: 44). Given that, he formulates 
what he takes to be Berkeley’s definition of ‘emotive meaning’ (noting, though, 
that Berkeley himself did not use the modern term):
An expression has emotive meaning = def.
(1) It does not, or is not intended to, communicate descriptive information; 
that is to say, it has no cognitive meaning.
(2) But it is used for (some of) the following ends: (a) ‘the raising of some 
Passion’; (b) ‘the putting the Mind in some particular Disposition’; (c) ‘the 
exciting to or deterring from an Action’.
(Belfrage 1987: 46; cf. 1986: 644)
Berkeley’s theory as introduced in the Draft Introduction, Belfrage says, entails 
a distinction between cognitive/descriptive propositions that ‘do communicate 
human knowledge’, and non-cognitive/non-informative propositions that ‘do 
not communicate any human knowledge.’ The latter, though, ‘can be properly 
used for other, “emotive”, purposes’ (Belfrage 1986b: 644). Put differently, 
there are propositions which do, and are intended to, evoke ideas in the minds 
of hearers or readers, and those that do not. Nevertheless, according to the 
alleged emotive theory, the latter propositions are meaningful if being used for 
one or more of the purposes listed above. I shall consider Belfrage’s reading of
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the crucial passage, the one concerning ‘the Pauline promise’, separately in the 
following subsection. In addition to that, Belfrage points out Berkeley’s ‘further 
examples of emotive usage’ following the threefold distinction above. Some of 
those cases, he says, ‘could still be interpreted descriptively; others exhibit an 
interaction between, or a mixture of, descriptive and emotive elements; and 
(most interesting) a few have no cognitive meaning whatsoever’ (Belfrage 
1987: 48). Apparently Belfrage allows that, according to Berkeley’s theory, some 
propositions can be used in both ways, descriptively/cognitively and emotively.
So, Belfrage explicates, as an example of expressions of the type (a), Ber­
keley points to the terms ‘Lie’ and ‘Rascal’. When ‘the raising of some Passion’ 
by means of these words (or, in effect, by propositions containing them) is 
intended, Belfrage says, they ‘should earlier in the hearer’s experience have 
been connected — though later “quite omitted” — with ideas “apt to produce 
those Emotions of Mind’” (Belfrage, ibid.; 25, 26).
The type (b) is illustrated by the proposition ‘Aristotle hath said it’ when 
uttered by a ‘Schoolman’ in order ‘to dispose you to receive his Opinion with 
that deference and Submission that Custom has annex’d to that Name’ (24, 25). 
This, Belfrage says, is a ‘purely persuasive use of a reference to Aristotle’. It 
looks like a descriptive statement, and it can be used descriptively. Yet in this 
case it is not intended to give any descriptive information about Aristotle or his 
writings. So, here we have ‘a perfect example of a purely emotive, non- 
descriptive usage’ (Belfrage 1986b: 645; 1987: 48-49).
Finally, Belfrage asserts, Berkeley uses a ‘value statement’ to illustrate the 
type (c): ‘Such an Action is Honourable’ (25). The meaning of this utterance, on 
this reading, is identical with the speaker’s intention, which is not to evoke 
ideas in the mind of the hearer, but to provoke certain action. The intention is, 
in Berkeley’s words,
that those Words should excite in the Mind of the Hearer an esteem of that 
particular Action and stirr him up to the performance of it.
(Ibid.)
The meaning of the utterance in question, Belfrage says, is ‘exactly the same’ as 
if the speaker had uttered the imperative ‘Perform and esteem such an action!’ 
The utterance containing a descriptive/cognitive element (the action) and an 
emotive element (the value term ‘honourable’) has a ‘seemingly descriptive 
form’, which is changed by the latter element to the non-descriptive imperative 
(Belfrage 1987: 49).
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1.3.2. The Pauline promise
Berman’s and Belfrage’s positions, once again, agree in essential points, the 
main divergence lying in the understanding of the relation of the Draft to the 
sermon On Immortality. Whereas Berman insists on the addition of a new 
‘specific emotive component’ to the non-cognitivist theory already present in 
the sermon and entry 720, Belfrage sees in the Draft ‘an entirely new 
approach’:
Earlier, in the sermon, he [Berkeley] asked (assuming that non-referential 
usage is an abuse of language): to what kind of thing do religious mysteries 
refer? His new way of asking — now speaking about words, not about 
things — was: how is language used in non-cognitive discourse?
(Belfrage 1986b: 643)
Thus propositions, say, concerning heavenly pleasures are no more seen as 
‘metaphysical descriptions’ referring to those, transcendent pleasures. The new, 
emotive theory of meaning does not concern the latter at all. It is a theory ‘about 
words in ordinary speech acts, not about things’ (Belfrage 1986a: 324). 
Berkeley observed, according to Belfrage, that ‘language is often used for non- 
referential purposes’ (Belfrage 1986b: 643). The relevant terms and proposi­
tions neither stand for ideas nor refer to things (inside or outside of the scope of 
human knowledge). Non-cognitive discourse, furthermore, gives no information 
whatsoever, but it is meaningful if used for some emotive purpose.
Crucial to both commentators’ accounts is a passage in the Draft where St. 
Paul’s mysterious promise of heavenly rewards is allegedly introduced as an 
instance of emotive, non-cognitive language use. The relevant proposition to be 
considered is the same as that quoted in the sermon, Belfrage and Berman 
maintain, but it is interpreted differently. Berkeley says:
We are told [that] the Good Things which God hath prepared for them that 
love him are such as Eye hath not seen nor Ear heard nor hath it enter’d into 
the Heart of Man to conceive. What man will pretend to say these Words of 
the Inspir’d Writer are empty and insignificant?
(22)3
The purpose of uttering these words, he explains, is not to ‘bring into’ human 
minds ideas of those heavenly things. Instead the design
is to make them [men] more chearfull and fervent in their Duty.
(23)
3 Berkeley’s wording of the promise appears to be a synthesis of 1 Cor. 2:9 and a 
passage from the The Book o f Common Prayer, The Collect for the sixth Saturday after 
Trinity (See Belfrarage 1987: 20; Stewart 1989/1990: 19).
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Here, then, the emotive theory is supposedly applied to the mystery of afterlife. 
For, Berman thinks, the words of St. Paul about the mysterious ‘good things’ 
are considered by Berkeley to be ‘cognitively empty’ (Berman 1994: 145) and 
yet meaningful insofar as they are used for an emotive purpose: to make 
Christians ‘more chearfull and fervent in their Duty.’ In Belfrage’s terminology, 
‘language is here used non-referentially’. For St. Paul does not refer to any 
things at all, Belfrage claims, ‘he uses language emotively with the end in view 
of making people act in a certain way.’ The mysterious proposition, Berkeley 
seems to say, does not evoke ‘any ideas at all’ in the hearers’ or readers’ minds 
(Belfrage 1986a: 324-325). Accordingly, these scholars aver, nothing has been 
communicated by uttering the proposition in question (Berman 1994: 144-145, 
162). Belfrage is particularly resolved in this point:
One thing is clear: St. Paul’s promise does not communicate any descriptive 
information. That is to say (at this stage of Berkeley’s development), the 
Pauline promise does not have any cognitive meaning.
(Belfrage 1986b: 645)
...no one can possibly get any information out of that passage.
(Belfrage 1986b: 646)
...the Pauline promise is void of cognitive meaning, neither is it intended to 
communicate any information.
(Ibid.)
Not surprisingly, he transforms the promise of heavenly rewards into an impera­
tive. Given Berkeley’s description of the emotive intention of the speaker, he 
suggests, ‘instead of saying’:
There are inconceivably pleasant joys in store for blessed souls in heaven, 
one could equally well say:
Act in accordance with what Christian doctrine prescribes as being our duty!
(Ibid.)
Berman, for his part, observes that in the Draft Berkeley seems to hold that 
St.Paul’s words do not have enough cognitive content to be true. So here it 
becomes questionable whether the ‘proposition can have cognitive content and 
can be true’ even ‘in the next life’ (See Berman 1994: 162).
On the whole, according to the emotivist reading of the Draft, Berkeley sees 
the Pauline promise as a proposition that does not evoke ideas or inform. It is 
‘cognitively empty’, or, has no cognitive meaning. In other words, it does not 
refer to, or stand for, anything. Neither is it true, Berkeley appears to think. 
However, the proposition does have an emotive meaning. For it is used by the 
speaker in order to make ‘people act in a certain way’.
Finally, Berman and Belfrage point to the ‘mechanism’ — association or 
‘customary connection’ of non-cognitive words with certain emotions, actions,
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and dispositions, without any ideas occurring in the minds of the hearer — 
which Berkeley proposes to explain how St. Paul’s ‘empty description’ can 
provoke appropriate reactions in the hearers (23, 24; Belfrage 1986b: 646, 1987: 
46-47; Berman 1994: 145, 162).
For both scholars, the way Berkeley discusses in the Draft the Pauline 
promise and other relevant examples of language use strongly supports the 
attribution of the emotive theory to him
1.4. Alciphron (1732)
According to Berman’s relevant distinction, Alciphron (1732), Berkeley’s ‘most 
comprehensive statement on religion’ (Berman 1994: 134), contains a statement 
of natural or rational theology and a defence of Christian mysteries. This is 
where, after two decades of its first publication in the Introduction to the 
Principles o f Human Knowledge (I §20), the ‘emotive theory’ comes into play 
again. The following two subsections (1.4.1. and 1.4.2.) aim to point out main 
assertions in, and features of, Berman’s reading of Alciphron.
1.4.1. The emotive theory and (utterances about) mysteries
1. Berman claims to have detected a close resemblance between Berkeley’s 
innovative theory of meaning and the emotive theory offered by (former) 
Logical Positivists, e.g. Alfred J Ayer. There is, Berman says:
no doubt that he [Berkeley] anticipates the emotive analysis of metaphysical 
and religious language offered by such (former) Logical Positivists as A. J. 
Ayer, in Language, Truth and Logic (London, 1936), chs. 1 and 6. The irony, 
of course, is that the Logical Positivists applied the emotive theory destruc­
tively to religion, whereas Berkeley used it to defend religion.
(Berman 1994: 155; cf. 1981: 229; 1993: 212)
2. In accordance with his account of the Pauline promise in the Draft 
Introduction, Berman maintains that in Alciphron, dialogue VII, the ‘emotive 
theory’ is used to explain the significance of a certain kind of religious 
utterances,4 namely those concerning Christian mysteries. The objective, again, 
Berman thinks, is to defend mysteries by showing that the relevant utterances 
are significant, despite the fact that they do not inform or stand for ideas. 
Remarkably the position advanced in the Lockean entries of the Commentaries
4 I take it that by ‘utterances’ Berman means spoken or written sentences. In his 
reading of Alciphron he is primarily concerned with emotive utterances as contrasted 
with cognitive (informative) statements. Berkeley himself makes no explicit distinction, 
using the term ‘proposition’ to cover both cases.
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and the paper Of Infinites is presented in Alciphron as a position of freethinking 
opponents. Strict cognitivism, with its application to mysteries, is represented as 
a too narrow conception of meaning which is to be rejected by friends of 
religion. By giving up the Lockean position and allowing words, which are used 
in some non-cognitive function, to be significant, Berkeley could now represent 
mysteries as being ‘emotive and not cognitive’, and therefore meaningful (Ber­
man 1994: 149).
Berkeley’s philosophical theology in Alciphron, as Berman sees it,5 relies on 
the linguistic distinction between cognitive statements and emotive utterances, 
or, more generally, between the cognitive and three non-cognitive functions of 
language. The characterization of the latter, Berman says, ‘has changed little 
between 1708, 1710 and 1732.’ The following extract from section 14 of dialo­
gue VII seems to include a lucid reformulation of the emotive theory:
Thus much, upon the whole, may be said of all signs:— that they do not 
always suggest ideas signified to the mind: that when they suggest ideas, they 
are not general abstract ideas: that they have other uses besides barely standing 
for and exhibiting ideas, such as [1] raising proper emotions, [2] producing 
certain dispositions or habits of mind, and [3] directing our actions in pursuit 
of that happiness which is the ultimate end and design, the primary spring and 
motive, that sets rational agents at work...
(Works 3: 307)
Given the mentioned distinctions, Berman accordingly endeavours to re­
construct Berkeley’s ‘linguistic’ theology. The interpretation runs as follows. 
Cognitive statements such as ‘That cow is brown’6 inform (or ‘suggest’ ideas), 
whereas emotive utterances such as ‘Cheer up!’, ‘Life’s a bore’ or ‘Get out!’ 
produce (1) emotions, (2) dispositions, and (3) actions. Both the statements and 
utterances are meaningful, the former in so far as they inform or stand for ideas, 
the latter as they provoke these reactions in hearers and readers. Statements of 
natural theology, particularly those about the existence and attributes of God, 
belong, on Berman’s reading, to the first, and utterances concerning mysteries 
to the second category. Thus the statement ‘God exists and is wise’ conveys 
some information or knowledge about God and has cognitive content. Utte­
rances concerning the Holy Trinity or a future state, on the other hand, ‘have 
little or no cognitive content’ and thus are ‘essentially emotive’ for Berkeley. 
The latter are meaningful in the sense that they produce certain emotional 
effects in those who hear or read them, and also provoke morally right actions. 
(See Berman 1981: 223-224, 227; 1993: 205-207, 210; 1994: 147-148, 159, 
162.)
5 See Berman 1981; 1993; 1994: 144-163. Berman’s interpretation in its most ela­
borated form is contained in the latter monograph.
6 The relevant examples are given by Berman (Berman 1981: 224; 1993: 206; 1994: 
148).
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Furthermore, Berman asserts, Berkeley held that certain words or names 
have ‘emotive power’ or a tendency to produce ‘emotions, habits, and actions’, 
and that words or utterances used in talking about mysteries, along with the 
words ‘matter’, ‘freethinker’ and several others are of that kind. Words may 
have, Berman continues, either positive or negative emotive power, provoking, 
respectively, desirable and undesirable effects (See Berman 1994: 150-154).
3. Berkeley’s alleged emotive theory can hardly be examined separately from 
his notion of faith. Furthermore, in dialogue VII, section 10, Berman argues, 
Berkeley ‘identifies faith with the three non-cognitive functions of language’:
Faith, I say, is not an indolent perception, but an operative persuasion of 
mind, which ever worketh some suitable action, disposition, or emotion in 
those who have it...
(Worb 3: 301)
Given that, Berman says, in dialogue VII the ‘emotive theory’ is applied to four 
specific mysteries: grace, the Holy Trinity, original sin and a future state. Thus 
in section 8 an emotive account of the Trinity is given. Berman paraphrases:
Although a man may form no distinct idea of trinity, substance, or 
personality, this does not imply, Berkeley maintains, that the mystery is 
meaningless; because it may well produce in his mind ‘love, hope, gratitude, 
and obedience, and thereby become a lively operative principle influencing 
his life and actions...’
(Berman 1994: 146-7)
The effects mentioned by Berkeley — ‘love, hope, gratitude, and obedience’ as 
well as the influence on life and actions — are taken by Berman to be effects of 
emotive utterances concerning the Trinity. These effects, Berman seems to 
think, are specific to this mystery.7 He continues:
Berkeley deals in a similar way with grace, original sin, and a future state. He 
admits that they have little or no cognitive content, but this does not prevent 
their meaningful use. Thus talk of grace has the tendency to produce good 
habits and piety; original sin can deter people from committing an evil deed, 
and a future state is likely to produce good habits and a salutary sense of one’s 
unworthiness. Religious mysteries are pragmatic; they are justified by their 
utility.
(Berman 1994: 147)
7 Berman is accompanied here by Peter Walmsley who puts it explicitly that a 
“‘proper impression” of the words [relating to the Trinity] depends on the reader’s 
having quite specific emotional responses — “love, hope, gratitude, and obedience” — 
and then acting appropriately on these feelings— “agreeably to the notion of saving 
faith”’ (Walmsley 1990: 186, emphasis added).
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Berman does not argue that in Alciphron — as he says is the case in the Draft 
Introduction — Berkeley explained this effectiveness of utterances as a 
consequence of customary connection between them and certain emotions, 
dispositions, and actions. Yet they have, as he says, a ‘tendency to’ or are 
‘likely to’, or at least ‘can’, produce these effects. On this reading, (utterances 
concerning) different mysteries have different effects and the effects, as it were, 
make or render them meaningful (See Berman 1981: 223-224; 1993: 205; 1994: 
146-147).
4. In accordance with the non-cognitivist reading of the sermon On Immortality, 
entry 720 of the Commentaries, and the Draft Introduction, Berman maintains 
that in Alciphron, too, utterances (propositions) about Christian mysteries are 
seen as giving no information whatsoever.
According to Berman, the issue whether these utterances are true for 
Berkeley, in Alciphron, remains undecided. That is, Berkeley seems to be less 
radical now than in the Draft, where a purely emotive account of afterlife is 
given. But in Alciphron too, he merely allows that propositions about grace 
‘may possibly’ be true (See Berman 1994: 161-163).
5. Berman indicates that in some passages (e.g. IV. 15 and VII. 13) Berkeley 
allows words about mysteries to be ‘symbolic expressions’ that give us ‘some 
‘glimmering’ representation of what is beyond our understanding’, but it 
remains unclear whether these expressions, in his view, have cognitive content 
(Berman 1994: 163).
1.4.2. Cognitive theology, emotive mysteries, and science
1. For Berkeley, Berman says, faith (concerning mysteries) is not “‘an act of the 
understanding”; it is an emotional act’ (Berman 1982: 164). However, faith 
concerning, or talk of, mysteries, according to his interpretation, does rely on 
‘cognitive theology’. Thus, he insists, the emotive effectiveness of talk of 
mysteries rests on our background belief in the existence of a good, wise, and 
just God, whose existence Berkeley undertakes to prove in dialogue IV. For ‘in 
order to believe sensibly in mysteries’, Berman says, ‘we must, according to 
Berkeley, first believe that there is a God.’ If ‘the God of theism [...] did not 
exist’, he continues, ‘then there would hardly be much point in speaking about 
his grace or his three-in-one nature’ (Berman 1994: 134-135; cf. 1981: 219; 
1993: 200). Put in terms of the basic linguistic distinction, cognitive statements 
of natural or rational theology — so Berman says — support emotive utterances 
about mysteries (Berman 1981: 224; 1993: 207; 1994: 148).
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2. The belief in, and knowledge of, the perfections of God is related to faith 
(concerning mysteries) in a specific way, Berman explains:
Because we know from the optic language that God is good, wise, knowing, 
and just, we must also realize that we ought to act and feel in certain ways. 
Because God is just, it is right to be fearful of doing the wrong thing; and it 
is imperative to develop such moral habits. Because God is good, it is right 
to love him; because he is wise and knowing, it is appropriate to respect him 
(Ale. IV, 18). Now, in Berkeley’s view, belief in the Christian mysteries is an 
excellent way of bringing about these desirable ends. Nothing will so 
effectively make people fear God’s justice as the mystery of a future state. 
Similarly, the best way of bringing people to love God is by means of the 
symbolism embodied in the Holy Trinity.
(Berman 1994: 147, emphasis added; cf. 1981: 224; 1993: 206)
Unlike the cognitive talk of God and his attributes, the emotive talk of mysteries 
is not intended to express or communicate knowledge. The purpose is to make 
us ‘act and feel in certain ways’, that is, to make us perform morally right 
actions and to have certain attitude towards God: to fear his justice and to love 
him (ibid.). This exegesis of the relevant passages in Alciphron clearly follows 
the same pattern as that of the Pauline promise in the Draft (see sect. 1.3.2. 
above).
3. Berkeley’s apology has one more salient facet, to wit, in Berman’s words, 
‘the defence and illustration of mysteries by parity of reasoning’. In dialogue 
VII of Alciphron, sects. 7 and 11-14, he makes use of the method of ‘parity of 
reasoning’ for apologetic purposes. That is, he compares religious mysteries 
with certain cherished tenets in philosophy and science, e.g. the ‘doctrine of 
force’, with the view to show that the latter are no more comprehensible than 
the former (See Berman 1981: 226-227; 1993: 209-210; 1994: 156-158).
To summarize all aspects of Berkeley’s ‘emotive account of mysteries’, 
Berman says:
Berkeley’s defence of religious mysteries has, broadly speaking, three prongs 
or components: (i) utterances about mysteries are shown to be essentially 
emotive; (ii) while justified pragmatically, by their effectiveness, they are also 
supported and evaluated by rational theology; (iii) their apparent obscurities 
and difficulties are shown to have parallels in the received theories of the most 
admired thinkers of the time, Locke and Newton. Hence one must either 
accept religious mysteries or reject them along with cherished philosophical, 
mathematical, and scientific mysteries.
(Berman 1994: 159; cf. 1981: 227; 1993: 210)
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1.5. Summary of the non-cognitivist interpretation
Belfrage’s and Berman’s account of the early development of Berkeley’s views 
on meaning, and Berman’s emotivist reading of Alciphron, may be summarized 
thus. In Berkeley’s early works, a radical doctrinal shift reflecting a sudden 
change in his view on semantics can be discerned. For in the paper Of Infinites
(1707) and the Philosophical Commentaries (1707-1708), up to entry 696, 
Berkeley adhered to a strict, Lockean, cognitivist position, which entails that 
every meaningful sign (including words [terms] and mathematical signs) stands 
for an idea. But in the sermon On Immortality as well as the ‘later entries’ of the 
Commentaries, the austere cognitivist view is abandoned. Now at least some 
words which do not stand for ideas, and some propositions which do not inform, 
are seen as legitimate and meaningful. Notable in this respect is entry 720, 
where a clear distinction between two radically different kinds of proposition — 
cognitive and non-cognitive — is made. After that, in the Draft Introduction
(1708), an ‘emotive theory’ of meaning is introduced.
According to the theory, words can be, and are, used not only to signify, and 
‘communicate’ ideas (in other words, to inform), but also to evoke (1) emotions,
(2) dispositions, and (3) actions. In the first case they have a cognitive, in the 
second, an emotive, meaning.
An outline of the theory is published in the Introduction to the Principles of 
Human Knowledge (1710). After two decades the theory reappears in Alciphron 
(1732), where it is incorporated into Berkeley’s defence of natural and revealed 
religion against freethinkers’ objections.
Belfrage’s and Berman’s reconstruction of Berkeley’s early development up 
to the appearance of the ‘emotive theory’ in the Draft, as well as the emotivist 
account of Alciphron, turn on their understanding of Berkeley’s view on what 
they call ‘non-cognitive’ propositions in Scripture. More precisely, the 
attribution of both the earlier non-cognitivism and the later emotive theory to 
Berkeley hinges on the interpretation of a number of passages (in some of the 
writings referred to above) which concern propositions related to Christian 
mysteries (such as the Pauline promise of heavenly rewards, or the talk of the 
grace of God, in the New Testament). In these scholars’ opinion, such 
propositions are seen as ‘non-cognitive’, ‘non-descriptive’ or ‘non-informative’ 
in all of Berkeley’s relevant texts, and in addition, ‘emotive’ in the Draft and 
Alciphron. In other words, they think that, for Berkeley, the propositions in 
question, firstly, do not evoke ideas or inform — that is, they do not give us the 
least knowledge of anything; secondly, are used merely to provoke certain 
emotional effects, and actions; thirdly, are ‘cognitively empty’, and therefore 
not true, for us.
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CHAPTER 2. 
ARGUMENTS AGAINST 
THE NON-COGNITIVIST INTERPRETATION
2.1. No clash between the paper and the sermon
I shall not directly argue either for or against the historical reconstruction 
offered by Berman and Belfrage of the presentation of the paper Of Infinites, 
and the alleged disputation with Browne, King or other ‘educated Irish 
Anglicans’. For the question whether Berkeley’s radical change of mind was 
occasioned by criticisms from that audience makes sense only if it is shown that 
the doctrinal clash is indeed discernible in his writings. This section is 
concerned with Berman’s and Belfrage’s thesis that the view on the meaning of 
‘non-cognitive’ terms and propositions taken in the sermon On Immortality is in 
direct contradiction to the one put forward in the paper.
In what follows I shall express a few doubts about this account and hope to 
produce some evidence against it.
First, it seems highly unlikely that before reading the paper Berkeley was not 
aware of the theological implications of the current discussion on ‘infinites’, or 
did not realize the significance of the term ‘infinite’, or, more widely, of the 
notion of infinity, in religious discourse.
On the contrary, as Wolfgang Breidert points out, the very criticism of the 
new mathematical doctrine of infinitesimals may have had a religious 
motivation.8 For previously the employment of the notion of infinity had been a 
privilege of theology (See Breidert 1989: 93-94). Further, Breidert says:
Der Vortrag zeigt— abgesehen vom Philosophischen Tagebuch—, daß 
BERKELEYS Denken mindestens seit 1707 auf eine Kritik an der 
Infinitesimalmathematik ausgerichtet war, und diese Kritik war von Anfang 
an auch mit theologischen Problemen verknüpft, jedenfalls dürfte das 
Interesse, das diese Fragen für BERKELEY hatten, theologische bzw. 
religionspolitische Motive haben. Eine solche Verbindung liegt in der 
abendländischen Tradition nahe, in der die Unendlichkeit das wichtigste 
Merkmal göttlicher Attribute ist. Wer den Begriff der Unendlichkeit 
gebrauchte, rührte damit immer auch an theologische Probleme.
(Breidert 1989: 94)
Thus in the intellectual environment in which Berkeley developed his ideas, 
infinity was seen as ‘the most important characteristic of divine attributes’, 
which means that to use the notion (or, one could add, the relevant terms, 
including ‘infinite’) unavoidably meant to touch theological problems.
A similar point has been made by Ben Vermeulen (Vermeulen 1985).
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In the light of this, the idea that Berkeley, the young Christian apologist, 
while writing the paper, did not realize the theological implications of what he 
says about the ‘infinites’ looks bizarre. And it is hard to take seriously the 
contention that until a certain time (the ‘Lockean’) Berkeley thought, in a 
contextual vacuum, the term ‘infinite’ was ‘illegitimate’ or ‘meaningless’, but 
then, after reading the paper, changed his mind and started to think that it is 
‘legitimate’, though ‘non-cognitive’. There is simply no reason to make him 
look so ingenuous as Berman and Belfrage want to have it.
On the other hand, it seems clear that the two texts, the sermon regarding 
afterlife and the paper on infinitesimals, are remarkably different as to their 
content, even though there is the common element Belfrage and Berman insist 
on, to wit, the term ‘infinite’, in one case being used in a mathematical and in 
the other in religious context. In this connection, it is hard to understand 
Belfrage’s suggestion that the sermon contains a demonstration in which the 
term ‘infinite’ is used in a way contradicting the position of the paper. I can see 
no sign in the sermon of a new semantic position being endorsed in the 
framework of a discussion on the ‘proper use of terms in valid demonstrations.’ 
This is clearly not the problem the sermon deals with. Berkeley reflects rather 
on why people do not bother to think about immortality or eternal happiness and 
‘scarce do any thing for the obtaining it’ (Works 7: 11). The cause being that we 
have ‘no determin’d idea of the pleasures of Heaven’ (Works 7: 13), that is, we 
make use of our imagination to conceive the latter, but they remain 
transcendent. For Berkeley, of course, the bliss in Heaven is eternal and infinite, 
regardless of his view on infinitesimals (and demonstrations in mathematics). 
There is, in fact, nothing extraordinary or revolutionary in his use of the term 
‘infinite’ in religious context.
I agree with Belfrage that, in the sermon, Berkeley takes the words ‘infinite 
eternal bliss’ etc. to stand for something real outside the scope of human 
knowledge in this life. Thus in the following passage:
Whoever beheld a Xtian would straightway take him for a pilgrim on earth 
walking in ye direct path to Heaven. So regardless should he be of the things 
of this life, so full of the next & so free from yt vice & corruption wch at 
present stains our profession, if then we can discover how it comes to pass yt 
our desire of life & immortality is so weak & ineffectual, we shall in some 
measure see into the cause of those many contradictions wch are too 
conspicuous betwixt the faith & practice of Xtians. & be able to solve yt 
great riddle namely yt men should think infinite eternal bliss within their 
reach & scarce do any thing for the obtaining it.
(Works 7: 11)
However, I cannot see why should we think Berkeley adhered to the same view 
neither before nor after the sermon. Quite a natural supposition would be that he 
always did. In this respect, I tend to agree with Robert McKim when he says:
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It seems plain that Berkeley, as an Anglican cleric, ought not to have been 
satisfied with ensuring only a non-cognitive meaning for religious discourse. 
Surely he thought that propositions which express orthodox Christian views 
about God, the afterlife, and so on, describe how things are.
(McKim 1985: 157, emphasis added)
In fact, I think, Belfrage has not produced persuasive evidence for the claim that 
in the later writings the position of the sermon has been rejected. I shall say 
more on that in the sections below. For now it suffices to say that the belief 
(which is natural for a Christian philosopher like Berkeley to hold), that the 
relevant propositions about afterlife ‘describe how things are’, is perfectly 
compatible with what he later says about the influence of such propositions on 
human minds and actions.
Belfrage’s and Berman’s assertion that, for Berkeley, such propositions do 
not inform, can also be questioned. For he speaks in the sermon of ‘those new 
discover’d regions of life & immortality’ (Works 7: 10). So, one would think, 
we have been informed of something (by means of relevant propositions), 
namely, the eternal happiness, which is possible for us to gain, and this is what 
Berkeley admonishes us to believe. In the light of this, a further objection to 
Belfrage’s reading of the sermon arises. His explanation of why Berkeley 
rejected the ‘metaphysical descriptions’ view is that it leads to the ‘absurd 
consequence’ that we ought to believe ‘in the existence of unknown things’ of 
which we have no idea (Belfrage 1986a: 323-324). Belfrage’s claim, however, 
is too strong. For, according to the sermon, we know the desirable thing to be 
eternal happiness, or everlasting pleasures:
1st we have no determin’d idea of the pleasures of Heaven & therefore they 
may not so forcibly engage us in the contemplation of them. 2dly they are the 
less thought on because we imagine them at a great distance, as to ye 1st, ’tis 
true we can in this life have no determin’d idea of the pleasures of the next & 
yt because of their surpassing, transcendent nature wch is not suited to our 
present weak & narrow faculties. But this methinks should suffice yt they 
shall be excellent beyond ye compass of our imagination, yt they shall be 
such as God wise, powerfull & good shall think fit to honour & bless his 
saints withall.
(Works 7: 13)
Note that, for Berkeley, we imagine these eternal pleasures. It is also to be noted 
that the passage is introduced to explain why ‘we never think, we never reason 
about ‘(ye revelation of) life & immortality’ (ibid., emphasis added). This does 
not look as an admittance of a complete ignorance of what is believed in, even 
though the ideas of things in this world we use for imagining the eternal
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happiness, are not adequate representations of the supernatural (Works 7: 12),9 
so that we have but St. Paul’s ‘empty description’ of it.
Berman acknowledges to some extent the relevance of metaphorical 
representations in this context for Berkeley. However, in the light of the 
foregoing considerations, his description of Berkeley’s position in the sermon as 
a ‘new non-Lockean, non-cognitive semantics’ or ‘a non-cognitive view of 
statements about religious mystery’ is strongly exaggerated. Berkeley’s use of 
the term ‘infinite’ in religious context should be seen as a commonplace rather 
than a manifestation of a new revolutionary theory of meaning. In the sermon 
he merely observes that by ‘our present weak & narrow faculties’ we cannot 
grasp the infinite pleasures of the life to come. He seems to take the pleasures to 
be there and to be infinite. And, accordingly, he does not seem to think that we 
know absolutely nothing of them, although we are unable to form a ‘determin’d 
idea’ of them.
My main point here is that the sermon hardly counts as a persuasive evi­
dence of a sudden and radical change in Berkeley’s view regarding semantics.
If, as the case appears to be, Berkeley was aware of the theological 
implications of the debate on infinitesimals, or, more generally, on infinity, and 
if the position expressed in the sermon is neither unique in Berkeley’s writings 
nor revolutionary from the semantic point of view, then it seems to follow that 
no ‘clash on semantics’ or ‘semantic revolution’ can be discerned in what he 
says on the infinite or infinity in his paper and sermon. This, however, is not to 
say that no clash may have taken place at all. Therefore I proceed to the alleged 
parallel development in the Philosophical Commentaries.
2.2. Entry 720 and ‘non-cognitive’ propositions in Scripture
It does seem that in the course of writing Notebook A Berkeley abandoned the 
principle that ‘we ought to use no sign without an idea answering it’ (Of 
Infinites) or ‘No word to be used without an idea’ (Commentaries, entry 356) 
and, accordingly, his view on the use of signs in mathematics changed into a 
more ‘pragmatic’ one. However, as I just asserted, the sermon On Immortality 
does not support Berman’s and Belfrage’s thesis that the change in Berkeley’s 
thought on meaning took place in a remarkably short period of time, that is, 
between 19 November 1707 and 11 January 1708.
Now I want to argue that the further evidence they have drawn from the 
Commentaries concerning the dramatic shift from strict cognitivism to the 
acceptance of some non-cognitive terms and propositions (as being meaning­
9 Similar remarks can be found in Berkeley’s later works, e.g. the essays The Future 
State and Immortality in The Guardian (1713), Works 7: 181-184, 183-184; 222-224, 
223.
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ful), is far from convincing. More precisely, I have in view their reading of 
entry 720 as opposed to entry 696.
In entry 696, indeed, Berkeley adheres to the strict semantic principle:
Let him [the Reader] beware that I do not impose on him by plausible empty 
talk that common dangerous way of cheating men into absurditys. Let him 
not regard my Words any otherwise than as occasions of bringing into his 
mind determin’d [ideas crossed out] significations so far as they fail of this 
they are Gibberish, Jargon & deserve not the name of Language.
In entry 720, the principle or a related rule or criterion is confined to ‘Matters of 
Reason & Philosophy’:
When I say I will reject all Propositions wherein I know not [the full ordinary 
crossed out] fully & adequately & clearly so far as knowable the Thing 
meant thereby This is not to be extended to propositions in the Scripture. I 
speak of Matters of Reason & Philosophy not Revelation, In this I think an 
Humble Implicit faith becomes us just (where we cannot [fully crossed out] 
comprehend & Understand the proposition) such as a popish peasant gives to 
propositions he hears at Mass in Latin. This proud men call blind, popish, 
implicit, irrational, for my part I think it more irrational to pretend to dispute 
at cavil & ridicule [things crossed out] holy mysteries i. e propositions about 
things out of our reach that are altogether above our knowlege out of our 
reach. Wn I shall come to plenary knowlege of the Meaning of any Text then 
I shall yield an explicit belief. Introd:
Berkeley does indeed allow here an exception to the strict rule formulated in the 
beginning of the entry. I do not believe, however, that the ‘Matters of 
Revelation’ in general and ‘propositions about things out of our reach’ in 
particular are understood here in the way Belfrage and Berman think they are.
For one thing, again, it seems natural to suppose that Berkeley thought such 
propositions really do concern, or are about, ‘things out of our reach’, and, 
further, as ‘Matters of Revelation’, reveal something about them. This, I think, 
can be concluded regardless of the issue of whether or how he would have 
explained the content of revelation in terms of ideas.
As for the meaning of these propositions, Berkeley admits he knows not 
‘fully & adequately & clearly so far as knowable the Thing meant thereby.’ 
This is clearly not to say that the propositions have no ‘cognitive meaning’ 
whatsoever or that we know absolutely nothing of the ‘Thing meant thereby’. 
Rather we know what is meant by them, but only in so far as it has been 
revealed. We know from Scripture, say, to take an example from the sermon On 
Immortality, that the faithful will obtain ‘eternal happiness’. According to the 
sermon, people try to conceive of that state of everlasting happiness by means 
of ‘pleasant ideas’ such as ‘green meadows, fragrant groves, refreshing shades, 
crystal streams’ (Works 7: 12). And yet, our fancy being weak, the desirable 
‘pleasures of Heaven’ or ‘coelestial joys’ remain hidden from us at present 
(Works 1: 13).
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These reflections in the sermon very well confirm with entry 720, for 
propositions about eternal happiness or ‘coelestial joys’ are nothing but 
‘propositions about things out of our reach’.
It appears that the chief point Berkeley makes in entry 720 is not about the 
meaning of the propositions in Scripture. In matters of revelation, he insists, ‘an 
Humble Implicit faith becomes us just (where we cannot comprehend & 
Understand the proposition) such as a popish peasant gives to propositions he 
hears at Mass in Latin’. Berkeley’s point, I think, is that we ought to assent to 
the relevant propositions in Scripture, that is, to believe what has been said 
about the mysterious things, although we do not understand this talk 
completely. His comparison implies that these propositions can be understood 
to some extent. For presumably the ‘popish peasant’ has some idea of what is 
being said at ‘Mass in Latin’. The last sentence of the entry also suggests that, 
in our present life, we lack complete understanding of the propositions in 
question.10
Thus, contrary to Belfrage’s suggestion, Berkeley, in contrasting ‘Matters of 
Reason & Philosophy’ with ‘Matters of Revelation’, does not introduce a rough 
distinction between the two completely different kinds of propositions: 
cognitive (informative) and non-cognitive (non-informative). What he does in 
effect, I propose, is that he distinguishes between propositions to be examined, 
and accepted or rejected, on the basis of reason, and those to be accepted on the 
basis of faith. Likewise in entry 584 he contrasts ‘implicit faith’ with reasoning 
and demonstrations:
There may be Demonstrations used even in Divinity. I mean in reveal’d 
Theology, as contradistinguish’d from natural, for tho the Principles may be 
founded in Faith yet this hinders not but that legitimate Demonstrations 
might be [drawn crossed out] built thereon. Provided still that we define the 
words we use & never go beyond our Ideas. Hence ‘twere no very hard 
matter for those who hold Episcopacy or Monarchy to be establish’d jure 
Divino. to demonstrate their Doctrines if they are true. But to pretend to 
demonstrate or reason any thing about the Trinity is absurd here an implicit 
Faith becomes us.
There is hardly any doubt, I think, that Berkeley held the relevant propositions 
in Scripture to be true, regardless of his philosophical views on language, 
signification, ideas, metaphors, etc. Not so on Berman’s reading, as I explained 
in the previous chapter. However, he has offered no evidence for the claim 
implied by his reading that Berkeley did not hold the orthodox view, which 
entails that these propositions are true just because they come from God, who 
never lies. The view derived by Berman from entry 720, that such propositions 
cannot be true in this life and can be true in the next, seems incomprehensible. 
To my knowledge Berkeley has nowhere in his writings suggested that
10 For the latter details of interpretation I owe thanks to Robert McKim.
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propositions concerning the Trinity, divinity of Christ and the like may not be 
true (for us). I shall discuss this issue more fully in the section on Alciphron.
So far I have raised some objections to the account given by Belfrage and 
Berman of the early development of Berkeley’s thought about meaning.
Firstly, there appears to be no evidence that Berkeley repudiated the 
principle ‘No word to be used without an idea’ during that particular period o f 
time, to wit, between 19 November 1707 and 11 January 1708.
The occurrence of the term ‘infinite’ in the sermon in the context of talking 
about afterlife is not surprising, unique, or revolutionary. The term is used there 
to express a commonplace theological position rather than a new position in 
semantics.
Secondly, neither in the sermon nor in entry 720 propositions related to 
divine mysteries are seen as being ‘cognitively empty’ and thus possibly not 
true for us (human beings in this world). For Berkeley seems to allow some 
knowledge to be imparted by them. At the same time, unlike Berman, he does 
not seem to link the truth of such propositions to the ‘amount’ of their 
‘cognitive content’.
I wish to stress, finally, that the central point made in entry 720 concerns 
faith , more precisely, assent to the propositions in question, rather than their 
meaning.
It is worthwhile to keep these reflections in mind whilst interpreting 
Berkeley’s later works. I proceed now to the Draft Introduction.
2.3. Draft Introduction
2.3.1. Berkeley’s new doctrine and the‘emotive theory’
I will not discuss here whether Berkeley’s account of language and meaning, in 
the Draft Introduction, is the first of its kind in the history of philosophy.11 But I 
want to discuss Belfrage’s and Berman’s alleged discovery of the doctrine 
which they call an ‘emotive theory’.
Berkeley maintains in the Draft that words can be meaningfully used without 
evoking ideas in the minds of readers or hearers inasmuch as language has other 
ends or uses (25, cited above). The same point is famously made in § 20 of the 
published Introduction to the Principles, where Berkeley appears to have 
summarized the substance of his reflections in the Draft on these matters:
Besides, the communicating of ideas marked by words is not the chief and 
only end of language, as is commonly supposed. There are other ends, as the 
raising of some passion, the exciting to, or deterring from an action, the 
putting the mind in some particular disposition; to which the former is in
11 See Stewart 1989/1990: 16; Brykman 1993: 191.
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many cases barely subservient, and sometimes entirely omitted, when these 
can be obtained without it, as I think does not infrequently happen in the 
familiar use of language. I entreat the reader to reflect with himself, and see if 
it doth not often happen either in hearing or reading a discourse, that the 
passions of fear, love, hatred, admiration, disdain, and the like arise, 
immediately in his mind upon the perception of certain words, without any 
ideas coming between. At first, indeed, the words might have occasioned 
ideas that were fit to produce those emotions; but, if I mistake not, it will be 
found that when language is once grown familiar, the hearing of the sounds 
or sight of the characters is oft immediately attended with those passions, 
which at first were wont to be produced by the intervention of ideas, that are 
now quite omitted. May we not, for example, be affected with the promise of 
a good thing, though we have not an idea of what it is?...
There may be more or less significant differences between the published 
account of language and meaning, and that in the Draft. But clearly, the core of 
Berkeley’s new doctrine remains the same: language has ‘other ends’ or ‘other 
uses’ besides the ‘communicating of ideas’ (which is not to deny that prior to a 
given occasion of such language use the words used ‘might have occasioned 
ideas’). The substance of the doctrine is stated again in Alciphron VII, sects. 5 
and 14.
Belfrage and Berman, I want to emphasize, do not assert that the doctrine 
published in the Principles (and Alciphron) differs from the one in the Draft in 
any substantial respect.12 For they assert, respectively, that Berkeley published 
his ‘emotive theory’ in the Principles (Berman 1994: 146), and that after 
writing the Draft he ‘did not abandon his theory of emotive meaning, he 
expanded his view on non-referential usage’ (Belfrage 1986b: 647, emphasis 
added). The extract from the Draft they refer to as the one embodying the 
‘emotive theory’ (25) is very similar in wording to the beginning of the passage 
just quoted.
The question I want to put is whether we are enlightened by being told that 
the ‘other ends’ or ‘other uses’ of language, as Berkeley himself calls them, 
constitute ‘non-cognitive functions of language’, or that words used for a ‘good 
purpose’ other than the ‘communicating of ideas’ have an ‘emotive meaning’, 
or that his doctrine is an ‘emotive theory’ of meaning.
Now, both before and after Belfrage’s and Berman’s ‘discovery’, Berkeley’s 
account of the ‘other uses’ of language has been pointed at, and more or less 
comprehensively considered, by a number of scholars,13 some of whom also
12 Genevieve Brykman, on the other hand, sees a significant difference: ‘the generally 
admitted correspondence between words and ideas is, in the first draft of the 
Introduction, a very small part of what could be taken to constitute the meaning of 
words’ (Brykman 1982/1983: 14).
13 See e.g. Warnock 1953: 73-76, Rauter 1961: 402, Hay 1970: 38, Bennett 1971: 52-  
58; Flew 1974; Tipton 1994 (1974): 140-141, 283-284; Kearney 1975: 292-293;
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speak of ‘emotive uses’ of language in these contexts, at the same time not 
ascribing ethical emotivism to Berkeley.14
It is true that, as a rule, only the published Introduction has been considered 
by scholars. However, given the fact that Belfrage and Berman themselves take 
the doctrine stated in the Principles to be basically the same as the one 
expressed in the Draft, they do not seem to add anything of importance 
concerning the very account o f the ‘other uses’ o f language in Berkeley’s 
works, except, perhaps, the claim that when language is used for some other 
purpose than to ‘communicate’ ideas, then it is not informative (not used 
informatively).15
A remarkable feature of their exegesis of the Draft and section 20 of the 
published Introduction to the Principles, but also of Berman’s reading of 
Alciphron, is the extensive use o f anachronistic terminology. They try and claim 
to elucidate Berkeley’s doctrine, as a number of scholars before them, but, in 
effect, I think, the description of it as an ‘emotive theory’ hardly suggests 
anything besides misleading associations. In this respect, I agree with M. A. 
Stewart’s critical comments regarding Belfrage’s interpretation of the Draft 
(See Stewart 1989/1990: 15-17). Among other things, Stewart says:
an unfortunate consequence of the anachronistic labelling [‘emotive theory of 
meaning’ or ‘theory of emotive meaning’] is that, besides misleading the 
commentator into adopting 20th-century analogues, it suggests a historical 
doctrine which Berkeley never contemplates, that there are uses of language 
which, without explicitly asserting that anything is the case, express or 
evince the feelings of the speaker.
(Stewart 1989/1990: 16)
Woozley 1976: 429^130, 432-433; Pitcher 1977: 78-79, 88, 250, 259; Land 1978: 10- 
13; 1986: 79-89; Nuchelmans 1983: 147-154; Brykman 1984: 299-324; 1993: 189- 
224; Formigari 1988: 130; Bonk 1997: 66-69; Dancy 1998: 197; Williford 2000, ch. 1. 
Also see M. W. Beal’s account of Berkeley’s ‘conditions of meaningfulness’ (Beal 
1971: 505-512).
14 See Stroll 1954: 22-25, Olscamp 1970, ch. 5. By calling Berkeley’s doctrine an 
‘emotive theory’, note, Belfrage and Berman do not ascribe an emotive theory of ethics 
to him. For what we have in the Draft is, according to them, a theory of various non- 
cognitive/emotive uses of language. Only one of Berkeley’s examples— ‘Such an 
action is honourable’ —  is referred to as ‘a value statement’ by Belfrage. In his opinion, 
Berkeley uses the statement merely as ‘an example of emotive, non-cognitive, usage’ 
(Belfrage 1987: 49). In this connection it is remarkable that Stephen Clark does ascribe 
ethical emotivism to Berkeley (See Clark 1985: 240-241, 244). Alan White speaks of 
‘hints in Berkeley of what we may call an ‘emotive’ or an ‘imperative’ theory of ethics’ 
(White: 1955: 178).
15 To be precise, A. D. Woozley (Woozley 1976: 429) has made a similar point.
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Berman, true, appears to see the point when he remarks:
Berkeley’s emotive theory can also be criticized. One shortcoming is that he 
failed to see that, while non-cognitive words are able to evoke emotions, for 
instance, conversely emotions are able to evoke words; that is, language has 
an expressive function, as in ‘Oh dear!’ and ‘Gosh!’
(Berman 1994: 161)
In any case, to avoid obscurity and delusion, it would be better, I think, not to 
describe Berkeley’s doctrine in terms of the ‘emotive theory’, that is, to make 
use of such expressions as ‘emotive meaning’, ‘cognitive meaning’, ‘cognitive 
content’, 1 non-cognitive propositions’, ‘descriptive information’, etc, in this 
context.
Belfrage’s reply to Stewart (Belfrage 1991), it has to be noted, does not 
address the problem of using misleading anachronistic terms.
2.3.2. The Pauline promise reconsidered
I return now to the Pauline promise. For, according to Berman and Belfrage, in 
the Draft it is interpreted differently than in the sermon, and, in a way that 
strongly supports the attribution of the emotive theory to Berkeley. As 
explained in the first chapter, for Berman, merely a new, emotivist component 
is added in the Draft to the non-cognitivism already present in the sermon and 
entry 720 of the Commentaries. For Belfrage, on the other hand, the position 
adopted in the Draft diverges essentially from that in the sermon insofar as 
Berkeley has now rejected the idea of ‘metaphysical descriptions’ of 
transcendent reality.
In both scholars’ opinion, Berkeley, in the Draft, offers an emotive account 
of St. Paul’s promise of heavenly rewards. This reading is mistaken, I believe. 
The crucial passage is this:
But farther, to make it evident that Words may be used to good purpose 
without bringing into the Mind determinate Ideas, I shall add this Instance. 
We are told [that] the Good Things which God hath prepared for them that 
love him are such as Eye hath not seen nor Ear heard nor hath it enter’d into 
the Heart of Man to conceive. What man will pretend to say these Words of 
the Inspir’d Writer are empty and insignificant? And yet who is there that 
can say they bring into his Mind clear and determinate Ideas or in Truth any 
Ideas at all of the Good Things in store for them that love God? It may 
perhaps be said that those Words lay before us the clear and determinate 
abstract Ideas of Good in general and Thing in general, but I am afraid it will 
be found that those very abstract Ideas are every whit as remote from the 
Comprehension of Men as the particular pleasures of the Saints in Heaven. 
But, say you, those Words of the Apostle must have some import They 
cannot be suppos’d to have been utter’d without all meaning and design
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whatsoever. I answer the saying is very weighty and carrys with it a great 
design, but it is not to raise in the Minds of Men the Abstract Ideas of Thing 
or Good nor yet the particular Ideas of the Joys of the Blessed. The Design is 
to make them more chearfull and fervent in their Duty.
(22, 23)
The passage has in fact much more in common with the sermon On Immortality 
and entry 720 of the Commentaries than Berman and Belfrage recognize. 
Firstly, note that here again it is pointed to the weakness of our mental 
capacities (with respect to transcendent heavenly pleasures): the relevant 
abstract ideas are ‘as remote from the Comprehension of Men as the particular 
pleasures of the Saints in Heaven’. To put it differently, we are unable to form 
and communicate ideas of the latter. A little later Berkeley says: ‘4is evident 
the Apostle never intended the Words [Good things] should [mark out to] our 
Understandings the Ideas of those particular Things our Faculties never attain’d 
to’ (24). St. Paul’s words are not intended to evoke such ideas in our minds 
since we cannot have such ideas. This, however, secondly, is not to say that the 
words ‘good things’ in the proposition ‘the Good Things which God hath 
prepared for them that love him ...’ do not (as Belfrage puts it) ‘refer to’, or, in 
Berkeley’s terms, stand for, heavenly rewards. I cannot see whence it follows 
that, contrary to the view brought forward in the sermon, Berkeley now thinks 
‘good things’, in this context, do not stand for good things in Heaven. The 
‘customary connection’ account (23, 24) does not entail that. To say, as 
Berkeley does, that the purpose of the talk of heavenly rewards is to make 
people ‘more chearfull and fervent in their Duty’, which effect may follow 
without forming ‘the Abstract Ideas of Thing or Good nor yet the particular 
Ideas of the Joys of the Blessed’, is not to deny the reality of these rewards. For 
the duty is to love God and behave in such a way as to obtain the desirable 
‘good things’, ‘eternal life’ or ‘eternal happiness’ (See Works 7: 10-14, 28-29, 
34, 46, 115). I am in agreement here with Paul Olscamp (Olscamp 1970: 153) 
and Kenneth Wayne Williford (Williford 2000: 43-^14).
So it seems to be taken for granted in the passage that there are desirable 
‘Good Things which God hath prepared for those that love him’, and these 
things are beyond our comprehension in this life.
Thirdly, it seems clear that if St. Paul had not ‘referred to’ the mysterious 
things in Heaven, nobody would have ever talked about them.
Now, in the light of these clarifications, the Pauline promise, relating to 
supernatural realm, can hardly be termed an ‘ordinary speech act’ that, 
according to Belfrage, Berkeley’s alleged ‘emotive theory’ was applied to. On 
the contrary, this is quite an extraordinary speech act, which is by no means 
equivalent to the imperative ‘Act in accordance with what Christian doctrine 
prescribes as being our duty!’
Whether one calls Berkeley’s account of the ‘other uses’ of language an 
‘emotive theory’ or otherwise might not be a substantial issue. What matters
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here is the following. Berman’s and Belfrage’s reconstruction of Berkeley’s 
early development from austere cognitivism towards the ‘emotive theory’ relies 
(to a significant extent) on their interpretation of his remarks on the Pauline 
description of Heaven. This interpretation, however, looks seriously flawed. For 
neither in the sermon On Immortality nor in the Draft the words of St. Paul 
seem to be considered ‘non-cognitive’ (‘non-informative’) in the sense 
explained by these scholars. That is, in these works, Berkeley rather assumes 
that by his mystical description St. Paul has made something known to 
mankind, namely, that there are inestimable rewards in Heaven to be obtained 
by the pious.
2.4. Alciphron
I have divided my objections to, and comments on, Berman’s emotivist reading 
of Alciphron into two subsections, first of which dealing primarily with the 
issues of language and meaning that, however, are closely related to Berkeley’s 
conception of faith, and the second with the relation between natural and 
revealed religion as well as faith and science.
2.4.1. Faith, truth, revelation, and signification
1. Berman refers to chs. 1 and 6 of A. J. Ayer’s Language, Truth and Logic as 
places where an ‘emotive analysis of metaphysical and religious language’ is 
given, an analysis allegedly anticipated by Berkeley in the Draft Introduction 
and Alciphron. However, Ayer’s book does not contain such an analysis. For he 
offers an emotivist account of the meaning of ‘ethical statements’ such as 
‘exhortations to moral virtue’, and ‘ethical judgements’ of the type ‘x is wrong’, 
but metaphysical and religious statements or utterances are taken to be literally 
insignificant or nonsensical by him.16 It is true that, unlike Berkeley, Ayer 
considers only relevant utterances of theism, not of the revealed religion 
(including mysteries). But still it is not correct to state that Ayer’s emotive 
analysis of religious language has been anticipated by Berkeley.
It is worth of inquiring, nonetheless, whether Berkeley, in Alciphron, 
dialogue VII, as Berman claims the case to be, made use of an ‘emotive theory’ 
to explain the significance of utterances concerning Christian mysteries.
2. To begin with, I want to spell out some preliminary reasons to oppose 
Berman’s ascription of a distinction between cognitive statements of rational 
theology and emotive utterances concerning mysteries to Berkeley.
16 See Ayer 1990, ch 6. For this objection I owe thanks to Tom Stoneham and Tiiu 
Hallap.
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Berman tends to regard Christian mysteries as if they were (for Berkeley) 
nothing more than (emotive, non-cognitive) words or utterances. Consider, for 
example, the following passage where he links Berkeley’s account of mysteries 
to Toland’s view:
that if a word does not signify a distinct idea, then it is meaningless; and that 
since Christian mysteries do not stand for ideas, they must be as meaningless 
as ‘Blictri’.
Now Berkeley accepted part of Toland’s claim, namely, that religious 
mysteries do not signify distinct ideas; but this does not imply, Berkeley 
urged, that they are meaningless. That conclusion only follows if one accepts 
the Lockean either/or [...] that words either communicate ideas and are 
meaningful, or do not signify ideas and are meaningless.
(Berman 1994: 148-9; cf. 1981: 225; 1993: 207.)
Mysteries appear to be regarded here as words rather than something signified, 
meant or expressed by them. More generally it could be said that in the passages 
describing the alleged ‘emotive theory’, Berman describes Christian mysteries 
as bearing characteristics that he ascribes to words, statements and utterances 
such as being ‘emotive’, having ‘little or no cognitive content’, standing or not 
standing for ideas, etc. (See Berman 1981: 223-5; 1993: 205-8; 1994: 145-149, 
162.)
On the other hand he frequently distinguishes between mysteries and their 
verbal expressions or the terms signifying them:
By skilfully using some of the critical results of his early work in philosophy 
and philosophy of science, Berkeley tries to show that there is nothing 
‘absurd or repugnant’ in the Christian mysteries. Thus he contends that while 
it is hard to understand grace, it is not any harder than understanding the 
scientist’s concept of force; although both ‘grace’ and ‘force’ are of 
considerable use (Ale. VII, 7). And while there seem to be difficulties in 
understanding the Athanasian doctrine of the Trinity, there are similar 
perplexities, Berkeley holds, in the widely accepted (Lockean) theory of 
personal identity (developed in Essay, П. xxvi), that personal identity 
consists in identity of consciousness.
(Berman 1994: 156; 1981: 226-7; 1993: 209-10.)
The religious mysteries along with the ‘mysteries’ in science and philosophy are 
considered here as doctrines that may contain difficulties, be more or less 
comprehensible, but not as mere (emotive, non-cognitive) words or utterances. 
In one place, Berman says that the mysteries are expressed in emotive language, 
which also implies a distinction.17 He asks, further, whether the mysteries as 
distinguished from statements about them can be true, on Berkeley’s scheme 
(Berkeley 1994: 161-162). And finally, he points to Berkeley’s suggestion that
17 See the figure in Berman 1981, p. 226; 1993, p. 209; 1994, p. 155.
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‘words about mysteries can function symbolically’ (Berman 1994: 163). So in 
these cases he allows that there is more to mysteries than mere ‘sensible signs’ 
used by speakers for emotive purposes (See Berman 1981: 226-7; 1993: 209- 
11; 1994: 155-9).18
Apparently the ambiguity of the term ‘mystery’ is present in Berkeley’s 
own, and also in his contemporaries’, works.19 However, Berkeley clearly 
maintains that ‘the wording of a mystery’ or ‘retaining or rejecting a term’ in 
talking about mysteries is not a substantial issue (VII. 10, Works 3: 302) and 
that, for instance, the same mystery of the Trinity or ‘Creator, Redeemer, and 
Sanctifier’ is expressed in various ways and propositions (VII. 8, Works 3: 297). 
So he does not seem to regard the mysteries as merely emotive, cognitively 
meaningless utterances. The mysteries as central tenets or doctrines of 
Christianity are not reduced to ‘cognitively empty’ words. Furthermore, in 
Alciphron there appears to be one sense of the term ‘mystery’ not mentioned by 
Berman at all. Pointing to the use and effects of faith, Berkeley says of the evil 
intentions of a freethinker:
Whereas that very man, do but produce in him a sincere belief of a Future 
State, although it be a mystery, although it be what eye hath not seen, nor ear 
heard, nor hath it entered into the heart of man to conceive, he shall, 
nevertheless, by virtue of such belief, be withheld from executing his wicked 
project: and that for reasons which all men can comprehend, though nobody 
can be the object of them.
(VII. 10, Works 3: 303) 
And concerning the Christian mysteries in general he observes:
why men that are so easily and so often gravelled in common points, in 
things natural and visible, should yet be so sharp-sighted and dogmatical 
about the invisible world and its mysteries is to me a point utterly unaccount­
able by all the rules of logic and good sense.
(VI. 30, Works 3: 280)
The ‘mysteries’ in this sense appear to signify certain hidden realities, which the 
doctrines and utterances concern. Berkeley’s description of the effects arising 
from the belief in mysteries is, accordingly, intended to show that the ‘doctrines 
relating to heavenly mysteries might be taught, in this saving sense, to vulgar 
minds’ (VII. 9, Works 3: 299-300, emphasis added). The heavenly mysteries, 
then, are distinguished from doctrines and utterances (propositions) relating to 
them. Consequently, Berman’s assertion that Berkeley gives an ‘emotive 
account of mysteries’ — in either of his senses of the word — that is, takes the 
Christian mysteries to be merely emotive utterances or something expressed in 
emotive language, is, at best, misleading.
18 The same confusion arises in Berman 1996: 139-140.
19 See e.g. Browne 1990 (1733), ch. 5.
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There is a further reason to question the attribution of the distinction to 
Berkeley.
According to Berman, Berkeley believed certain words or names to have an 
‘emotive power’ or a tendency to produce ‘emotions, habits, and actions’. 
However, such mystery-terms as ‘trinity’ or ‘incarnation’ may hardly be said to 
bear a particular emotive or action-promoting power. There is nothing 
‘essentially emotive’ in them. The same applies to the theological propositions 
in which such terms occur. For Berkeley mentions disputes about the ‘nature, 
extent, and effects’ as well as other aspects of grace and compares them with 
discussions about force in science. In that context, utterances about force and 
grace are obviously not intended to evoke emotions. Neither are they utterly 
meaningless for Berkeley (VII. 7, Works 3: 296). Despite his insistence on 
practical faith and a critical attitude towards useless speculations (VII. 15, 
Works 3: 308), there is no evidence that he held all theological propositions and 
discussions concerning mysteries to be either emotive or senseless.
Some of Berman’s expressions suggest that, for Berkeley, mysteries are not 
at all a subject of theology. For example Berman says:
Berkeley’s emotive account of mysteries rests squarely on his cognitive 
account of theology.
(Berman 1981: 224; 1993: 206; 1994: 147)
However, as already said, Berkeley does refer to theological discussions about 
mysteries. From Berman’s reading it follows that theological — like any 
other — talk of mysteries is emotive; and then, to be consistent, it is necessary 
to introduce an extraordinary distinction between cognitive and emotive 
theology which has no foundation in Alciphron.
3. Now I want to examine more closely Berman’s interpretation of Alciphron 
regarding the meaning of utterances concerning mysteries.
First, in the passages cited, or referred to, by Berman to demonstrate the 
presence of the ‘emotive theory’, Berkeley speaks, in fact, about the effects of 
faith or ‘belief of mysteries’ in general and about the effects of one’s belief in 
particular mysteries, and not about the effects of mere utterances.20 Thus he 
talks about ‘the saving faith of Christians’ which is ‘a vital operative principle, 
productive of charity and obedience’ (VII. 9, Works 3: 300) and the effects of 
the belief in original sin and a future state (VII. 10, Works 3: 301-303). Faith or 
belief, according to Berkeley, is or at least implies assent to a proposition, and 
in one place he is inclined to say that it is the propositions concerning the 
Trinity which direct and affect the mind (VII. 8, Works 3: 297). However, he 
clearly relates this influence to the belief in the Trinity:
20 Cf. Gelber 1952: 512.
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Alciphron. Fear not: by all the rules of right reason, it is absolutely 
impossible that any mystery, and least of all the Trinity, should really be the 
object of man’s faith.
Euphranor. I do not wonder you thought so, as long as you maintained that 
no man could assent to a proposition without perceiving or framing in his 
mind distinct ideas marked by the terms of it. But, although terms are signs, 
yet having granted that those signs may be significant, though they should 
not suggest ideas represented by them, provided they serve to regulate and 
influence our wills, passions, or conduct, you have consequently granted that 
the mind of man may assent to propositions containing such terms, when it is 
so directed or affected by them, notwithstanding it should not perceive 
distinct ideas marked by those terms. Whence it seems to follow that a man 
may believe the doctrine of the Trinity, if he finds it revealed in Holy 
Scripture that the Father, the Son, and the Holy Ghost, are God, and that 
there is but one God, although he doth not frame in his mind any abstract or 
distinct ideas of trinity, substance, or personality; provided that this doctrine 
of a Creator, Redeemer, and Sanctifier makes proper impressions on his 
mind, producing therein love, hope, gratitude, and obedience, and thereby 
becomes a lively operative principle, influencing his life and actions, 
agreeably to that notion of saving faith which is required in a Christian.
(VTI. 8, Works 3: 296-297, emphasis added)
And in another passage he refers to the ‘articles of our Christian faith which, in 
proportion as they are believed, persuade, and, as they persuade, influence the 
lives and actions of men’ (VII. 15, Works 3: 308, emphasis added).
It seems that Berkeley’s account of the efficacy of the Christian faith cannot 
be construed as the introduction of a theory of emotive meaning, unless one first 
assumes that by ‘effects of faith’ he means effects produced by certain emotive 
utterances. And this is indeed what Berman appears to assume on his emotivist 
reading. He also expresses this assumption by the puzzling statement that, in the 
following passage, Berkeley ‘identifies faith with the three non-cognitive 
functions of language’:
Original sin, for instance, a man may find it impossible to form an idea of in 
abstract, or of the manner of its transmission; and yet the belief thereof may 
produce in his mind a salutary sense of his own unworthiness, and the 
goodness of his Redeemer: from whence may follow good habits, and from 
them good actions, the genuine effects of faith', which, considered in its true 
light, is a thing neither repugnant nor incomprehensible, as some men would 
persuade us, but suited even to vulgar capacities, placed in the will and 
affections rather than in the understanding, and producing holy lives rather 
than subtle theories. Faith, I say, is not an indolent perception, but an 
operative persuasion of mind, which ever worketh some suitable action, 
disposition, or emotion in those who have it; as it were easy to prove and 
illustrate by innumerable instances taken from human affairs.
(VII. 10, Works 3: 301; emphasis added)
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However, from the fact that in some passages faith, and in others language, is 
related to the provoking of emotions, dispositions and actions, it does not follow 
that faith and the ‘other uses’ of language are one and the same thing.
Rather it seems to follow that, for Berkeley, faith and language are related in 
a specific way. Faith concerning mysteries entails assent to certain propositions 
in Scripture (and other relevant texts)21 A closer look at the text reveals that 
Berkeley’s concern in dialogue VII, sects. 1-15 (or, 1-18, in the first two 
editions), is to show that such assent is possible and reasonable.22 Note that his 
reflections on the uses and significance of words and other signs are put forward 
in this framework.
Freethinkers’ understanding of assent is said to rest on a primitive (too 
narrow) view on the use of signs:
Words are signs: they do or should stand for ideas, which so far as they 
suggest they are significant. But words that suggest no ideas are insigni­
ficant. He who annexeth a clear idea to every word he makes use of speaks 
sense; but where such ideas are wanting, the speaker utters nonsense.
(VII, 2, Works 3: 287)
Since the terms like ‘Trinity’ or ‘future state’ do not stand for such ideas, 
Christians are in effect accused of assenting to nonsensical propositions.
To address the objection, Berkeley insists on his conception, already known 
from the Draft and published Introduction to the Principles, of the various uses 
of words and other signs. He points to a number of cases where signs are used 
in a way that makes them ‘useful and significant’ even though they do not stand 
for (clear and distinct) ideas (See VII. 5-7, Works 3: 291-296). He further 
argues that one can assent to (or, it is not absurd to assent to) propositions 
related to mysteries insofar as they, if assented to, have good impact on one’s 
mind and actions. Neither in science nor in faith, (clear and distinct) ideas are 
necessary for assent (VII. 7-12, 14-15, Works 3: 295-305, 307-309).23
Clearly, Berkeley does not attribute any ‘emotive power’ to the relevant 
words and propositions as such. He speaks about the effects of faith, or, of 
assenting to certain propositions
One interesting problem the emotivist reading has to face is the meaning or 
meaningful use of utterances concerning particular mysteries. If they do not 
evoke distinct ideas, inform or have cognitive content, what, then, makes a 
difference between the meaningful use of the utterances concerning a particular
21 E.g. the Creeds and 39 Articles o f Religion.
22 This is clear from VII, 1, 3, 4, 8, 9, 11, Works 3: 286, 288, 290-291, 296-297, 299, 
303.
23 The issue of assent (to propositions concerning mysteries), as I already noted, is 
central in entry 720 of the Commentaries. In the Draft Introduction, too, Berkeley 
disagrees with those ‘Who think it nonsense for a Man to assent to any Proposition each 
term whereof doth not bring into his Mind a clear and distinct Idea...’ (26).
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mystery and those concerning another such mystery or all others? Berman 
seems to think that the difference lies in the effects produced by those 
utterances. He relies on the examples that Berkeley gives of the good effects 
resulting from the belief in particular mysteries; but, as already noted, Berman 
describes these effects as effects of the ‘talk o f  mysteries. Thus he links 
utterances about the Trinity to ‘love, hope, gratitude, and obedience’, those 
about grace to ‘good habits and piety’, those about original sin to deterring 
‘people from committing an evil deed’, and those about a future state to ‘good 
habits and a salutary sense of one’s unworthiness’. Utterances concerning 
different mysteries have, on this reading, distinctive emotive meaning since 
they produce different or at least not wholly coinciding effects.
In this context, however, Berman, first of all, mismatches Berkeley’s claims 
concerning original sin and a future state. According to Berman:
original sin can deter people from committing an evil deed, and a future state 
is likely to produce good habits and a salutary sense of one’s unworthiness.
(Berman 1994: 147; cf. 1981: 224; 1993: 205)
In Berkeley we find that a man’s belief in original sin:
may produce in his mind a salutary sense of his own unworthiness, and the 
goodness of his Redeemer: from whence may follow good habits, and from 
them good actions...
(VII. 10, Works 3:301)
And in the passage regarding afterlife, Berkeley says:
Whereas that very man, do but produce in him a sincere belief of a Future 
State, although it be a mystery [...] he shall, nevertheless, by virtue of such 
belief, be withheld from executing his wicked project.
(VII. 10, Works 3: 303)
Berman’s slip would be insignificant if it did not reveal a more serious problem 
in his interpretation. In removing (almost) everything cognitive from the talk 
and faith or belief concerning mysteries, there appears to be nothing that makes 
this particular effect, abstaining from an evil action, appropriate to the belief in 
future state and those other effects, the sense of one’s unworthiness and of the 
goodness of Redeemer, to the belief in original sin. The connection between 
particular effects and beliefs remains inexplicable.24
4. Now I want to put forward my final, and, to my mind, conclusive arguments 
against the non-cognitivist (emotivist) understanding of what Berkeley, in 
Alciphron and elsewhere, says about the use and truth of the propositions 
concerning mysteries.
24 Michael Ayers drew my attention to this difficulty.
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Berman does not take seriously Berkeley’s claim that the ‘doctrines relating 
to heavenly mysteries’ are ‘revelations of God’ (VII. 8, Works 3: 296).25 The 
emotivist reading of Alciphron entails that Berkeley took God’s revelation 
concerning heavenly mysteries to be non-informative. However, again, to 
reveal (revelare) something concerning these mysteries means nothing other 
than to make something known about them; and Berkeley held the words and 
propositions of Scripture to be instrumental in this informative process (VI. 4, 
6-8, Works 3: 225, 228-233). He says that revelation was not intended to 
‘convey a perfect knowledge’ but rather imperfect ‘hints and glimpses’ (VI. 8, 
Works 3: 233-234). Yet if it gave some knowledge about the ‘heavenly 
mysteries’, however imperfect it be, the propositions used for that purpose were 
not essentially emotive; and there appears to be no point in asking whether or 
not he ever ‘intended to explain all mysteries in the way he explained that of the 
future state, as purely emotive’ (Berman 1994: 163). It also seems to follow 
then that Berkeley regarded propositions concerning God’s revelation as true 
propositions, not as merely emotive utterances, ‘neither true nor false’.26
After all, in Scripture, Berkeley thinks, God, not man, is the speaker. 
Whereas in using regularly the ‘visual language’ God speaks to men 
immediately, in Scripture he speaks by the mediation of inspired writers (VI. 6 - 
10, Works 3: 227-240). This is to say that the divinely inspired persons have 
been ‘committed to writing’ (VI. 10, Works 3: 239), but ‘the Spirit did not 
dictate every particle and syllable, or preserve them from every minute 
alteration by miracle’ (VI. 7, Works 3: 232). All in all, the writers express what 
God has revealed to them, Scripture is ‘the Word of God’ (VI. 7, Works 3: 233). 
Now Berkeley, I take it, was committed to the traditional Christian view that the 
genuine word of God is necessarily true. For him, God neither lies nor speaks 
(reveals) nonsense.
Further, Berkeley thought that certain views and propositions about 
mysteries were false, like those of the Sabellians (VII. 9, Works 3: 300-301). 
Hence there is an additional reason to suppose that he thought the Anglican 
‘doctrines relating to heavenly mysteries’ and the relevant propositions were 
true. He has, in fact, expressed no doubt about that. His saying that ‘there may 
be possibly divers true and useful propositions’ concerning grace (VII. 7, Works 
3: 296), is, I think, not an expression of uncertainty about the truth of the 
Christian doctrine of grace (See Berman 1994: 162-163), but rather an 
admittance that no proposition concerning grace can be shown to be true and yet 
the queries about it and not having ideas of it do not prove that these 
propositions cannot be useful and true.
Finally, as I argued above, in the relevant passages Berkeley is primarily 
concerned with the issue of assent. Now, in this context, I take it, assent to a
25 Berkeley held the view that all of these doctrines are contained in Scripture (VI. 10; 
VII. 4, 8, 15, Works 3: 239, 289, 297, 309).
26 Cf. Ayer 1990, ch. 6.
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proposition in Scripture means to accept, approve or receive it as coming from 
(veracious) God and thus as being true or expressing truth.27
Everything said in this section about Berkeley’s understanding of revelation, 
truth, and the text of Scripture seems to agree not only with what he says on 
these matters in Alciphron, but also in the other texts examined above. A bulk 
of evidence from Berkeley’s writings and some hard speculation about his 
thought is needed to support the claim that, at any stage of his intellectual 
development between 1707 and 1732, he did not adhere to the view that in 
Scripture God has revealed a number of important mysterious truths formerly 
unknown to mankind, including those about the grace of God, heavenly 
rewards, etc. As far as I can see, Berman and Belfrage have not provided such 
evidence.
All the evidence we have suggests that Berkeley was of opinion that the 
Christian religion relies on saving truths revealed in Scripture. Consider, for 
example his note for a sermon preached in 1729:
10. after all — what mysterious truths come by Xt? St Mat. 13.11 to you it is 
given to know the mysteries of heaven. Wt are these important principal 
truths? True God revealed, our own state by original sin & our own 
corruption. The cure thereof, life & immortality with the way to come at it. 
our eyes open’d as to sin & duty, hell & heaven &c, Rom 15. 29 25. Xt king 
wt his kingdom. Priest wt his sacrifice. Prophet wt his doctrine. Love of God 
& neighbour Summary thereof, other doctrines try’d by this touch-stone.
(Works 7: S4)28
5. As for the ‘symbolic expressions’ related to mysteries and the meaning or 
signification of relevant terms and propositions, I want to say the following.
As already noted in the first section of this chapter (2.1.), there are several 
places in Berkeley’s works where he talks of representing supernatural things 
by means of ideas we have of natural ones. This line of thought is present in 
Alciphron, too.
In some passages he seems to suggest that mysteries can be illustrated by 
analogies, metaphors, similes, etc. (See VI. 11, VII. 13, Works 3: 240-241, 
305-307).29 This way of expression is common in Scripture, fitting to its 
‘simple, unaffected, artless, unequal, bold, figurative style’ (VI. 7, Works 3: 
232). Significant in this respect are his arguments concerning the analogy of 
nature between the ‘things spiritual, supernatural, or relating to another world’
27 Cf. Locke 1975, bk. IV, ch. 16, sect. 14 (p. 667), bk. IV, ch. 18, sect. 2 (p. 689).
28 See also A Discourse addressed to Magistrates (1738), Works 6: 201-222, 219, and 
Olscamp 1970: 216.
29 Some scholars have observed the significance of the talk of analogies and metaphors 
in this context. See Johnson 1752: 47-49; Olscamp 1970: 146-153; Brykman 1984: 
505-509; 1993: 392-396.
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and natural things.30 Thus on the one hand, we are unable to form an idea of, 
say, the union of the divine and human nature in Christ, this being beyond our 
comprehension.31 But on the other hand, the mystery can be illustrated by the 
analogy with the union of human soul and body (VI. 11, Works 3: 240-241). 
This form of representation, though, one could say, belongs to ‘hints and 
glimpses, rather than views’. It is clear that Berkeley, unlike Peter Browne, 
offers no theory or precise explanation of how the supernatural realm is 
represented by ideas and conceptions in our minds. As compared to the 
conception of metaphorical and proper analogy in talking about the attributes of 
God (in dialogue IV), his remarks on the use of metaphors and the like ways of 
representation with respect to mysteries (in dialogue VII) are rather vague and 
indefinite. The obscurity in this point, I surmise, is meant to avoid various 
problems and objections that could have possibly risen concerning any 
explication of the literal or metaphorical meaning of the terms like ‘grace’, 
‘Trinity’, ‘Father’, ‘Son’, etc. Instead of that Berkeley insists on the ‘another 
use of words besides that of marking and suggesting distinct ideas’ (VII. 5, 
Works 3: 292).
I also think that Berkeley himself did not see the meaning of the propositions 
concerning mysteries as a genuine problem or interesting philosophical 
question. Rather he thought we cannot possibly know, at least in this life, what 
‘the invisible world and its mysteries’ they describe are really like — and 
nevertheless we ought to assent to them, relying on the authority of God (See 
VI. 2, Works 3: 221). In any case, what these propositions ultimately mean, or 
what their terms stand for, is not identical with the emotional effects of faith 
(assent).
2.4.2. The role of mysteries, and ‘parity of reasoning’
Finally, I want to comment on the alleged relation of ‘cognitive theology’ to 
‘emotive mysteries’ and the comparison of faith with science.
1 .1 agree with Berman’s notion that, for Berkeley, the belief in mysteries relies 
on the belief in, or knowledge of, the existence and attributes of God. For this is 
basically as much as to say that revealed religion rests on natural religion. I 
cannot see, however, why should one express that notion in the obscure, 
anachronistic terminology of emotive utterances of a certain kind being 
supported by cognitive statements of a certain kind. From what has been said so
30 See also Berkeley’s sermon On Eternal Life, Works 7: 105-113, 107.
31 Note the following remark made by G. A. Johnston in his account of Berkeley’s 
conception of faith: ‘Faith assures us of the realtiy of things of which we have no ideas’ 
(Johnston 1965: 356).
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far it seems clear that for Berkeley faith is not something purely linguistic. 
Neither is it purely emotional.
Religious assent and its effects imply, on his account, some comprehension 
of what is believed and how it relates to us. For example, the belief in a future 
state, implies, among other things, the realization that evil intentions and actions 
in this life will bring about some (in our present condition unknown) dreadful 
punishments in the next. Such belief is possible, according to Berkeley, without 
having ideas of those particular punishments (VII. 10, Works 3: 302-303). This 
makes it still harder to make sense of the alleged identification of faith with 
‘non-cognitive functions of language’.
2. In Berman’s view, Berkeley held that God disclosed the mysteries or 
doctrines of the Trinity, future state etc. just in order to make people act 
virtuously and have the right feeling or attitude towards God: to fear His justice 
and to love Him. The mysteries serve, then, merely as tools to produce in people 
such effects as love, hope, gratitude, piety and good habits. It is not quite clear 
whether or not this ‘emotive account of mysteries’ implies that Berkeley 
himself believed that, for example, God is a trinity and has truly been ‘manifest 
in the flesh’ (VI. 10, Works 3: 239). So Berman may be understood as attri­
buting to Berkeley somewhat unorthodox views on basic Christian doctrines.
There is, however, inadequate textual evidence for Berman’s claim that 
Berkeley thought the mysteries served no other purpose than to produce certain 
emotions, dispositions, and actions, and to deepen a belief in the existence and 
attributes of God. The passages quoted or mentioned by Berman to support his 
claims (IV. 18; V. 27, 29; VII. 7, 8, 10, and Works 7: 146-147)32 in no way 
indicate that Berkeley regarded mysteries merely as tools to bring about ‘good 
habits’ and that they were utterly in the service of natural religion. For instance, 
Berman asserts:
Nothing will so effectively make people fear God’s justice as the mystery of
a future state.
(Berman 1994: 147; cf. 1981: 224; 1993: 206)
All that Berkeley says on this point is that the ‘belief of a Future State’ is more 
effective in avoiding an evil action than a theoretical talk of the ‘beauty of 
virtue’, which ‘powerful effect’ relies on the fear of future punishment (VII. 10, 
Works 3: 302-303).33 It does not follow from this, however, that he thought talk 
and belief about the future state is needed only or primarily to evoke morally 
right actions and the feeling of fear. If Berkeley held that God’s revelation 
concerning the future state was not intended to make us aware of the future 
rewards and punishments, then, it seems, he believed there was nothing to fear.
32 See Berman 1981: 224; 1993: 207; 1994: 147-148.
33 See also Berkeley’s essays in The Guardian (1713), No. 55, The Sanctions o f  
Religion, Works 7: 198-201, 199, and No. 89, Immortality, Works 7: 222-224, 223.
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‘For why should a bad man fear a being that is not literally just’, Berman asks 
(Berman 1981: 224; 1993: 206; 1994: 147). But why should a bad man fear 
God’s justice if he thought with Berkeley that the talk of future punishments 
was merely emotive?
3. I shall not discuss Berkeley’s ‘parity arguments’ in detail here. However, I 
would like to make a brief remark on this topic to conclude the whole 
examination of the non-cognitivist interpretation.
Comparing the physical doctrine of force with the theological doctrine of 
divine grace, Berkeley asks:
shall we deny that it [the ‘doctrine of force’] is of use, either in practice or 
speculation, because we have no distinct idea of force? Or that which we 
admit with regard to force, upon what pretence can we deny concerning 
grace? If there are queries, disputes, perplexities, diversity of notions and 
opinions about the one, so there are about the other also: if we can form no 
precise distinct idea of the one, so neither can we of the other. Ought we not 
therefore, by a parity of reason, to conclude there may be possibly divers true 
and useful propositions concerning the one as well as the other? And that 
grace may, for aught you know, be an object of our faith, and influence our 
life and actions, as a principle destructive of evil habits and productive of 
good ones, although we cannot attain a distinct idea of it, separate or 
abstracted from God the author, from man the subject, and from virtue and 
piety its effects?
(VII. 7, Works 3: 295-296)
Note that he argues here to the effect that grace ‘may [...] be an object of our 
faith’ which means as much as ‘we can assent to propositions about grace.’ 
Faith and science ‘both imply an assent of the mind’ (VII. 11, Works 3: 303) 
and both are evaluated on the basis of their good influence on human minds, 
actions, lives (VII. 14-15, Works 3: 307-309). By the ‘parity of reason’ a 
number of similarities between force as an object of science and grace as an 
object of faith can be found. The symmetry has its limits, though. In the light of 
the foregoing discussions, I think, it can hardly be denied that Berkeley held the 
grace of God to be real and effective, whereas in case of force he notes, ‘the 
reality of the thing itself is made a question’ (VII. 6, Works 3: 295).34
34 M. W. Beal’s talk of ‘religious and scientific instrumentalism’ in this context (Beal 
1971: 510-511) is to my mind misleading.
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CONCLUSIONS
Belfrage’s and Berman’s accounts of the early development of Berkeley’s 
views on meaning (more precisely, the alleged development from strict 
cognitivism to an emotive theory of meaning), as well as Berman’s emotivist 
reading of Alciphron, are mistaken. (See sect. 1.5. above for a summary of their 
non-cognitivist reading of Berkeley’s relevant works.)
My main conclusions about, and objections to, Belfrage’s and Berman’s 
non-cognitivist interpretation, as well as my own observations concerning 
Berkeley’s writings, are these.
1. Neither the sermon On Immortality nor entry 720 of the Philosophical 
Commentaries gives evidence of a sudden and radical change in Berkeley’s 
view regarding semantics, that is, a repudiation of the earlier strict 
cognitivism and acceptance of some non-cognitive (‘non-descriptive’, ‘non- 
informative’) discourse, more precisely, the non-cognitive term ‘infinite’, 
and ‘non-cognitive propositions in Scripture’, as Belfrage and Berman 
understand them.
2. Berkeley’s use, in the sermon, of the term ‘infinite’ in religious context is to 
be seen as an expression of a commonplace theological position rather than 
advancing a new position in semantics. So there is no contradiction or 
doctrinal clash to be discerned between the paper Of Infinites and the 
sermon. The subject matter of the sermon— immortality, and ‘infinite 
eternal bliss’ in Heaven — and that of the paper — the mathematical 
doctrine of infinitesimals — are remarkably different. Contrary to Belfrage’s 
account, the sermon does not concern the issue of ‘the proper use of terms in 
valid demonstrations’ and it does not contain a demonstration. Rather it 
contains reflections on the promised eternal happiness and the cause of why 
people do not bother to think about it.
3. In entry 720 Berkeley differentiates between propositions to be examined, 
and accepted or rejected, on the basis of reason, and those to be accepted on 
the basis of faith. This, however, contrary to Belfrage’s suggestion, is not to 
distinguish between cognitive (informative) and non-cognitive (non- 
informative) propositions. For in the entry Berkeley does not suggest that the 
latter propositions, those concerning Christian mysteries, have no ‘cognitive 
meaning’ whatsoever or that we know absolutely nothing of what is meant 
by them. Likewise, contrary to Berman, he does not take these propositions 
to be ‘cognitively empty’, for he appears to suggest that we lack complete 
understanding of them, not understanding as such.
4. Berkeley’s accounts, in the sermon and the Draft Introduction, of St. Paul’s 
description of heavenly rewards, do not differ to the extent Belfrage and 
Berman think they do. Both in the sermon and the Draft Berkeley seems to 
assume that, firstly, the heavenly rewards or pleasures are there (and are 
infinite), and, secondly, we know of them by means of St. Paul’s words. For
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Berkeley, St. Paul’s words are not emotive in the sense explained by Berman 
and Belfrage.
5. Berkeley, as it is known, gives in the Draft an account of the ‘other ends’ or 
‘other uses’ of language besides the ‘communicating of ideas’. Berman’s and 
Belfrage’s description of it in the anachronistic terms of the ‘emotive theory’ 
of meaning does not seem to suggest anything enlightening about the very 
doctrine of the various uses of language itself. Also, my analysis of the non- 
cognitivist interpretation has shown, I believe, that the description of the 
development of Berkeley’s early views on meaning in terms of 
cognitivism/non-cognitivism is obscure and misleading.
6. It appears that both in entry 720 of the Commentaries and the first half of 
dialogue VII of Alciphron Berkeley’s main concern is the issue of assenting 
to propositions about Christian mysteries. His reflections in Alciphron on the 
uses and significance of signs are introduced in this framework. For 
Berkeley, freethinkers accuse Christians of assenting to nonsensical 
propositions insofar as the propositions in question contain terms that do not 
‘suggest’ (clear and distinct) ideas. It is in this context that he insists on the 
‘another use of words besides that of marking and suggesting distinct ideas.’ 
Berkeley argues that it is not absurd to believe, or assent to, the propositions 
concerning mysteries given the good influence they have, or rather, this 
belief has, on our ‘life and actions’. This is not to say, contrary to what the 
emotivist reading suggests, that such propositions do not describe, or inform 
human beings of, anything.
7. In Alciphron, dialogue VII, Berkeley does not, as Berman claims the case to 
be, introduce an ‘emotive theory’ of meaning to explain the significance of 
terms and propositions concerning mysteries by ascribing to them a power to 
evoke emotions, dispositions and actions. For in the passages Berman refers 
to, or cites, to support his claim Berkeley speaks of the good influence and 
effects of faith, or, of assenting to relevant propositions, not of the effects of 
uttering ‘cognitively empty’ words. Berman’s suggestion, which seems to be 
intended to address this problem, that Berkeley ‘identifies’ faith with ‘non- 
cognitive functions of language’ is incomprehensible. Berkeley, contrary to 
Berman’s contention, does not ascribe any ‘emotive power’ to the relevant 
terms and propositions as such.
8. In the light of the evidence we have both from the writings more closely 
discussed in this thesis and Berkeley’s other works, it seems clear that he 
held propositions concerning mysteries to be true and also informative, 
which makes them essentially different from ‘non-cognitive’ or ‘emotive’ 
expressions or utterances as Belfrage and Berman understand them. Unlike 
Berman, he does not link the question of the truth of such propositions to the 
‘amount’ of their ‘cognitive content’. For him, Scripture is the word of 
(veracious) God. The relevant propositions in Scripture serve as ‘instru­
ments’ of revelation. They are used to inform mankind of the heavenly 
rewards and other mysterious things which he, for all we know, believed to
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be there. The Christian mysteries as revealed doctrines or truths, which 
concern supernatural realm, are by no means identified with ‘emotive 
utterances’.
9. Berkeley seems to have assumed that the relevant terms in propositions 
regarding mysteries (e.g. ‘good things’ in Heaven, ‘the grace of God’, etc.) 
stand for supernatural realities even though the metaphorical representations 
we use to think about the latter are not adequate. He refers to such 
representations with respect to mysteries in several writings, but he adA'ances 
no theory or detailed account about them.
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SUMMARY IN ESTONIAN
Berkeley, müsteeriumid ja tähendus. 
Mittekognitivistliku tõlgenduse kriitika
George Berkeley (1685-1753) arusaamu keelest, tähendusest ja  märkidest on 
uuritud paljude vaatenurkade alt. Samas leidub vaid üksikuid uurimusi Berkeley 
tähenduskontseptsiooni kujunemise varase faasi (1707-1708) kohta. Kõige 
põhjalikumad uurimused sel teemal pärinevad Bertil Belfragelt ja  David 
Bermanilt. Viimane on esitanud ka üksikasjaliku tõlgenduse Berkeley hilise­
matest vaadetest keelele ja  tähendusele, mis ilmnevad teosest Alciphron  (1732). 
Üldjoontes moodustavad Bermani ja  Belfrage uurimused koherentse terviku, 
mida nimetan väitekirjas (teemasse puutuvate Berkeley teoste ja  neis sisaldu­
vate asjakohaste lõikude) m ittekognitivistlikuks tõlgenduseks.
Selle tõlgenduse kohaselt kujunes Berkeley tähenduskontseptsioon aastatel 
1707-1708 järgnevalt. Esmalt pooldas Berkeley ranget kognitivismi, leides, et 
kõik sõnad ja  teised märgid, mis ei tähista ideid (Locke’i ja Berkeley tähen­
duses), on mõttetud; seejärel ütles ta sellest vaatest ootamatult lahti, mööndes, 
et vähemasti osa mittekognitiivsetest (mitteinformatiivsetest) sõnadest ja  lau­
sungitest [utterances, proposition s] on mõttekad; ja viimaks jõudis Berkeley 
emotiivse tähenduse teooriani, mille kohaselt mittekognitiivsed sõnad ja 
lausungid on mõttekad ja  tähenduslikud, kui neid kasutatakse emotsioonide, 
hoiakute või teatud tegude esilekutsumiseks. Sama teooria on väidetavalt aval­
datud ka P rin tsiip ide  sissejuhatuses (1710) ja  A lciphron'h . Mittekognitivist- 
likus tõlgenduses on kesksel kohal Belfrage ja  Bermani arusaam sellest, mida 
väidab Berkeley oma kirjutistes kristlikke müsteeriume puudutavate lausungite 
kohta. Belfrage ja Bermani väitel oli Berkeley nii aastatel 1707-1708 kui ka 
hiljem arvamusel, et säärased lausungid on kognitiivse sisuta (mitteinfor- 
matiivsed, mittedeskriptiivsed) ja  viimaks omistas neile emotiivse tähenduse.
Käesoleva doktoriväitekirja põhieesmärgiks on mittekognitivistliku tõlgen­
duse analüüsimine ja  hindamine. Püüan näidata, et see tõlgendus on ekslik, 
anakronistlik ja  vastuolus tekstilõikudega, mida Berman ja  Belfrage on esitanud 
oma seisukohtade kinnituseks. Seega on mu lähenemisviis peamiselt kriitiline. 
Samas tulevad selle kriitika tulemusel nähtavale mitmed nüansid nii Berkeley 
varasemates kui ka hilisemates kirjutistes ja  vaadetes.
Väitekirja esimeses peatükis kirjeldan detailselt mittekognitivistlikku 
tõlgendust, pöörates erilist tähelepanu samasustele ja  erinevustele Belfrage ja 
Bermani arusaamades Berkeley tähenduskontseptsiooni kujunemisest. Teises 
peatükis esitan oma üksikasjaliku vastuargumentatsiooni sellele tõlgendusele, 
järgides esimese peatüki struktuuri. Väitekirja lõpus toon ära mittekogni­
tivistliku tõlgenduse vaatlusest sündinud järeldused.
54
Berkeley varaste kirjutiste ja  Alciphron'\ analüüsi põhjal näitan väitekiijas,
et
1. puudub tekstiline tõendusmaterjal selle kohta, et Berkeley oleks hüljanud 
oma varase tähenduskontseptsiooni selle lühikese ajavahemiku jooksul, mida 
Belfrage ja  Berman on pakkunud;
2. vastupidi ühele mittekognitivistliku tõlgenduse põhipunktidest ei käsitle 
Berkeley üheski vaadeldud kirjutistest kristlikke müsteeriume puudutavaid 
lausungeid mittekognitiivsete (kognitiivse sisuta, kognitiivse tähenduseta), 
mitteinformatiivsete või emotiivsete lausungitena;
3. Berkeley tähenduskontseptsiooni kujunemise kirjeldus kognitivismi- 
mittekognitivismi-emotivismi terminites on väga ebamäärase sisuga ja  
eksitav;
4. Berkeley kirjutised ei anna alust omistada talle emotiivse tähenduse teoonat 
(nii nagu Berman ja  Belfrage seda mõistavad).
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‘Entry 720 of Berkeley’s Philosophical Commentaries and “non-cognitive” 
propositions in Scripture’, Archiv für Geschichte der Philosophie (forthcoming).
Entry 720 of Berkeley’s Philosophical Commentaries 
and ‘non-cognitive’ propositions in Scripture
by Roomet Jakapi (Tartu)
This article is concerned with the development of Berkeley’s early views on 
language and meaning. Two eminent Berkeley scholars, Bertil Belfrage and 
David Berman, have described that development as a transition from the 
Lockean, cognitivist view that all significant words or names stand for ideas, to 
an emotive theory of meaning, which allows words to be significant even if they 
do not signify ideas, provided that they evoke appropriate emotions, 
dispositions or actions.1 Briefly, according to this interpretation Berkeley first 
held the cognitivist view, which is manifested in his early notebooks, the 
Philosophical Commentaries (written 1707-8), up to entry 696, and also in the 
paper “Of Infinites”.2 Then, Belfrage and Berman argue, he gave up the strict 
cognitivist position, accepting also certain non-cognitive propositions, and 
words that do not stand for ideas. That view is allegedly expressed in entry 720 
of the Commentaries as well as in Berkeley’s sermon “On Immortality”.3
1 See Bertil Belfrage, “The clash on semantics in Berkeley’s Notebook A”, 
Hermathena, 139 (1985), pp. 117-126, “Berkeley’s Theory of Emotive Meaning 
(1708)”, History o f European Ideas, 7, (1986a) No. 6, pp. 643-649, “Development of 
Berkeley’s early theory of meaning”, Revue Philosophique de la France et de 
I’Etranger, (1986b) No. 3, pp. 319-330, “Editor’s Commentary” in George Berkeley’s 
Manuscript Introduction, ed. B. Belfrage (Oxford: Doxa, 1987), pp. 25-57, esp. pp. 4 4 -  
57, David Berman, “Berkeley’s Semantic Revolution: 19 November 1707-11 January 
1708”, History o f European Ideas, 7, (1986) No. 6, pp. 603-607, George Berkeley. 
Idealism and the Man (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1994), pp. 11-17, 144-146, 161 f . 
According to Belfrage, a parallel shift, or, clash, as he calls it, can be seen in the 
development o f Berkeley’s views on the ‘concept of number’ and ‘nature of 
demonstration’. For in that case, Belfrage argues, Berkeley gave up his earlier view that 
numbers denote ideas, and demonstrations are ‘confined’ to ideas, and instead evolved 
an instrumentalist conception o f numbers and demonstrations (Belfrage 1985, pp. 120— 
123; 1987, pp. 52-54).
2 Berkeley read the paper before the Dublin Philosophical Society on 19 November
1707 (Berman 1986, p. 603, Belfrage 1986a, p. 643).
3 The sermon was delivered in the Trinity College Chapel, Dublin, on 11 January
1708 (Ibid.). It is published in The Works of George Berkeley Bishop of Cloyne [ Works], 
ed. A. A. Luce and Т. E. Jessop (9 vols.; London: Thomas Nelson, 1948-57), vol. 7, 
pp. 9 -15. On Belfrage’s view, Berkeley, in the sermon, gave an account o f non- 
cognitive propositions in Scripture —  considering them as ‘metaphysical descriptions’ 
of transcendent reality —  that he later rejected (Belfrage 1986a, p. 643; 1986b, pp. 321- 
324). Nevertheless, Berman and Belfrage share the opinion that Berkeley, in his earlier
1
16
Finally, in the Draft Introduction (written in 1708), Berkeley reached the 
emotive theory.
This account may contain other questionable points as well, but I will object 
here to Belfrage’s and Berman’s reading of entry 720 of the Commentaries.4 In 
particular, I disagree with their claim that in this entry Berkeley points out a 
particular kind of legitimate non-cognitive propositions, that is to say, 
propositions that do not inform and have no ‘cognitive meaning’ or ‘cognitive 
content’.5 The propositions in question are those in Scripture concerning 
Christian mysteries.6
The entry reads as follows:
When I say I will reject all Propositions wherein I know not [the full 
ordinary crossed out] fully & adequately & clearly so far as knowable the 
Thing meant thereby This is not to be extended to propositions in the 
Scripture. I speak of Matters of Reason & Philosophy not Revelation, In this
I think an Humble Implicit faith becomes us just (where we cannot [fully 
crossed out] comprehend & Understand the proposition) such as a popish 
peasant gives to propositions he hears at Mass in Latin. This proud men call 
blind, popish, implicit, irrational, for my part I think it more irrational to 
pretend to dispute at cavil & ridicule [things crossed out] holy mysteries i. e 
propositions about things out of our reach that are altogether above our 
knowlege out of our reach. Wn I shall come to plenary knowlege of the 
Meaning of any Text then I shall yield an explicit belief. Introd:7
as well as later writings, viewed the propositions or statements in question as non- 
cognitive (non-informative).
4 For critical commentaries on Berman’s and Belfrage’s accounts of Berkeley’s early 
intellectual development, see Robert McKim, ''''The entries in Berkeley’s Notebooks: a 
reply to Bertil Belfrage”, Hermathena, 139 (1985), pp. 156-161, M. A. Stewart, 
“Berkeley’s Introduction Draft”, Berkeley Newsletter, 11 (1989/1990), pp. 10-19 (reply 
by B. Belfrage: “A Response to M. A. Stewart’s ‘Berkeley’s Introduction Draft’”, 
Berkeley Newsletter, 12, 1991/1992, pp. 1-10), Genevieve Brykman, Berkeley et le 
Voile des Mots (Paris: Libraire Philosophique J. Vrin, 1993), pp. 78-84 , Kenneth 
Wayne Williford, Three Studies on Berkeley’s Philosophy of Language (Master’s 
Thesis, University of Iowa, 2000), pp.22-^15. For a detailed examination o f Berman’s 
emotivist reading of Berkeley’s Alciphron (1732), dialogue 7, see Roomet Jakapi, 
“Emotive Meaning and Christian Mysteries in Berkeley’s Alciphron”, British Journal 
for the History o f  Philosophy, forthcoming.
5 Belfrage 1987, p. 56, Berman 1994, pp. 144f., 161f.
6 I do not discuss here Berkeley’s putative account o f non-cognitive language use in 
other contexts. For a comprehensive exposition o f Berkeley’s position as cognitivism 
allowing emotive uses of ethical language, see Paul J. Olscamp, The Moral Philosophy 
o f George Berkeley (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1970), ch. 5, pp. 130-153.
7 George Berkeley, Philosophical Commentaries, ed. George H. Thomas (Ohio: 
Alliance 1976), p. 94f.
2
What Berkeley expressly says here about the relevant propositions in Scripture 
is that they belong to “Matters of [...] Revelation” and are “about things out of 
our reach”8. This is to say, on a traditional account of revelation, that they serve 
precisely the purpose to inform mankind of (the existence of) these remote 
things. Accordingly, in the sermon “On Immortality” Berkeley speaks of the 
“revelation of eternal happiness or misery” and “new discover’d regions of life
& immortality”9. In several other sermons and writings he (explicitly or 
implicitly) says it to be revealed in the Scriptures that God is a trinity, that the 
grace of God operates on Christians, that there will be a general resurrection 
and last judgement, etc.10 To state with Berman and Belfrage that, according to 
Berkeley, biblical propositions about those supernatural matters give no 
information11, is in fact to deny that Berkeley acknowledged a genuine 
revelation concerning “the invisible world and its mysteries” 12. However, there 
seems to be nothing in Berkeley’s works to support that assertion.13 So he did 
consider such propositions to be informative; and this can be concluded 
regardless of the issue of whether or how he would have explained the content 
of revelation in terms of ideas.
In Alciphron, dial. 6, sect. 6, Berkeley distinguishes between the ‘narrative’, 
‘devotional and prophetic’, and ‘doctrinal’ parts o f the Scripture (Works, vol. 3, p. 228). 
Entry 720, it would seem, is primarily concerned with certain ‘doctrinal’ parts 
containing such mysterious doctrines as the Holy Trinity, rewards and punishments in a 
future state, etc.
9 Works, vol. 7, p. 10.
10 See Commentaries, entry 776, p. 102; sermons “On Charity”, “On the Mystery of 
Godliness” and the “Anniversary Sermon”, Works, vol. 7, pp. 30, 87, 92, 116; 
Alciphron, dial. 6, sect. 10, dial. 7, sects. 4, 7, 8, Works, vol. 3, pp. 239, 289, 296f.
11 See Belfrage 1986a, pp. 644-646; Berman 1994, pp. 12, 144f., 162.
12 Alciphron, dial. 6, sect. 30, Works, vol. 3, p. 280.
13 Elsewhere Berkeley points indeed, as Berman and Belfrage observe, to St. Paul’s 
‘empty tho emphatical’ or ‘indefinite’ description o f a future state:
Eye hath not seen, nor ear heard, neither hath it entered into the heart o f man to 
conceive the things which God hath prepared for those that love him.
(1 Cor 2: 9; essay “Immortality” in the Guardian, 1713, Works, vol. 7, p. 223)
See also “On Immortality”, Works, vol. 7, p. 12. However, on a traditional Christian 
reading, this description does inform us about the following: there are desirable “things 
which God hath prepared for those that love him”, these things are above our 
comprehension in this life. Berkeley definitely does not reject this view by claiming in 
the Draft Introduction that the purpose o f using these words is not to bring “into the 
Mind determinate Ideas” of these things, but make men “more chearfull and fervent in 
their Duty” (Belfrage 1987, p. 105ff.). For the duty is to love God and behave in such a 
way as to obtain the desirable things, ‘highest and most inestimable rewards’ or ‘eternal 
happiness’ (See Works, vol. 7, pp. I lf .,  28f., 34, 46, 115). I am in agreement here with 
Olscamp (Olscamp 1970, p. 153) and Williford (Williford 2000, p. 43f.).
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As to the meaning of these propositions, Berkeley admits that he knows not 
“fully & adequately & clearly so far as knowable the Thing meant thereby”. 
This is clearly not to say that the propositions have no ‘cognitive meaning’ 
whatsoever or that we know absolutely nothing of the “Thing meant thereby”. 
Rather we know what is meant by them, but only so far as it has been revealed. 
We know from Scripture, say, that the faithful will obtain ‘eternal happiness’. 
According to Berkeley’s sermon from 1708, people try to conceive of that state 
of everlasting happiness by means of ‘pleasant ideas’ such as “green meadows, 
fragrant groves, refreshing shades, crystal streams”14. And yet, our fancy being 
weak, the desirable ‘pleasures of Heaven’ or ‘coelestial joys’ remain hidden 
from us at present. These pleasures and joys, Berkeley assures, “shall be 
excellent beyond ye compass of our imagination”15.
It appears, further, that the chief point Berkeley makes in entry 720 is not 
about the meaning of the propositions in Scripture. In matters of revelation, he 
insists, “an Humble Implicit faith becomes us just (where we cannot 
comprehend & Understand the proposition) such as a popish peasant gives to 
propositions he hears at Mass in Latin” . Berkeley’s point, I think, is that we 
ought to assent to the relevant propositions in the Bible, that is, to believe what 
the speaker, i. e. God, tells us about the mysterious things, although we do not 
understand His talk completely. Berkeley’s comparison seems to imply that 
these propositions can be understood to some extent. For presumably the 
‘popish peasant’ has some idea of what is being said at ‘Mass in Latin’. The last 
sentence of the entry also suggests that, in our present life, we lack complete 
understanding of the propositions in question.16
Thus, contrary to Belfrage’s suggestion17, Berkeley, in contrasting “Matters 
of Reason & Philosophy” with “Matters of Revelation”18, does not introduce a 
rough distinction between the two completely different kinds of propositions: 
cognitive (informative) and non-cognitive (non-informative).
There is hardly any doubt, I think, that Berkeley held the relevant proposi­
tions in Scripture to be true, regardless of his philosophical views on language, 
signification, ideas, metaphors, etc. Not so on Berman’s reading. Berman thinks 
that, on Berkeley’s account the answer to the question whether these pro­
positions are true or not depends on how much cognitive content they have for 
us. Since, as Berkeley allegedly suggests, they have no cognitive content, it 
seems that they cannot be true. On the other hand, Berman argues, the final 
sentence of entry 720 — “Wn I shall come to plenary knowlege of the Meaning
14 “On Immortality”, Works, vol. 7, p. 12.
15 Ibid., p. 13.
16 For the latter details of interpretation I owe thanks to Robert McKim.
17 See Belfrage 1987, p. 56.
18 Likewise in entry 584 of the Commentaries Berkeley contrasts ‘implicit faith’ with 
reasoning and demonstrations (p. 76f.).
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of any Text then I shall yield an explicit be lief’ — implies that, for Berkeley, 
the propositions in question “can have cognitive content and can be true, if only 
in the next life”19. However, Berman has offered no evidence for the claim 
implied by his reading that Berkeley did not hold the orthodox view, which 
entails that these propositions are true just because they come (by the mediation 
of inspired writers) from God, who never lies. Berkeley admits elsewhere that 
“we have no determin’d idea of the pleasures of Heaven”20. Yet he does not 
indicate that the propositions about these pleasures are not true. The view 
Berman derives from entry 720, that such propositions cannot be true in this life 
and can be true in the next, is incomprehensible. To my knowledge Berkeley 
has nowhere in his writings suggested that propositions concerning the Trinity, 
divinity of Christ and the like may not be true. On the contrary, he was of 
opinion that the Christian religion relies on the saving truths revealed in 
Scripture.21
Thus Berkeley, in entry 720 of the Philosophical Commentaries, does not 
claim propositions relating to divine mysteries to be non-cognitive in the sense 
explained by Berman and Belfrage. And it is hardly believable that he later 
became to regard them as purely emotive. Rather he believed them to be true, 
informative and indeed meaningful; no ‘development’ occurred in that respect.
19 Berman 1994, p. 162. Cf. Belfrage 1986b, p. 323.
20 “On Immortality”, Works, vol. 7, p. 13.
21 Consider, for example his note for a sermon preached in 1729:
10. after all —  what mysterious truths come by Xt? St Mat. 13.11 to you it is given 
to know the mysteries o f heaven. Wt are these important pricipal truths? True God 
revealed, our own state by original sin & our own corruption. The cure thereof, 
life & immortality with the way to come at it. our eyes open’d as to sin & duty, 
hell & heaven &c, Rom 15. 29 25. Xt king wt his kingdom. Priest wt his sacrifice. 
sProphet wt his doctrine. Love of God & neighbour Summary thereof, other 
doctrines try’d by this touch-stone.
(Works, vol. 7, p. 84)
See also A Discourse addressed to Magistrates (1738), Works, vol. 6, p. 219, and 
Olscamp 1970, p. 216.
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EMOTIVE MEANING AND 
CHRISTIAN MYSTERIES 
IN BERKELEY’S ALCIPHRON
Roomet Jakapi
Berkeley’s Alciphron, or the Minute Philosopher (1732) is designed as a 
defence of the Christian religion against free-thinkers. This apology, however, 
contains philosophical discussions, for instance, on personal identity and free­
dom of the will that may in principle be considered independently of Berkeley’s 
religious intentions. It has been argued that the most and perhaps the only 
remarkable philosophical novelty in Alciphron is a theory of emotive meaning 
or emotive language, applied in this case to Christian mysteries. It has also been 
argued that the theory was already present in Berkeley’s Draft Introduction 
(1708).1 However, my concern here will be to examine the claim that Berkeley 
uses this kind of theory in Alciphron, more precisely, in the seventh dialogue, to 
explain the meaning of utterances concerning Christian mysteries. In the 
following I focus on the most detailed account of Berkeley’s alleged theory of 
emotive language in Alciphron, that of David Berman,2 but I also refer to 
similar claims of other scholars who have written on the topic.
On Berman’s emotivist reading, Berkeley held that utterances concerning 
such mysteries as the Holy Trinity and original sin are emotive, that is, non-
1 For the claim and related discussion see Genevieve Brykman, Berkeley: Philosophie 
et Apologetique, (Paris: Libraire Philosophique J. Vrin, 1984) Ch. 6 pp. 299-324, 
Berkeley et le Voile des Mots (Paris: Libraire Philosophique J. Vrin, 1993) Ch. 6 pp. 
189-224, Bertil Belfrage, ‘The clash on semantics in Berkeley’s Notebook A ’, 
Hermathena, 139 (1985): 117-126, ‘Berkeley’s Theory o f Emotive Meaning (1708)’, 
History of European Ideas, 7, (1986) No. 6: 643-649, ‘Development o f Berkeley’s early 
theory of meaning’, Revue Philosophique de la France et de I'Etranger, (1986) No. 3, 
pp. 319-30, ‘Editor’s Commentary’ in George Berkeley’s Manuscript Introduction, ed. 
B. Belfrage (Oxford: Doxa, 1987) 25-57, pp. 46-50 , Robert McKim, ‘The entries in 
Berkeley’s Notebooks: a reply to Bertil Belfrage’, Hermathena, 139 (1985): 156-161, 
p. 157, David Berman, ‘Berkeley’s Semantic Revolution: 19 November 1707-11 
January 1708’, History o f European Ideas, 7 (1986) No. 6: 603-607, M. A. Stewart, 
‘Berkeley’s Introduction Draft’, Berkeley Newsletter, 11 (1989-90): 10-19, pp. 16-7, 
Kenneth Wayne Williford, Three Studies on Berkeley's Philosophy of Language 
(Master’s Thesis, The University o f Iowa, 2000) Ch. 1 pp. 1^15.
2 D. Berman, ‘Cognitive theology and emotive mysteries in Berkeley’s Alciphron', 
Proceedings o f the Royal Irish Academy, 81c (1981) No 7: 219-229, reprinted in 
George Berkeley: Alciphron, or the minute philosopher in focus, ed. D. Berman 
(London: Routledge, 1993) 200-213, George Berkeley. Idealism and the Man (Oxford: 
Clarendon Press, 1994) 144-163. Berman’s interpretation in its most elaborated form is 
contained in the latter monograph.
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informative, and yet meaningful in the sense that they produce certain emotional 
effects in those who hear or read them, and also evoke morally right actions.3 
Berkeley used, then, the theory in Alciphron to defend mysteries by showing 
that utterances about them are significant, despite the fact that they do not 
inform or stand for ideas.
The main purpose of this paper is to refute the claim that Berkeley, in 
Alciphron, considered propositions concerning the Christian mysteries to be 
non-informative, and reduced their meaning to the ability to evoke emotional 
effects, and actions 4 I also attempt to show what he actually said about faith 
and mysteries, and the propositions in relation to them.
In section I, I give a brief description of Berman’s interpretation. In section
II, I point out a fundamental ambiguity in Berman’s talk of mysteries and try to 
clarify what Berkeley himself meant by ‘mysteries’. In sections III and IV, I 
offer objections to the emotivist reading. I argue that this reading attributes to 
Berkeley views which either are inconsistent with what Berkeley explicitly says 
in Alciphron or bear too little or no textual support. Finally, I reach the 
conclusion that Berkeley held that at least some of the propositions concerning 
the mysteries are true and informative, and that the relevant effects and actions 
are produced in part by comprehension of what is communicated by those 
propositions.
I
Berkeley’s philosophical theology in Alciphron, as Berman sees it, relies on the 
linguistic distinction between cognitive statements and emotive utterances, or, 
more generally, between the cognitive and three non-cognitive functions of 
language. Thus cognitive statements such as ‘That cow is brown’5 inform, 
whereas emotive utterances such as ‘Cheer up!’, ‘Life’s a bore’ or ‘Get out!’ 
produce (1) emotions, (2) dispositions, and (3) actions. Both the statements and 
utterances are meaningful, the former so far as they inform or stand for ideas, 
the latter as they produce those effects in the minds of the readers and hearers.
3 I take it that by ‘utterances’ Berman means spoken or written expressions. His 
interpretation is primarily concerned with emotive utterances as contrasted with 
cognitive (informative) statements (See sect. I below). Berkeley himself makes no 
explicit distinction, using the term ‘proposition’ to cover both cases.
4 Thus I do not intend to give a general account o f his views on language and meaning 
either in Alciphron or elsewhere. Nor do I at present intend to examine the question 
whether certain early texts such as the Philosophical Commentaries and sermon ‘On 
Immortality’ justify attributing to Berkeley an appeal to an emotive theory of meaning 
in these contexts.
5 The relevant examples are given by Berman (Berman 1981, p. 224; 1993, p. 206; 
1994, p. 148).
2
Statements of natural or rational theology, particularly those about the existence 
and attributes of God, belong, on Berman’s reading, to the first, and utterances 
concerning mysteries to the second category.6 Thus the statement ‘God exists 
and is wise’ conveys some information or knowledge about God and has 
cognitive content. Utterances concerning the Holy Trinity, grace of God, 
original sin or a future state, on the other hand, ‘have little or no cognitive 
content’7 and thus are ‘essentially emotive’8 for Berkeley.
According to this emotivist reading, Berkeley held that certain words have 
emotive power and that words or utterances used in talking about mysteries are 
of that kind, producing such effects as love, hope, obedience, and good habits.9 
Berman does not argue that in Alciphron —  as he says is the case in the Draft 
Introduction —  Berkeley explained this effectiveness of utterances as a 
consequence of customary connection between them and certain emotions, 
dispositions, and actions. Yet they have, Berman says, a ‘tendency’ or are 
‘likely to’, or at least ‘can’, produce these effects.10 Berman insists that, for 
Berkeley, the emotive effectiveness of talk of mysteries rests on our background 
belief in the existence of a good, wise, and just God. Talk of mysteries is 
intended to make us ‘act and feel in certain ways’, that is, to make us perform 
morally right actions and to have certain attitude towards God: to fear his justice 
and to love him.11
II
While talking about Berkeley’s putative use of the theory of emotive language 
to defend Christian mysteries, the first thing to be clarified is what he meant by 
‘mysteries’ and whether he thought there were mysteries in some sense or 
another as distinguished from utterances about them. The notion of mysteries 
involved in Berman’s interpretation is not clear-cut. On the one hand he is close 
to saying that mysteries are certain (emotive, non-cognitive) words or
6 Berkeley saw, according to Berman, that non-cognitive words can evoke emotions, 
but not that (such) words can express them too, as in ‘Oh dear!’ or ‘G osh!’ (Berman 
1994, p. 161). There is, however, Berman says:
no doubt that he [Berkeleyl anticipates the em otive analysis o f metaphysical and 
religious language offered by such (former) Logical Positivists as A. J. Ayer, in 
Language, Truth and Logic (London, 1936), chs. 1 and 6. The irony, o f course, is 
that the Logical Positivists applied the emotive theory destructively to religion, 
whereas Berkeley used it to defend religion.
(Berman 1994, p. 155; cf. 1981, p. 229; 1993, p. 212)
7 Berman 1981, p. 223; 1993, p. 205; 1994, p. 147, 162.
8 Berman 1981, p. 227; 1993, p. 210; 1994, p. 159.
9 Berman 1994, pp. 146-7, 150-4; cf. 1981, pp. 223-4; 1993, p. 205
10 Berman 1981, pp. 223-4; 1993, p. 205; 1994, p. 147.
11 Berman 1981, pp. 219, 224; 1993, pp. 200, 206; 1994, pp. 134, 147.
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utterances. Consider the following passage where he links Berkeley’s account 
of mysteries to Toland’s view:
that if a word does not signify a distinct idea, then it is meaningless; and that 
since Christian mysteries do not stand for ideas, they must be as meaningless 
as ‘Blictri’.
Now Berkeley accepted part of Toland’s claim, namely, that religious 
mysteries do not signify distinct ideas; but this does not imply, Berkeley 
urged, that they are meaningless. That conclusion only follows if one accepts 
the Lockean either/or [...] that words either communicate ideas and are 
meaningful, or do not signify ideas and are meaningless.
(Berman 1994, pp. 148-9)12
Mysteries, it would seem, are regarded here as words rather than something 
signified, meant or expressed by them. On the other hand Berman frequently 
distinguishes between mysteries and their verbal expressions or the terms 
signifying them:
By skilfully using some of the critical results of his early work in 
philosophy and philosophy of science, Berkeley tries to show that there is 
nothing ‘absurd or repugnant’ in the Christian mysteries. Thus he 
contends that while it is hard to understand grace, it is not any harder than 
understanding the scientist’s concept of force; although both ‘grace’ and 
‘force’ are of considerable use (Ale. vii. 7). And while there seem to be 
difficulties in understanding the Athanasian doctrine of the Trinity, there 
are similar perplexities, Berkeley holds, in the widely accepted (Lockean) 
theory of personal identity (developed in Essay, II. xxvi), that personal 
identity consists in identity of consciousness.
(Ibid., p. 156)13
The religious mysteries along with the ‘mysteries’ in science and philosophy are 
considered here as doctrines that may contain difficulties, be more or less 
comprehensible, but not as mere (emotive, non-cognitive) words or utterances. 
In one place, Berman says that the mysteries are expressed in emotive language, 
which also implies a distinction.14 He asks, further, whether the mysteries as 
distinguished from statements about them can be true, on Berkeley’s scheme.15
12 Cf. ibid., p. 15; 1981, p. 225; 1993, p. 207.
13 Cf. Berman 1981, pp. 226-7; 1993, pp. 209-10.
14 See the figure in Berman 1981, p. 226; 1993, p. 209; 1994, p. 155. Note that this 
view seems incompatible with Berman’s claim that utterances concerning mysteries are 
essentially emotive —  if they are not essentially different from such utterances as 
‘Cheer up!’ and ‘Get out!’, they cannot express even obscure or incomprehensible 
doctrines since the latter utterances do not inform and do not express anything, 
according to Berman.
15 Berman 1994, pp. 161-2.
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And finally, he points to Berkeley’s suggestion that ‘words about mysteries can 
function symbolically’.16
Berman’s interpretation appears to turn on a confused conception of 
mysteries. For in the passages describing the theory of emotive meaning, he 
says both of the verbal expressions of mysteries and the mysteries themselves 
that they are ‘emotive’, have ‘little or no cognitive content’, which, however, 
‘does not prevent their meaningful use’, and that they ‘do not stand for ideas’.17 
The mysteries bear, on that account, characteristics that Berman ascribes to 
words, statements and utterances. In the discussion of Berkeley’s ‘parity 
arguments’ concerning faith, science, and philosophy, however, the mysteries 
are distinguished from utterances about them; they are, then, something that can 
be expressed in (emotive) language.18
Berkeley himself maintains clearly that ‘the wording of a mystery’ or 
‘retaining or rejecting a term’ in talking about mysteries is not a substantial 
issue (VII. 10; Works 3: 302)19 and that, for instance, the same doctrine of the 
Trinity or ‘Creator, Redeemer, and Sanctifier’ is expressed in various ways and 
propositions (VII. 8; Works 3: 297). It is hard to understand then the question of 
whether the doctrine or mystery itself (not the term ‘Trinity’) does or does not 
signify ideas.20
In general, it is indeed the revealed doctrines of grace, original sin, and 
others that Berkeley calls mysteries (VI. 10, 12; VII. 4, 8; Works 3: 239, 242-3, 
289, 296-7). This, however, is not the only signification of the term ‘mystery’. 
Pointing to the use and effects of faith, Berkeley says concerning the evil 
intentions of a freethinker:
Whereas that very man, do but produce in him a sincere belief of a Future 
State, although it be a mystery, although it be what eye hath not seen, nor 
ear heard, nor hath it entered into the heart of man to conceive, he shall, 
nevertheless, by virtue of such belief, be withheld from executing his 
wicked project: and that for reasons which all men can comprehend, 
though nobody can be the object of them.
(VII. 10; Works 3: 303)
16 Ibid., p. 163.
17 See Berman 1981, pp. 223-5; 1993, pp. 205-8; 1994, pp. 145-149, 162.
18 See Berman 1981, pp. 226-7; 1993, pp. 209-11; 1994, pp. 155-9. The same 
confusion arises in Berman’s article ‘George Berkeley’ in Routledge History of 
Philosophy, Vol. V, British Philosophy and the Age of Enlightenment, ed. S. Brown 
(London: Routledge, 1996) 123-149, pp. 1 3 9 ^ 0 .
19 References to Berkeley’s works are from The Works of George Berkeley Bishop of 
Cloyne, ed. A. A. Luce and T.E. Jessop (London, 1948-57). References to Alciphron 
additionally cite dialogue number and section number.
20 Cf. Berman 1994, pp. 148-9, 162.
19 5
And concerning the Christian mysteries in general he observes:
why men that are so easily and so often gravelled in common points, in 
things natural and visible, should yet be so sharp-sighted and dogmatical 
about the invisible world and its mysteries is to me a point utterly 
unaccountable by all the rules of logic and good sense.
(VI. 30; Works 3: 280)
It appears that the ‘mysteries’ in this sense signify certain hidden realities, 
which the doctrines and utterances concern. Berkeley’s description of the 
effects arising from the belief in mysteries is, accordingly, intended to prove 
that the ‘doctrines relating to heavenly mysteries might be taught, in this saving 
sense, to vulgar minds’ (VII. 9; Works 3: 299-300, emphasis added). The 
heavenly mysteries, then, are distinguished both from doctrines relating to them 
and utterances about them. Consequently, Berman’s assertion that Berkeley 
gives an ‘emotive account of mysteries’21 —  in either of his senses of the 
word —  that is, takes the Christian mysteries to be merely emotive utterances or 
doctrines expressed in emotive language, is, at best, misleading.
Ill
Nevertheless, it is still worth inquiring whether there is to be found, in 
Alciphron, an emotivist theory of the meaning of utterances concerning 
mysteries. There are, I argue, several reasons why such a theory cannot be 
reasonably ascribed to Berkeley.
Berkeley speaks, in fact, about the effects of faith  or ‘belief of mysteries’ in 
general and about the effects of one’s belief in particular mysteries, and not 
about the effects of mere utterances. Thus he talks about ‘the saving faith of 
Christians’ which is ‘a vital operative principle, productive of charity and 
obedience’ (VII. 9; Works 3: 300) and the effects of the belief in original sin and 
a future state (VII. 10; Works 3: 301-3). Faith or belief, according to Berkeley, 
is or at least implies assent to a proposition, and in one place he is inclined to 
say that it is the propositions concerning the Trinity which direct and affect the 
mind (VII. 8; Works 3: 297). However, he clearly relates this influence to the 
belief in the Trinity. And in another passage he refers to the ‘articles of our 
Christian faith which, in proportion as they are believed, persuade, and, as they 
persuade, influence the lives and actions of men’ (VII. 15; Works 3: 308, 
emphasis added).
It seems that Berkeley’s account of the efficacy of the Christian faith cannot 
be construed as the introduction of a theory of emotive meaning, unless one first 
assumes that by ‘effects of faith’ he means effects produced by certain emotive 
utterances. And this is indeed what Berman appears to assume on his emotivist
21 Berman 1981, p. 224; 1993, p. 206; 1994; p. 147.
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reading. He also expresses this assumption by the puzzling statement that 
Berkeley ‘identifies faith with the three non-cognitive functions of language’.22 
This emotivist reading makes it difficult to understand what Berman means 
elsewhere by the 'belief in the Christian mysteries’, 23 and how such belief could 
be related to faith.
In any case, regardless of internal coherence of Berman’s position there is no 
evidence for his general claim that Berkeley held the relevant propositions to be 
non-cognitive, or merely emotive.
The emotivist reading faces another interesting problem which is the 
meaning or meaningful use of utterances concerning particular mysteries or the 
doctrines in question. If they do not suggest distinct ideas, inform or have 
cognitive content, what, then, makes a difference between the meaningful use of 
the utterances concerning a particular mystery and those concerning another 
such mystery or all others? Berman seems to think that the difference lies in the 
effects produced by those utterances. He relies on the examples that Berkeley 
gives of the good effects resulting from the belief in particular mysteries; but, as 
already noted, Berman describes these effects as effects of the ‘talk o f  
mysteries. Thus he links utterances about the Trinity to ‘love, hope, gratitude, 
and obedience’, those about grace to ‘good habits and piety’, those about 
original sin to deterring ‘people from committing an evil deed’, and those about 
the future state to ‘good habits and a salutary sense of one’s unworthiness’.24 
Utterances concerning different mysteries have, on this reading, distinctive 
emotive meaning since they produce different or at least not wholly coinciding 
effects.
In this context, however, Berman, first of all, mismatches Berkeley’s claims 
concerning original sin and a future state. According to Berman:
original sin can deter people from com m itting an evil deed, and a future state 
is likely to produce good habits and a salutary sense o f  one’s unworthiness.
(Berman 1994, p. 147)25
22 Berman 1981, p. 223; 1993, p. 205; 1994, p. 146.
23 Berman 1981, p. 224; 1993, p. 206; 1994, p. 147, emphasis added.
24 Berman 1994, pp. 146-7; cf. 1981, pp. 223—4; 1993, pp. 205-6. Berman is 
accompanied here by Peter Walmsley who puts it explicitly that a ‘“proper impression” 
of the words [relating to the Trinity] depends on the reader’s having quite specific 
emotional responses —  “love, hope, gratitude, and obedience” —  and then acting 
appropriately on these feelings —  “agreeably to the notion of saving faith’” . (The 
Rhetoric o f Berkeley’s Philosophy. Cambridge Studies in Eighteenth-Century English 
Literature and Thought 6 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990), p. 186, 
emphasis added).
25 Cf. Berman 1981, p. 224; 1993, p. 205.
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In Berkeley we find that a man’s belief in original sin:
may produce in his mind a salutary sense of his own unworthiness, and the 
goodness of his Redeemer: from whence may follow good habits, and from 
them good actions.
(VII. 10; Works 3: 301)
And in the passage cited above, Berkeley says:
Whereas that very man, do but produce in him a sincere belief of a Future 
State, although it be a mystery [...] he shall, nevertheless, by virtue of 
such belief, be withheld from executing his wicked project.
(Vn. 10; Works 3: 303)
Berman’s slip would be insignificant if it did not reveal a more serious problem 
in his interpretation. In removing (almost) everything cognitive from the talk 
and faith or belief concerning mysteries, there appears to be nothing that makes 
this particular effect, abstaining from an evil action, appropriate to the belief in 
future state and those other effects, the sense of one’s unworthiness and of the 
goodness of Redeemer, to the belief in original sin. The connection between 
particular effects and beliefs remains inexplicable.
The whole emotivist reading relies on Berkeley’s remarks on the Trinity, 
grace, original sin and future state. Yet Berman even does not mention that 
Berkeley talks about the belief in a number of other mysteries such as the 
divinity of Christ, resurrection of the dead and ‘God manifest in the flesh’, that 
is, incarnation (VI. 10, 11; VII. 8; Works 3: 239-41, 298), and in those cases 
without mentioning distinctive or any emotional effects.
According to Berman, Berkeley held that certain words or names have 
‘emotive power’ or a tendency to produce ‘emotions, habits, and actions’.26 
However, the words like ‘trinity’ or ‘incarnation’ may hardly be said to bear a 
particular emotive or action-promoting power. There is nothing essentially 
emotive in them. The same applies to the theological propositions in which such 
terms occur. For Berkeley mentions disputes about the ‘nature, extent, and 
effects’ as well as other aspects of grace and compares them with discussions 
about force  in science. In that context, utterances about force and grace are 
obviously not intended to evoke emotions. Neither are they utterly meaningless 
for Berkeley (VII. 7; Works 3: 296). Despite his insistence on practical faith and 
a critical attitude towards useless speculations (VII. 15; Works 3: 308), there is 
no evidence that he held all theological propositions and discussions concerning 
mysteries to be either emotive or senseless. Furthermore, Berkeley certainly 
thought that certain views and propositions concerning mysteries were false, 
like those of the Sabellians (VII. 9; Works 3: 300-1). Hence it is reasonable to 
suppose that he thought the Anglican ‘doctrines relating to heavenly mysteries’ 
and the relevant propositions were true. He has, in fact, expressed no doubt
26 Berman 1994, pp. 150, 152-3.
about that. His saying that ‘there may be possibly divers true and useful 
propositions’ concerning grace (VII. 7; Works 3: 296), is, I think, not an 
expression of uncertainty about the truth of the Christian doctrine of grace,27 but 
rather an admittance that no proposition concerning grace can be shown to be 
true and yet the queries about it and not having ideas of it do not prove that 
these propositions cannot be useful and true.
Berman, perhaps, tries to escape the difficulty by saying that:
Berkeley’s emotive account of mysteries rests squarely on his cognitive 
account of theology.
(Berman 1981, p. 224; 1993, p. 206; 1994, p. 147)
The mysteries, on this account, are not a subject of theology. Yet this is not 
Berkeley’s view for, as already said, he refers to theological discussions about 
mysteries. From Berman’s reading it follows that theological — like any 
other — talk of mysteries is emotive; and then, to be consistent, it is necessary 
to introduce an extraordinary distinction between cognitive and emotive 
theology which has no foundation in Alciphron.
IV
In addition to the previous objections, there are also strong reasons in 
Berkeley’s theology to reject the emotivist reading.
In Berman’s view, Berkeley held that God disclosed the mysteries or 
doctrines of the Trinity, future state etc. just in order to make people act 
virtuously and have the right feeling or attitude towards God: to fear His justice 
and to love Him.28 The mysteries serve, then, merely as tools to produce in 
people such effects as love, hope, gratitude, piety and good habits. It is not quite 
clear whether or not this ‘emotive account of mysteries’ implies that Berkeley 
himself believed that, for example, God is a trinity and has truly been ‘manifest 
in the flesh’. So Berman may be understood as attributing to Berkeley some­
what unorthodox views on basic Christian doctrines.
There is, however, inadequate textual evidence for Berman’s claim that 
Berkeley thought the mysteries (doctrines) served no other purpose than to 
produce certain emotions, dispositions, and actions, and to deepen a belief in the 
existence and attributes of God. The passages quoted or mentioned by Berman
27 Cf. Berman 1994, pp. 162-3.
28 This accords with Bertil Belfrage’s comment on ‘Berkeley’s emotive theory’ in the 
Draft Introduction: ‘“There are good things in heaven’ seems to be a recommendation 
to act in accordance with what Christian doctrine prescribes as our duty” (Belfrage 
1987, p. 48). For alternative readings, see Paul J. Olscamp, The Moral Philosophy of 
George Berkeley (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1970), 149-153, and Williford 2000, 
Ch. l,p p . 7 -22.
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to support his claims (IV. 18; V. 27, 29; VII, 7, 8, 10, and Works 7: 146-7)29 in 
no way indicate that Berkeley regarded mysteries merely as tools to bring about 
‘good habits’ and that they were utterly in the service of natural religion. For 
instance, Berman asserts:
Nothing will so effectively make people fear God’s justice as the mystery
of a future state.
(Berman 1994, p. 147)30
All that Berkeley says on this point is that the ‘belief of a Future State’ is more 
effective in avoiding an evil action than a theoretical talk of the ‘beauty of 
virtue’, which ‘powerful effect’ relies on the fear of future punishment (VII. 10; 
Works 3: 302-3).31 It does not follow from this, however, that he thought talk 
and belief about the future state is needed only or primarily to evoke morally 
right actions and the feeling of fear. If Berkeley held that God’s revelation 
concerning the future state was not intended to make us aware of the future 
rewards and punishments, then, it seems, he believed there was nothing to fear. 
‘For why should a bad man fear a being that is not literally just’, Berman asks.32 
But why should a bad man fear God’s justice if he thought with Berkeley that 
the talk of future punishments was merely emotive?
Berman does not take seriously Berkeley’s claim that the ‘doctrines relating 
to heavenly mysteries’ are ‘revelations of God’ (VII. 8; Works 3: 296).33 The 
emotivist reading entails that Berkeley took God’s revelation concerning 
heavenly mysteries to be non-informative. However, to reveal (revelare) 
something concerning these mysteries means nothing other than to make 
something known about them; and Berkeley held the words and propositions of 
the Scriptures to be instrumental in this informative process (VI, 4, 6-8; Works 
3: 225, 228-233). He says that revelation was not intended to ‘convey a perfect 
knowledge’ but rather imperfect ‘hints and glimpses’ (VI. 8; Works 3: 233-4). 
Yet if it gave some knowledge about the mysteries, however imperfect it be, the 
utterances used for that purpose were not essentially emotive; and there appears 
to be no point in asking whether or not he ever ‘intended to explain all 
mysteries in the way he explained that of the future state, as purely emotive’.34 
It also seems to follow then that Berkeley regarded propositions concerning
29 See Berman 1981, pp. 223-4; 1993, pp. 205-7; 1994 pp. 146-8.
30 Cf. Berman 1981, p. 224; 1993, p. 206.
31 See also Berkeley’s essays in The Guardian (1713), No. 55, ‘The Sanctions o f  
Religion’, Works 7: 198-201, p. 199, and No. 89, ‘Immortality’, Works 7: 222-4 , p. 
223.
32 Berman 1981, p. 224; 1993, p. 206; 1994, p. 147.
33 Berkeley held the view that all o f these doctrines are contained in the Scripture (VI. 
10; VII. 4, 8, 15; Works 3: 239, 289, 297, 309).
34 Berman 1994, p. 163.
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God’s revelation as true propositions, not as merely emotive utterances, ‘neither 
true nor false’ .35
Finally, Berman’s reading seems incompatible with Berkeley’s arguments 
from the analogy of nature between the ‘things spiritual, supernatural, or 
relating to another world’ and natural things (VI. 11; Works 3: 240-1).36 For 
instance, Berkeley says:
I cannot comprehend why any one who admits the union of the soul and 
body should pronounce it impossible for the human nature to be united to the 
divine, in a manner ineffable and incomprehensible by reason.
(Ibid.)
The purpose of this comparison is to show that the doctrine of the two natures 
being united in Christ is not absurd (VI. 10, 12; Works 3: 239-40, 242-3) which 
implies that so far as analogy goes, something can be understood concerning the 
mystery. It is hard to conceive how this fits the assumption that utterances about 
the two natures of Christ are merely emotive, that is, meaningless, except in so 
far as they produce emotional effects, and that Berkeley excluded meaningful 
non-emotive talk of mysteries.37
I conclude therefore, on the whole, that in Alciphron Berkeley does not 
consider propositions concerning heavenly mysteries as emotive, non-informa- 
tive utterances. It seems, rather, that he assumed the relevant propositions (in 
the Scriptures, Creeds, 39 Articles o f Religion, etc.) were true and conveyed 
some information about supernatural things, eternal, past, present, or to come. 
There seems to be, accordingly, no reason to doubt that he thought, simply, that 
the terms in question do signify heavenly mysteries: that, for instance, ‘incarna­
tion’ stands for incarnation, and ‘grace’, in its religious sense, as Berkeley says, 
denotes ‘an active, vital, ruling principle, influencing and operating on the mind 
of man, distinct from every natural power or motive’ (VII. 4; Works 3: 290), 
notwithstanding our not having ‘clear and distinct’, ‘abstract’, ‘precise’, 
‘positive’ or indeed any ideas of those mysteries (VII. 8-10; Works 3: 297, 300, 
303). Berkeley’s concern in Alciphron, dialogue VII, is to show that one can 
reasonably assent to propositions concerning mysteries (VII. 1 ,4 , 8; Works 3: 
286, 290, 296-7) and that the terms and propositions in question are not 
‘senseless and insignificant’ (VII. 2; Works 3: 287); in that context he insists on 
the good effects that follow from such belief or what he calls ‘the efficacious 
necessary use of faith without ideas’ (VII. 10; Works 3: 302). The religious 
assent and its ‘genuine effects’ imply, on his account, some comprehension of 
what is believed and how it relates to us. For example, the belief in a future
35 See Ayer 1936, Ch. 6.
36 See also Berkeley’s sermon ‘On Eternal L ife’, Works 7: 105-113, p. 107.
I do not deny then that, according to Berkeley, such utterances can evoke emotions 
and dispositions. Rather I deny that he regarded them as essentially emotive, non- 
cognitive, non-informative utterances.
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State, implies, among other things, the realization that evil intentions and actions 
in this life will bring about some (in our present condition unknown) dreadful 
punishments in the next. Such belief is possible, according to Berkeley, without 
having ideas of those particular punishments (VII. 10; Works 3: 302-3). Thus 
the influence of Christian faith on human minds does not merely follow, on 
Berkeley’s view, from the emotive power of certain words or utterances. Still 
less is the meaning of those utterances to be explained in terms of their emotive 
power.
University of Tartu, Estonia
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AYER, BERMAN, BERKELEY JA 
EMOTIIVNE TÄHENDUS
Alljärgnevas arutelus figureerivad kolm põhitegelast, loogilise positivismi 
kunagine esindaja Alfred J. Ayer (1910-1989), idealismiklassik George Berke­
ley (1685-1753), meie kaasaegne filosoofia-ajaloolane ja  filosoof, Dublini Tri­
nity Kolledži professor David Berman, ja  hulk kõrvaltegelasi.
Berman on ilmselt esimene (ja sealjuures väga autoriteetne) Berkeley-uurija, 
kes on selgesõnaliselt ja üksikasjalikult väljendanud seisukohta, et keele ja 
tähenduse vallas oli Berkeley Ayer’ (ja ka teiste loogiliste positivistide) eel­
käijaks. Täpsemalt väidab Berman, et Berkeley on esitanud teooria teatud tüüpi 
lausungite [utterances] emotiivse tähenduse kohta, mis sarnaneb vägagi Ayer’ 
vastava asjakäsitlusega paarsada aastat hiljem. Säärase teooria väljamõtlemine 
teeb Berkeleyle kahtlemata au ning tõstab ta filosoofia ajaloos esile enam ja 
hoopis teisel moel, kui seda tavapäraselt kujutatud. Seda muidugi juhul, kui 
seesugune teooriaomistus õigustatud on.1
Allpool püüan ma näidata, et lähemal vaatlusel ilmneb, et Bermani 
Berkeley-tõlgitsus on meelevaldne ja  tekstilise kinnituseta.
Arvan, et tegemist on kasuliku õppetunniga, mis puudutab filosoofia ajaloo 
tõlgendamise problemaatikat üldiselt ja  seega võiks huvi pakkuda ka sootuks 
teiste teemadega tegelevatele filosoofia-ajaloo-tundlikele filosoofidele.
Artikli ülesehitus on järgmine. Pidades silmas Bermani Berkeley-interpretat- 
siooni lähtekohti annan kõigepealt lühiülevaate Ayer’ omaaegsest tähendus­
likkuse ehk mõttekuse kontseptsioonist. Seejärel vaatlen ja  hindan Bermani 
võrdlust Ayer’ emotivismi ja  Berkeley väidetava emotivismi vahel. Järgneb 
asjassepuutuvate terminite selgitus. Pärast seda annan üksikasjalikult edasi 
Bermani tõlgenduse, esitan sellele rea vastuväiteid ja teen kokkuvõtte.
Verifikatsioon ja tähendus
Teatavasti taotlesid loogilise positivismi esindajad teaduse puhastavat eristamist 
metafüüsikast (või pseudoteadusest), püüdes näidata, et metafüüsika-lausungid 
(laused, väited) on mõttetud või tähendusetud. Seevastu matemaatika ja  loogika 
analüütilised formulatsioonid ning empiiriliste teaduste lausungid on (nende 
arusaamise kohaselt) mõttekad ja tähenduslikud. Mõttekate (teaduslike) empii­
riliste lausungite eristamiseks metafüüsilisest absurdist võeti tarvitusele verifi- 
katsiooniprintsiip. Sellest lähemalt allpool.
! Mõned kommentaatorid on seostanud Berkeley keelekäsitust Austini kõneaktide 
teooriaga, hilise Wittgensteini arusaamaga keelemängudest jne. Neid tõlgitsusi ma 
käesolevas artiklis ei vaatle.
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Loogilise positivismi tähtteoseks ingliskeelses filosoofiamaailmas oli Alfred 
J. Ayer’ 1936. aastal ilmunud monograafia “Keel, tõdeja loogika” (Ayer 1990). 
Võib öelda, et epistemoloogilises plaanis on see teos jätkuks briti empiristlikule 
mõttesuunale, mille üheks klassikuks peetakse Berkeleyt. Kuna Berman seostab 
Berkeley ‘emotiivse tähenduse teooriat’ eelkõige just Ayer’ keelekäsitusega, 
siis püüan järgnevalt mõnevõrra lihtsustatud kujul esitada viimase arusaama 
verifikatsioonist kui lausete mõttekuse või tähenduslikkuse kontrollimise 
meetodist ning selle rakendustest metafüüsika ja  eetika valda kuuluvatele 
lausungitele.
Oma verifikatsiooniprintsiibi-esituses teeb Ayer vahet (väit)lausetel [sen­
tence] ja  propositsioonidel. Selle arusaama kohaselt laused väljendavad  (või 
näivad väljendavat) prepositsioone; propositsioonidel on tõeväärtus; verifitsee- 
ritakse prepositsioone, mitte lauseid.2 Ayer:
Kontrollimaks sääraste otsustuste [statement] ehtsust, mis paistavad olevat 
faktiotsustused, kasutame verifikatsioonikriteeriumi. Ütleme, et lause 
[sentence] on iga antud isiku jaoks faktiliselt tähenduslik [factually signi­
ficant] siis, ja ainult siis, kui isik teab, kuidas verifitseerida propositisiooni, 
mida see lause paistab väljendavat — see tähendab, kui ta teab, millised vaat­
lused paneksid ta teatud tingimustel tunnistama seda prepositsiooni tõeseks 
või heitma selle väärana kõrvale. Kui see arvatav prepositsioon on aga sää­
rase loomuga, et oletus tema tõesuse või vääruse kohta on kooskõlas ükskõik 
millise eeldusega isiku tulevikukogemuse suhtes, siis on see isiku seisukohalt 
võttes pelk pseudo-propositsioon, juhul kui tegu pole tautoloogiaga. Seda 
prepositsiooni väljendav lause võib olla tema jaoks emotsionaalselt tähen­
duslik; kuid ta pole sõna otseses mõttes tähenduslik.
(Ayer 1990: 16)
Ayer eristab praktilist ja  põhim õttelist verifitseeritavust, et tagada sääraste 
lausete vastavus tähenduslikkuse kriteeriumile, mille puhul me teame, millised 
teoreetiliselt võimalikud vaatlused oleksid arvatavalt nende lausetega väljenda­
tavate prepositsioonide tõesuse või vääruse kindlakstegemise seisukohalt rele­
vantsed, ehkki niisuguste vaatluste teostamine on praktiliselt võimatu. Ayer 
viitab siinkohal Moritz Schlicki toodud näitele, milleks on prepositsioon, et Kuu 
tagaküljel on mäed. See prepositsioon on praktiliselt verifitseerimatu, ütleb 
Ayer aastal 1936, sest niisugust raketti pole veel leiutatud, mille pardalt asja­
kohast vaatlust teostada, kuid me teame, milline teoreetiliselt mõeldav vaatlus 
seda prepositsiooni verifitseerida võiks (Ayer 1990: 17).
Verifikatsioonikriteeriumi rakendamisel metafüüsikale ilmneb, et sinna kuu­
luvate prepositsioonide (näit. “Meelekogemuse maailm tervikuna on eba­
2 Tõsi, mitte igal pool oma teoses ei pea ta sellest eksaktsest eristusest kinni, 
kõneledes kohati ka otsustuste/väidete [statement] ja lausete verifitseerimisest (vt. näit. 
lk. 108, 112). Ayer’ enda hilisem selgitus ja verifikatsiooniprintsiibi edasiarendus sisal­
dub raamatu lisas, mis on kirjutatud aastal 1946 (Ayer 1990: 171-185).
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reaalne”) tõesuse või vääruse kindlakstegemiseks on põhimõtteliselt võimatu 
teostada asjakohaseid vaatlusi ja  seega on tegemist pseudo-propositsioonidega. 
Metafüüsiku lausungitel ei ole faktilist sisu, s.t. nendega tahetakse midagi 
faktilist väita, ehk teisisõnu, väljendada ehtsaid ehk tõelisi [genuine] proposit- 
sioone, aga tegelikult ei väideta nendega midagi ja  nad on mõttetud 
[nonsensical] (Ayer 1990: 17, 21, 24).
Oma teose 6. peatüki “Eetika ja  teoloogia kriitika” lõpuosas rakendab Ayer 
sama kriteeriumi teoloogiale, leides, et prepositsioonid Jumala eksistentsi ja 
loomuse või inimeste surmajärgse elu [afterlife] kohta kuuluvad metafüüsika 
valda, sest ükski põhimõtteliselt teostatav vaatlus ei ole nende prepositsioonide 
tõesuse või vääruse kindlakstegemise seisukohalt relevantne; neist asjust kõne­
ledes ei öelda maailma kohta midagi, ei väära ega tõest, vastavad lausungid on 
mõttetud, (otseses mõttes) tähenduseta [not literally significant] (Ayer 1990: 
123).
Nagu nähtub eelpool tsiteeritud lõigust, arvab Ayer, et mõnedel faktilises 
plaanis mõttetutel, tähenduseta lausungitel võib lausuja jaoks olla emotsio­
naalne tähendus. See käib ka teatud tüüpi ‘väärtusotsustuste’ [statements o f 
value, judgements o f  value] kohta, millele keskendutaksegi 6. peatükis. Ayer 
vaatleb ‘eetikaotsustusi’ [ethical statements], kinnitades samas, et kõik nende 
kohta öeldu kehtib ka esteetikaotsustuste puhul [aesthetical statements].
Ta eristab eetika vallas kaht sorti lausungeid, millel on kõneleja jaoks 
emotsionaalne tähendus: “manitsused vooruslikkusele” [exhortations to moral 
virtue] ja  “tegelikke eetikaotsustusi” [actual ethical judgements] väljendavad 
lausungid. Nimetatud manitsused või õhutused ei ole Ayer’ väitel “üldsegi mitte 
prepositsioonid” (siin ilmselt ‘väite’ või ‘väitlause’ tähenduses), vaid nad on 
“hüüatused või käsud, mille eesmärgiks on ajendada lugejat teatud kindlal moel 
tegutsema” (Ayer 1990: 108). ‘Tegelikke eetikaotsustusi’ käsitledes märgib 
Ayer, et ta tegeleb üksnes normatiivse (mitte deskriptiivse) eetikaga. Norma­
tiivse eetika lausungid, näiteks lausungid kujul “x on hea” või “x on vale 
[wrong]”, milles esinevad normatiivse eetika sümbolid (näit. ‘vale’), ei väljenda 
‘empiirilisi prepositsioone’. Teisisõnu, neil pole faktilist sisu ja  nad ei ütle ega 
väljenda midagi tõest ega väära. Kui lauses esineb mingi eetika-sõna ehk 
‘-sümbol’, siis on sel vaid ‘emotiivne’ funktsioon: väljendada lause ütleja või 
kirjutaja tunnet teatud objekti(de) suhtes. Näiteks lause “Raha varastamine on 
vale” [“Stealing money is wrong.”] asemel võiks samahästi öelda “... 
varastatakse raha!!” [“Stealing moneyW”]. Sõna ‘vale’ kasutatakse siin vaid 
tundeväljenduseks. Ayer leiab, et eetikatermineid ei kasutata mitte üksnes tun­
nete väljendamiseks, vaid ka nende esilekutsumiseks ja  seeläbi teatud tege­
vustele õhutamiseks.
Kokkuvõtteks võib öelda, et Ayer’ arusaamise kohaselt ei väljenda nime­
tatud tüüpi, eetika ja  esteetika valda kuuluvad lausungid (1) midagi tõest ega 
väära, (2) neil puudub faktiline sisu (kognitiivne tähendus), kuid (3) neil on 
emotiivne funktsioon ja  tähendus.
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Berman, Berkeley ja Ayer
Juba paarikümne aasta vältel on David Berman mitmetes oma artiklites ja  
samuti ühes monograafias väitnud3, et Ayer’ ja  teiste omaaegsete loogiliste 
positivistide poolt esitatud emotivistlik “metafüüsilise ja religioosse keele 
analüüs” polnud täiesti uudne, sest paarsada aastat varem on Berkeley teoses 
Alciphron: or, the minute philosopher (1732) teinud avalikuks oma ‘emotiivse 
teooria’ [emotive theory] seletamaks teatud tüüpi religioossete terminite ja  
lausete tähendust. Seejuures nendib Berman iroonilist seika, et loogilised posi­
tivistid kasutasid oma teooriat religiooni suhtes destruktiivselt, Berkeley aga 
püüdis samase teooria abil religiooni kaitsta. “Oleks veelgi iroonilisem”, jätkab 
Berman, “kui näiteks Ayer’ emotiivse keele käsitlus pärineks Berkeleylt” 
(Berman 1994: 155). Siiski on Ayer ühes erakirjas (5. mail 1975) Bermani 
vastava pärimise peale kostnud:
Niipalju kui ma mäletan, ei olnud ma KEELE, TÕE JA LOOGIKA 6. pea­
tüki kiijutamise ajal sugugi mõjutatud Berkeley emotiivsest keeleteooriast. 
Olen täiesti kindel, et kui ma sissejuhatuses tunnistasin oma tänuvõlga 
Berkeley ees, siis pidasin silmas üksnes tema fenomenalismi.
(Ibid.)
Olgu nende otseste mõjutustega nii või teisiti, näib, et filosoofia ajaloo ühe 
arenguliini rekonstrueerimise seisukohalt on Berman esitanud tõsise väljakutse. 
Samas kaasneb tema tõlgendusega algusest peale põhimõttelisi raskusi.
Lausungid ‘Jumala’, ‘surmajärgse elu’ jms. kohta on Ayer’ järgi lihtsalt ja 
sõna otseses mõttes nonsenss ning erinevalt eetika valda kuuluvatest 
lausungitest kujul “x on vale”, “x on halb” jne., ei omistata religioossetele 
lausungitele4 emotiivset tähendust. Ayer’ raamat ei sisalda religioosse keele 
emotiivse tähenduse teooriat, mille Berman omistab Berkeleyle. Siit 
põhimõtteline erinevus Ayer’ ja Berkeley väidetava emotivismi vahel.5 Kui 
Alciphron' is sisaldubki ‘emotiivse tähenduse’ teooria, siis kasutatakse seda seal 
teatud tüüpi religioonilausungite, nimelt kristlike müsteeriumide kohta käivate 
lausungite tähenduse selgitamiseks. Kas Alciphron’is seesugune teooria või 
kontseptsioon sisaldub, ongi järgneva diskussiooni põhiküsimuseks. Seni on 
ilmnenud, et eelkirjeldatud võrdlus Ayer’ga on pinnapealne ja rangelt võttes 
ebaadekvaatnegi. Samas on Bermani Berkeley-tõlgendus Ayer’st inspireeritud 
ja  seetõttu tuleb ka järgnevas seda (olgugi meelevaldset) paralleeli silmas pida­
da. Nii näiteks tuleks arvestada sellega, et Berman kõrvutab Berkeley teooriat 
nimelt Ayer’ ja  teiste omaaegsete loogiliste positivistide emotivismiga, mis
3 Berman 1981; 1982: 148-165; 1993; 1994: 144-163; 1996. Kuna Bermani 
interpretatsioon on kõige põhjalikumal kujul esitatud monograafias (Berman 1994), siis 
annan viited just sellele.
4 Nimetan neid edaspidi ka religioonilausungiteks.
5 Neile asjaoludele juhtisid mu tähelepanu Tom Stoneham ja Tiiu Hallap.
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tähendab, et emotivismi või mittekognitivismi hilisemad arengusuunad ja  
vormid, nagu ka uuemad psühholoogilised uurimused emotsioonide kohta otse­
selt asjasse ei puutu.
Terminoloogiline selgitus
Emotivismi omistamisega Berkeleyle kaasneb paratamatult terminoloogilisi/ 
semantilisi/kontseptuaalseid nihkeid. Ülalpool tsiteeritud lõigus tegi Ayer vahet 
lausetel (lausungitel) ja  propositsioonidel, nõnda et (selles skeemis) esimesed 
väljendavad  viimaseid. Laused on mõttekad või mõttetud, tähenduslikud või 
tähendusetud, propositsioonid, mida saab lausetega väljendada, on tõesed või 
väärad, tõelised või pseudo-propositsioonid. Eristus propositsioonide ja  neid 
väljendavate lausete vahel on analüütilise filosoofia traditsioonis püsinud 
tänapäevani, kusjuures enamasti käsitatakse propositsioone kui lausete tähen­
dusi, abstraktseid objekte jne., vahel ka kui teatud tüüpi mentaalseid entiteete; 
täielikku üksmeelt küsimuses, mis ja  isegi kas propositsioonid on, ei ole 
saavutatud. Samas mõeldakse ingliskeelses filosoofiakiijanduses ‘proposition’i’ 
all tihtipeale ka lihtsalt tähenduslikku väitlauset. Selguse huvides ja  võimalike 
eksitavate assotsiatsioonide peletamiseks annaksin nüüd põgusa ülevaate sellest, 
mida mõeldi propositsiooni all Berkeley ajal ja  eel.
Nii (hilis)keskaegsetes loogikaraamatutes kui varauusaegse filosoofia täht­
teostes, kaasa arvatud John Locke’i Essees inimmõistusest (ilm. 1690), mõel­
dakse propositsioonide [propositio, proposition] all eelkõige väitlauseid, mis 
koosnevad kategoremaatilistest terminitest ehk ‘nimedest’ (näit. ‘animal’) ning 
neid ühendavatest ja  täiendavatest sünkategoremaatilistest terminitest (näit. 
‘est’, ‘non est’, ‘omnis’, ‘nullus’, etc.), nagu näiteks propositsioonis ‘omnis 
asinus est animal’. Kategoremaatiliste terminite ehk ‘nimede’ tähendus seisneb 
aga nendes (teatud tüüpi mentaalsete aktidena mõistetud) kontseptides [con- 
ceptus] või (kontseptide või ka kujutluspiltidena mõistetud) ideedes [idea], mida 
nad kõneleja või kiijutaja enese vaimus või hinges [mens, animus, mind, soul] 
ning eeldatavasti ka teiste sama keelt kõnelevate inimeste vaimus või hinges 
tähistama on pandud. Ses mõttes on ‘nimede’ tähendus või õieti nende tähistus 
[significatio, signification] kokkuleppeline. Traditsioonilise arusaamise kohaselt 
tähistavad ideed või kontseptid omakorda asju vaimust või hingest väljaspool ja  
see tähistamisviis ei ole mitte kokkuleppeline, vaid loomulik, eri keeli kõne­
levate inimeste juures ühesugune. Võib ka öelda, et ‘nimed’ tähistavad asju 
ideede või kontseptide vahendusel. Võimalik, et siin ei olegi tegemist tähendus­
teooriaga tänapäevases mõttes, vaid tähistamise teooriaga traditsioonilises 
mõttes.
Seega (hilis)kesk- ja  varauusaegse arusaamise kohaselt ei väljenda väit- 
laused (verbaalsed propositsioonid) mitte ajalis-ruumilise lokatsioonita propo­
sitsioone (s.o. abstraktseid objekte), vaid ennekõike ja  vahetult mõtteid ja  
mõtteosiseid kõneleja või kirjutaja enda ‘peas’ ning kaudselt või vahendatult
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tähistavad need ka asju, sündmusi või seoseid antud vaimu suhtes välises 
maailmas. Kuna leiti, et ka ideid või kontsepte saab terminitega analoogiliselt 
omavahel ühendada, siis tunnistasid paljud tollased filosoofid, kaasa arvatud 
Locke ja  varane Berkeley, ka ‘mentaalseid propositsioone’, s.o. verbaalsete 
lausete ja  nende terminitega vastavuses olevaid vaimseid ‘lauseid’, ideede või 
kontseptide ühendusi. Enamgi veel, mitmed keskaegsed mõtlejad, näiteks 
William Occam leidsid, et me mõtleme mentaalses (s.o. kontseptide) keeles, 
millel on oma kindel struktuur, grammatika jne. Mentaalne keel on siis ver­
baalse suhtes koguni primaarne: sõnu kasutatakse mentaalse diskursuse väljen­
damiseks. Locke peab oma tähistusekäsitluses veel kinni üldisest skolastikas 
levinud kolmikjaotusest terminite, kontseptide ja asjade vahel, osutades nende- 
vahelistele tähistusseostele, kuid varasematest üsnagi komplitseeritud mentaalse 
keele kontseptsioonidest on nii tema kui varase Berkeley juures kosta vaid 
kauget järelkuminat.6
Locke’i ja  varase Berkeley järgi on verbaalse propositsiooni (sõnalise lause) 
tähenduse või mõttekuse kriteeriumiks see, kas on võimalik vaimus moodustada 
vastavat mentaalset propositsiooni (vaimset ‘lauset’), s.t. ühendada vaimus ideid 
või kontsepte analoogiliselt neid tähistama pandud terminite ühendusviisile 
lauses. Kui kõneleja kasutab sõnu, millele ei vasta mingeid ideid või kontsepte, 
siis räägib ta mõttetusi. Näiteks lause “Blunga on glunga” oleks vähemasti eesti 
keeles mõttetu ja  nimelt sellepärast, et senimaani ei ole eesti keele 
kõnelejaskond sõnu ‘blunga’ ja  ‘glunga’ mingeid ideid või kontsepte oma 
vaimus tähistama pannud ja  nõnda need sõnad ka millegi teadaolevaga ei 
seostu; ei õnnestu moodustada sellele verbaalsele propositsioonile vastavat 
mentaalset propositsiooni. Ent lause “Valge ei ole must” on mõttekas, sest 
kumbki ‘nimi’ ses lauses tähistab teatud ideed ja  me saame moodustada vastava 
mentaalse propositsiooni, nimelt kõrvutades ‘vaimusilmas’ neid kaht ideed ja 
märgata või ‘tajuda’ (vastavalt verbaalsele eitusele ‘ei ole’), et need ideed ei 
ühti, ei sobi kokku (vrd. Locke 1975: 525). Eeldusel, et need ideed või kont­
septid tähistavad omakorda asju välisilmas, võib siis ka öelda, et see lause on 
tõene. Ühesõnaga, me saame ideede või kontseptide tasandil kontrollida, kas 
antud sõnaühend on mõttekas ja  tõene või ei.7
Oluline on silmas pidada, et kui Berkeley kõneleb propositsioonist, siis 
mõtleb ta selle all (väit)lauset (lausungit; nii tõlgendab seda ka Berman), mitte 
“seda, mida lause väljendab või tähendab” või “seda, mida lausega väidetakse”; 
sääraste lausete osisteks on ‘nimed’ ja  sünkategoremaatilised terminid; ‘nimede’
6 See tõsiasi jõudis mu teadvusse harivas vestluses Calvin Normore ja Simo 
Knuuttilaga.
7 Mõistagi on siin visandatud kesk- ja varauusaegsete tähistuskontseptsioonide 
üldjoonis ülimalt lihtsustav ja pealiskaudne; põhjalikuma ja täpsema asjakäsitluse 
esitamine ületaks paraku käesoleva artikli piirid ja võimalused. Mõningase asjakohase 
ülevaate saab näiteks nendest allikatest: Ashworth 1982, 1984, Normore 1990, Ayers 
1991, kd. 1, ptk. 2, Nuchelmans 1998.
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tähenduse konstitueerivad (tollal tüüpilise filosoofilise arusaama kohaselt) ideed 
või kontseptid kõneleja/kirjutaja ja  kuulja/lugeja vaimus; tähendusetuks loeb 
vähemasti varane Berkeley8 üldjuhul säärased propositsioonid, millele ei vasta 
ehk mis ei kutsu vaimus esile (selgepiirilisi) ideid. Sääraselt mõistetud pro­
positsioonid võivad olla tõesed või väärad, ent, nagu kohe näeme, neid võidakse 
kasutada ka muudel eesmärkidel kui seda on väitmine, et miski on nii või teisiti.
Bermani emotivistlik Berkeley-tõlgitsus
I
Alciphron’i näol on tegemist ortodoksse anglikaanluse põhiprintsiipe kaitsva 
teosega, mitmekülgse kaitsekõnega loomulikule ja  ilmutatud religioonile 
[natural religion, revealed religion], dogmaatilistele arusaamadele Jumalast ja 
tema atribuutidest, kristlikest müsteeriumidest, tahtevabadusest, kristlikust mo­
raalist jne. Teos koosneb seitsmest dialoogist, millest kahes, neljandas ja  seits­
mendas, pööratakse erilist tähelepanu religioonikeele problemaatikale. Bermani 
väitel esitab Berkeley oma ‘emotiivse teooria’ Alciphron i viimases dialoogis.
Berman rajab oma emotivistliku interpretatsiooni Berkeley väitele, mille 
leiame nii varasest Inimteadmise põhiprintsiipide (1710) sissejuhatuse alg­
variandist (tõenäoliselt kirjutatud aastal 1708), mis avaldati alles aastal 1987°, 
kui ka Alciphron1 ist, et ideede tähistamine ja  esilekutsumine teiste inimeste 
vaimus ( ‘ideede kommunikeerimine’) ei ole sõnade kasutamise ainukene 
eesmärk. Berkeley ütleb, et sõnadel
on ka teisi otstarbeid kui lihtsalt ideede tähistamine ja esiletoomine, nimelt 
sellised otstarbed nagu kohaste emotsioonide esilekutsumine, teatud kindlate 
vaimu hoiakute või soodumuste tekitamine ning meie tegevuste suunamine...
(VII. 14; Works 3: 30 7 )10
Bermani väitel nähtub siit, et Berkeley teeb vahet keele kognitiivsel funkt­
sioonil, milleks on ideede tähistamine ja  kommunikatsioon, ning kolmel mitte- 
kognitiivsel funktsioonil, milleks on (1) emotsioonide, (2) hoiakute ja (3) 
tegevuste esilekutsumine.
Nimetatud funktsioonide eristusele vastavalt teeb Berkeley (Bermani tõlgen­
duse kohaselt) vahet kognitiivsetel väidetel või otsustustel [cognitive state­
ments] ja  emotiivsetel lausungitel [emotive utterances].n Esimesed, näiteks
8 Selle kohta vt. Belfrage 1985 ja 1986.
9 Belfrage 1987.
10 Kõik viited Berkeley kirjutistele pärinevad standardväljaandest (Berkeley 1948-57, 
lüh. Works). Alciphroh’x puhul tsiteerin dialoogi, paragrahvi, standard väljaande köite ja 
lehekülje numbrit.
11 Berkeley ise kasutab mõlemal puhul terminit proposition.
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väide “See lehm on pruun”12, on informatiivsed, nad annavad meile midagi 
teada (või, Berkeley terminoloogias, kutsuvad esile ideid), teised, näiteks 
lausungid “Pea püsti!” või “Ära nukrutse!” [“Cheer up!”], “Elu on tüütu!” 
[Life’s a bore!”] ja  “Kao minema!” [Get out!], kutsuvad esile (ülaltoodud 
eristuse kohaselt) emotsioone, hoiakuid või tegevusi. Nii kognitiivsed väited kui 
emotiivsed lausungid on mõttekad või tähendusega, kuid erineval moel. 
Esimesed on mõttekad seetõttu, et nad edastavad mingit informatsiooni, teised 
aga seetõttu, et nad teenivad emotiivseid eesmärke. Bermani interpretatsiooni 
järgi teeb Berkeley vahet loomuliku religiooni väidetel ja  kristlike müstee­
riumide kohta käivatel lausungitel, nõnda et esimesed kuuluvad kognitiivsete 
väidete, teised emotiivsete lausungite klassi. Näiteks “Jumal eksisteerib ja  on 
tark” (jällegi Bermani näide) annab meile mingisugust informatsiooni või tead­
mist Jumala koh taja  seega on sel väitel ‘kognitiivne sisu’. Seevastu lausungid 
Püha Kolmainsuse või Jumala armu kohta on ‘loomult emotiivsed’ [essentially 
emotive] ning neil “on kas vähe kognitiivset sisu või pole seda üldse”. Ometi on 
viimast sorti lausungid mõttekad, niivõrd kui nad tekitavad teatud 
emotsionaalseid efekte ja  kutsuvad esile moraalselt õigeid tegusid.
Filosoofia-ajaloolise konteksti mõttes, leiab Berman, on Berkeley ‘emotiivne 
teooria’ vastuseks John Tolandi ja  teiste ‘vabamõtlejate’ etteheitele, et kristlikke 
müsteeriume puudutavad lausungid on mõttetud, sest neis figureerivad terminid 
‘Kolmainsus’, ‘pärispatt’ ja  teised samased ei tähista ega kutsu esile 
(selgepiirilisi) ideid.13 Berkeley väidetava teooria kohaselt on neil terminitel 
täita emotiivne funktsioon ja  seega ei ole nad mõttetud, olgugi et neid 
sisaldavatel lausungitel pole kognitiivset sisu.14
Alciphron'\ seitsmendas dialoogis, paragrahvides nr. 7, 8 ja 10, rakendab 
Berkeley oma ‘emotiivset teooriat’ neljale müsteeriumile, leiab Berman. 
Nendeks müsteeriumideks on Jumala arm, Püha Kolmainsus, pärispatt ja 
‘tulevane riik’ [future state]. Bermani järgi on iga nimetatud müsteeriumi kohta 
käivate lausungite kasutamisel spetsiifilised tagajärjed, nimelt tekivad 
eripärased emotsioonid, hoiakud või kaldutakse sooritama teatud sorti tegusid. 
Jumala armust kõnelemise tagajärjeks on kuuljate ‘head harjumused või 
soodumused’ [good habits] ja  vagadus, lausungid Kolmainsuse kohta kutsuvad 
esile “armastust, lootust, tänulikkust ja  kuulekust”, lausungid pärispatu kohta 
tekitavad samuti häid harjumusi või soodumusi, aga ka moraalses plaanis 
kasuliku tunde oma tühisusest või väärtusetusest, tulevase riigi kohta kõneldav 
hoiab inimesi sooritamast kuije tegusid.
12 Asjassepuutuvad näited pärinevad Bermanilt, mitte Berkeleylt.
13 Hiljuti on sedasama konteksti küllalt põhjalikult kirjeldanud Isabel Rivers (Rivers 
2000, kd. I, ptk. 1).
14 Ayer’ terminoloogiat kasutades võiks seda (Bermani poolt Berkeleyle omistatud) 
teooriat või vaadet tinglikult esitada ka nii: müsteeriumi-lausungitel pole faktilist sisu, 
nad ei väljenda propositsioone, kuid neil on emotiivne funktsioon.
Sääraste emotiivsete, kognitiivses plaanis sisutute lausungite ja  nende 
tagajärgede vahel on teatav ärrituse-reaktsiooni laadi seos. Teatud tüüpi 
lausungite kuulmisele või lugemisele järgneb teatud tüüpi emotsionaalne 
reaktsioon. Mõnedel sõnadel ja  lausungitel on ‘emotiivne vägi’ [emotive pow er] 
või ‘kalduvus’ [tendency] tekitada või kutsuda esile “emotsioone, soodumusi ja  
tegevusi” (Berman 1994: 150, 152-3).
Milline oli Berkeley seisukoht küsimuses, kas müsteeriumi-lausungid 
võiksid siiski ka tõesed  olla, jääb (Bermani väitel) ebaselgeks, nii et rahuldavat 
vastust me tema teostest ei leia. Sama kehtib Berkeley vihjete kohta sellele, et 
“sõnad müsteeriumide kohta” võivad toimida “sümboolsete väljendustena”, mis 
kuidagi hägusalt representeerivad inimmõistuseülest (Berman 1994: 161-3).
Niimoodi, lingvistilis-semantilises võtmes tõlgitsebki Berkeley kristlikku 
apologeetikat Berman, kes viimaks nendib, et Berkeley ei märganud, et sõnad 
võivad emotsioone mitte üksnes esile kutsuda, vaid ka väljendada, nagu näiteks 
väljendid “Oh sa issand!” [Oh dear!] või “Uau!” [Gosh!] (Berman 1994: 161).
II
Kuna Berkeley oletatav ‘emotiivne teooria’ on esitatud sootuks teises kontekstis 
kui Ayer’ oma, siis väärib ka see ‘taustsüsteem’ lähemat valgustamist, mida 
Berman teebki.
Bermani arvates on Berkeley innovatiivne teooria tihedasti seotud tema 
vaatega usule, nimelt “samastab [Berkeley] usu keele kolme mittekognitiivse 
funktsiooniga” (Berman 1994: 146):
Usk, ütlen ma, ei ole loid tajumine, vaid vaimu tegus veendumus [operative 
persuasion o f the mind], mis neis, kel see on, kutsub ikka esile mingi kohase 
teo, hoiaku või emotsiooni...
(VII. 10; Works 3: 301)
Usk [faith], leiab Berman, ei ole Berkeley jaoks “mõistuslik akt” [act o f  the 
understanding], vaid “emotsionaalne akt” (Berman 1982: 164). Teisisõnu, usk 
(müsteeriumidesse) pole kognitiivne, sest ta ei kätke endas mingit teadmist või 
informeeritust. Samas rajaneb usk müsteeriumidesse või kõne neist ‘kognitiivsel 
teoloogial’, mille väited, nagu eelpool seletatud, on Berkeley meelest informa­
tiivsed, tõesed ja  kognitiivse sisuga. Müsteeriumi-lausungite emotsionaalsed 
tagajärjed on võimalikud tänu taustaksolevale uskumusele [belief] hea, targa ja  
õiglase Jumala eksistentsi, mida püütakse kinnistada Alciphron'’\ neljandas 
dialoogis. Emotiivne kõne müsteeriumidest tugineb kognitiivsele kõnele 
Jumalast ja  tema atribuutidest. Teisisõnu, loomuliku teoloogia kognitiivsed 
väited (nagu Berman seda väljendab) toetavad emotiivseid lausungeid
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müsteeriumide kohta (Berman 1994: 148). Kes ei usu Jumalasse, reageerib 
jutule pärispatust ja  muust säärasest teisiti kui see, kes usub.
Kuna müsteeriumi-lausungid sisalduvad eelkõige Pühakirjas või on seal 
sisalduvast tuletatud, ja  Pühakirjas kõneleb (inspireeritud kirjameeste 
vahendusel) Jumal ise, siis on alust arvata, et neile lausungitele omistatud 
emotiivne funktsioon on Jumala enda poolt soovitud ja täidab mingit eesmärki. 
Bermani väitel ei ole Berkeley järgi selleks eesmärgiks inimkonna teavitamine 
millestki olulisest ja  senitundmatust. Need lausungid on kirja pandud selleks, et 
ajendada inimesi “tegutsema ja  tundma teatud kindlal moel” [act and fe e l in 
certain ways], see tähendab, sooritama moraalselt õigeid tegusid ning evima 
teatud kindlat hoiakut Jumala suhtes: kartma tema õiglust ja teda armastama 
(Berman 1994: 134, 147). Müsteeriumidest kõnelemise eesmärgiks on 
saavutada moraalselt hea või õige käitumine siin ilmas ja  kohane hoiak või 
tunne oma vägeva Looja suhtes. Niisiis on arvatavalt tegemist mitte- 
inform atiivsete, m itte-kognitiivsete, fak tilise  või kognitiivse sisuta, em otiivsete  
religioonilausungitega.
Kui pöörduda veelkord eelkäsitletud võrdluse juurde, siis võiks öelda ka nii, 
et Bermani tõlgenduses osutub Berkeley arusaam (aastal 1732) müsteeriumi- 
lausungitest samaseks Ayer’ arusaamisega (aastal 1936) eetika (ja esteetika) 
valda kuuluvatest emotiivsetest lausungitest, niivõrd kui mõlemal puhul 
peetakse silmas lausungeid, (1) mis rangelt võttes ei väida midagi, (2) millel 
puudub faktiline sisu (kognitiivne tähendus), kuid (3) millel on emotiivne 
funktsioon ja tähendus.
Argumendid emotivistliku tõlgitsuse vastu
Nüüd püüan ma näidata, et religioonilausungite emotiivse tähenduse teooria 
omistamine Berkeleyle, nagu Berman seda teeb, pole põhjendatud. Jagasin oma 
argumendid kahte ossa, millest esimeses on rõhuasetus otseselt keele ja 
tähendusega seotud küsimustel, teises aga Berkeley arvatavatel religioossetel 
tõekspidamistel.15
I
A lciphron 'i teksti hoolikas lugeja võib tähele panna, et nendes lõikudes, mida 
Berman kasutab Berkeley väidetava ‘emotiivse teooria’ tekstilise tõendus­
materjalina, ei räägita mitte asjakohaste propositsioonide  (lausungite) kuulmise 
või lugemise, vaid müsteeriumidesse uskumise headest tagajärgedest. Berkeley 
räägib nö. usu headest viljadest, mõjust, mida müsteeriumidesse uskumine 
inimesele avaldab. Näiteks kõneleb ta “kristlaste päästvast usust”, mis on “elav,
15 Enamus alljärgnevatest argumentidest on mõnevõrra erineval kujul esitatud artikli 
Jakapi, “Emotive M eaning...” alajaotustes III ja IV.
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tegus alge” [vital operative principle], mis kutsub esile ligimesearmastust või 
heldust [charity] ja  kuulekust” (VII. 9; Works 3: 300), teisal aga pärispattu ja 
tulevasse riiki uskumise kasulikust toimest (VII. 10; Works 3: 301-3). Pärispatu 
kohta ütleb Berkeley:
Näiteks võidakse leida, et on võimatu moodustada abstraktset ideed 
pärispatust või selle edasikandumisest, ja ometi võib usk sellesse [the 
belief thereof] kutsuda inimese vaimus esile vajaliku arusaamise [sense] 
oma tühisusest ja  Lunastaja headusest, millest omakorda tulenevad head 
harjumused või soodumused [habits] ja  neist head teod, need usu tõelised 
toimed [genuine effects o f  faith].
(VII. 10; Works 3: 301)
On päris ilmne, et Berkeley kõneleb siin sellest, et usk asjusse, mille kohta me 
ei suuda moodustada täpseid või abstraktseid ideid (mida nõutavad taga usu 
vastased), antud juhul usk pärispattu, avaldab soodsat mõju käitumisele. See on 
argument ülemeelelisse, mõistusega tabamatusse uskumise poolt, mitte skeemi 
“ärritus —  reaktsioon” järgiv seletus teatud tüüpi lausungite emotiivsele 
toimele.
On tõsi, et Berkeley järgi kätkeb usk millessegi [faith, belief] teatud pro- 
positsiooni(de)ga nõustumist [assent]. Ühes kohas ütleb ta tõesti, et need on 
propositsioonid Kolmainsuse kohta, mis suunavad ja  mõjustavad vaimu, ent ka 
seal on see mõju selgesti seotud usuga Kolmainsusse. Vastav tekstilõik on 
järgmine:
Alciphron. Ära pelga: kõigi õige arutluse reeglite kohaselt on absoluutselt 
võimatu, et mingi müsteerium, ja kõige vähem Kolmainsus, saaks tõeliselt 
inimese usu objektiks olla.
Eunhranor. Ma ei imesta selle üle, et sa seni nõnda mõtlesid, kuni olid 
arvamusel, et ükski inimene ei saa nõustuda propositsiooniga, ilma et ta 
tajuks või moodustaks oma vaimus selle propositsiooni terminitega märgitud 
selgepiirilisi ideid. Ehkki terminid on märgid, ometi, olles möönnud, et need 
märgid võivad olla tähenduslikud/mõttekad [significant] ka siis, kui nad ei 
too esile [suggest] nende poolt representeeritud ideid, küll aga täidavad seda 
otstarvet, et juhtida ja mõjutada meie tahet, kirgi või käitumist, siis selle 
tulemusel möönsid sa, et inimese vaim võib nõustuda sääraseid termineid 
sisaldavate propositsioonidega, kui need propositsioonid teda sel kombel 
juhivad või mõjustavad; ja seda kõike ka sellele vaatamata, et vaim ei taju 
nende terminitega tähistatud selgepiirilisi ideid. Sellest paistab järelduvat, et 
inimene võib uskuda Kolmainu-õpetust, kui ta leiab Pühakirjas ilmutatud 
olevat, et Isa, Poeg ja Püha Vaim on Jumal ja et on vaid üks Jumal, ehkki ta 
ei moodusta oma vaimus mingit abstraktset või selgepiirilist ideed 
kolmainsusest, substantsist või personaalsusest; seda eeldusel, et see õpetus 
Loojast, Lunastajast ja Pühitsejast avaldab tema vaimule kohaseid muljeid, 
nimelt tekitades seal armastust, lootust, tänulikkust ning kuulekust, ja seeläbi
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muutub elavaks tegusaks algeks, mis mõjutab tema elu ja tegevusi, kooskõlas 
selle arusaamaga päästvast usust, mida ühelt kristlaselt oodatakse.
(VII. 8; Works 3: 296-7)
Igatahes on Berkeley seletuses ülalloetletud toimete (armastus, lootus jne.) 
tekkele kätketud märksa enam kui Bermani tõlgenduses. Propositsioonidel on 
hea mõju ja  see on aluseks nendega nõustumisele, ent selleks, et nad avaldaksid 
jätkuvat mõju ja  muutuksid “elavateks tegusateks algeteks”, on vaja sedasama 
nõustumist, usku, mitte lihtsalt teatud propositsioonide kuuldavaletoomist, 
millele järgneb reaktsioon. Berkeley ei kirjelda usku ja  selle toimeid kui 
reaktsiooni emotiivsetele hüüatustele, vaid kui vaimu kasvavat tegusat 
veendumust [operative persuasion o f the mind] ja  sellest tulenevaid häid 
tagajärgi. Nii osutab ta teisal “meie kristliku usu artiklitele, mis, võrdeliselt 
sellega, kuivõrd neisse usutakse [in proportion as they are believed], veenavad, 
ning kui nad veenavad, siis ka mõjutavad inimeste elu ja  tegevust” (VII. 15; 
Works 3: 308, kaldkiri lisatud).
Bermani väide, et Berkeley “samastab usu keele kolme mittekognitiivse 
funktsiooniga”, näib mõistetamatu.16 See, et ühes kohas kõneleb ta keele 
otstarvetest ja  teisal usu mõjust ning mõlemal puhul mainib emotsioonide, 
hoiakute ja  tegude esilekutsumist, ei tähenda, et keele mittekognitiivsed 
funktsioonid ja  usk müsteeriumidesse on ükssama asi. Võiks tuua niisuguse 
võrdluse. Kui ma ütleksin, et üks kaunis meloodia teeb mu meele härdaks ja 
seejärel, et see meloodia toob mulle meelde mälestusi, mis teevad meele 
härdaks, siis ei tähendaks see sugugi ütelda, et nimetatud meloodia ja 
mälestused on üks ja  seesama.
Mitte mingil juhul ei ole usk Berkeley jaoks midagi puhtlingvistilist. 
Bermani kummalise väite kinnituseks puudub tekstiline tõendusmaterjal.
Bermani emotivistliku interpretatsiooniga kaasneb teinegi päris huvitav 
probleem, milleks on üksikute müsteeriumide kohta käivate propositsioonide 
(lausungite) tähendus. Küsimus on selles, mis eristab ühe niisuguse proposit- 
siooni tähendust või tähenduslikku/mõttekat kasutust teise omast. Et väidetavalt 
on tegu puhtemotiivsete, kognitiivse sisu või tähenduseta propositsioonidega, 
siis tundub, et tähenduserinevus seisneb nendes spetsiifilistes mittekogni- 
tiivsetes tagajärgedes, mida ühe või teise propositsiooni kasutamine kaasa toob. 
Nagu eelpool mainitud, seobki Berman kokku konkreetsete müsteeriumide 
kohta käivad propositsioonid ja neile eriomased tagajärjed: jutt pärispatust 
kutsub esile teistsuguseid emotsionaalseid efekte kui Kolmainsust puudutav 
propositsioon.17 Paraku tundub, et kui propositsioonides müsteeriumide kohtaja 
usus müsteeriumidesse ei ole mitte midagi kognitiivset, siis jääb üksikute 
uskumuste ja nende tagajärgede omavaheline seos seletamatuks. Jääb 
arusaamatuks, miks on näiteks tulevasse riiki uskumise puhul kohaseks
16 Vt. selle kohta ka Williford 2000: 72-3.
17 Peter Walmsley paistab samal seisukohal olevat (vt. Walmsley 1990: 186).
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reaktsiooniks kurjast teost loobumine ja  Kolmainsusse uskumise puhul 
armastus, lootus jne, ning mitte vastupidi.18 Ei ole alust seda segadust 
Berkeleyle omistada. Tema seisukoht paistab küll pigem niisugune olevat, et 
pärispatust kuuldes mõistab inimene oma tühisust ja  süüd, kuuldes Lunastajast 
ja temasse uskudes tekib inimeses arusaamine Lunastaja headusest jne. Mida 
veendunumalt inimene usub, seda suuremat mõju see usk tema tunnetele, 
hoiakutele ja  tegudele avaldab. Nii seitsmendas dialoogis kui mujalgi 
Alciphron ' is kirjeldab Berkeley kristluse head mõju moraalile, kommetele, 
haridusele jne, kuid ta ei seleta seda pelgalt teatud tüüpi lausungite iseäraliku ja  
loomuomase emotiivse tegususega.
Veel üheks raskuseks, millega emotivistlik tõlgitsus arvestanud pole, on see, 
et lisaks nimetatutele kõneleb Berkeley usust veel mitmetesse teistesse 
müsteeriumidesse nagu näiteks surnute ülestõusmine ja  inkamatsioon, 
mainimata nendega seoses mingeid (eriomaseid) emotiivseid toimeid (Vt. VI. 
10-12). Seda asjaolu ei maini Berman sõnagagi.
Tervikuna paistab, et kristliku usu tegususe kirjeldust Alciphron is ei saa 
käsitada (religiooni)lausungite emotiivse tähenduse teooriana.
Bermani väitel arvas Berkeley, et mõnedel sõnadel on ‘emotiivne vägi’ või 
kalduvus kutsuda esile ‘emotsioone, soodumusi ja  tegevusi’ ja müsteeriumi- 
lausungite mõju tuleneb just sedalaadi sõnade kasutamisest. On vägagi küsitav, 
kas säärastel terminitel nagu ‘kolmainsus’ või ‘inkamatsioon’ on mingi 
emotiivne vägi, nii et neid või neid sisaldavaid propositsioone võiks võrrelda 
tavapäraste emotiivsete hüüatustega. Vaevalt küll, et terminid ‘kolmainsus’ ja 
‘inkamatsioon’ või neid sisaldavad teoloogilised propositsioonid ‘loomult 
emotiivsed’ on. Berkeley on küll kriitiline katsete suhtes müsteeriume ära 
seletada, kuid ta ei väida kusagil, et igasugune teoloogiline diskussioon 
müsteeriumide üle on kas mõttetu või emotiivne. Ta ei ole väljendanud 
seisukohta, et säärase teoloogilise diskursuse eesmärgiks on emotsioonide 
esilekutsumine.
Berman paistab arvavat, et Berkeley jaoks polegi müsteeriumid teoloogilise 
arutelu objektiks, sest ta lausub, et “Berkeley emotiivne müsteeriumidekäsitlus 
tugineb otseselt tema kognitiivsele teoloogiakäsitlusele” (Berman 1994: 147). 
Ent Berkeley viitab võrdlevalt teaduslikele vaidlustele jõu [force] ja 
teoloogi li stele vaidlustele Jumala armu üle, väites, et vastavate selgepiiriliste 
ideede puudumisest hoolimata võivad need arutelud olla kasulikud ja  mõttekad 
(VII. 7; Works 3: 296).
Kokkuvõtteks võib öelda, et vastupidiselt Bermani arvamusele või 
soovunelmale ei ole Berkeley mõttearendus Alciphron 'i  seitsmendas dialoogis 
läbinisti keelealane. Juba esitatud argumentide põhjal on alust järeldada, et 
Berkeley ei esita seal (Ayer’ laadis) emotiivse tähenduse teooriat. Järgmises 
alalõigus tahan ma näidata, et on otsustavaid, teoloogiasse puutuvaid kaalutlusi, 
mille alusel võib Bermani tõlgitsuse tervikuna kõrvale heita kui väära.
18 Selle vastuväite eest võlgnen tänu Michael Ayersile.
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Bermani arusaamise kohaselt arvas Berkeley, et müsteeriumi-lausungeid on 
Pühakirjas kasutatud vaid selleks, et panna inimesi vooruslikult käituma ning 
tekitada neis hea ja  vägeva Looja suhtes kohane tunne või hoiak. Ilmneb, et 
need lausungid on vajalikud üksnes selleks, et kutsuda inimestes esile vagadust 
ja  tänutunnet, lootust ja  muid sedalaadi toimeid, ning mõjutada inimeste 
moraalset tegutsemist paremuse suunas. Kuna Bermani järgi on Berkeley vaated 
nende propositsioonide tõesuse küsimuses ebaselged ja  jääbki küsitavaks, kas ta 
ka tegelikult uskus, et Jumal on tõesti kolmainus ning et surnud tõepoolest üles 
tõusevad, siis tundub mulle, et Berman kipub Berkeleyle omistama mõnevõrra 
mitteortodoksseid seisukohti kristluse kesksete õpetuste suhtes.19 Tema vaate 
järgi ei erinegi Berkeley arusaam ilmutusreligioonist fundamentaalselt 
vabamõtlejate omast, kelle destruktiivse religioonikriitikaga Berkeley kogu oma 
teose ulatuses ja samuti reas teistes teostes nii tulihingeliselt polemiseerib.
Paraku ei ole midagi tuua Bermani väite kinnituseks, et Berkeley pidas 
müsteeriumide kohta käivate propositsioonide kasutamise ainukeseks või 
põhiliseks eesmärgiks teatud tunnete ja  tegude esilekutsumist. Berman ei 
arvesta sellega, et traditsioonilise vaate kohaselt kasutab Jumal neid 
propositsioone inimkonna teavitamiseks asjust, milleni inimkond mõistuse abil 
ei jõuaks. Seda seisukohta jagades märgib Berkeley, et Pühakirjas on 
asjakohastel sõnadel ja  propositsioonidel selles informeerimise protsessis täita 
instrumentaalne roll (VI. 4, 6-8; Works 3: 225, 228-233).
Propositsioonid (lausungid), mida Ayer pidanuks faktilises mõttes 
tähendusetuiks ja  mis Bermani tõlgenduses on kognitiivse sisuta, 
mitteinformatiivsed, emotiivsed ‘hüüatused’, on Berkeley jaoks kristliku 
ilmutuse kandjaks ehk taevasi müsteeriume puudutava informatsiooni 
edastamise vahendiks.
Siit on ka ilmne, et Berkeley vaate järgi, mida ta on väljendanud mitmetes 
oma jutlustes ja  kirjutistes20, annavad need propositsioonid mõnesugust teadmist 
üleloomuliku maailma kohta, olgu see teadmine kui tahes piiratud ja  ebaselge. 
Nii näiteks on just vaidlusaluste propositsioonide abil ilmutatud, et Jumal on 
kolmainus, et Sõna on saanud lihaks jne. Bermani interpretatsioon viib 
tegelikult järeldusele, mida Berman ise ei tee, et Berkeley ei tunnistanudki 
kristlikku ilmutust, mis tähendaks jällegi seda, et ta oli vabamõtleja. Paraku 
tundub, et niisuguse vaate omistamist talle ei õnnestu kinnitada ühegi 
tekstilõiguga tema teostest.
Tõsi, oma pealtnäha pehmema väite toetuseks tsiteerib või märgib Berman 
ära mõningaid kohti Alciphron is ja  mujal (IV. 18; V. 27, 29; VII. 7, 8, 10 ja 
Works 7: 146-7), kuid need ei anna kuidagi tunnistust sellest, et Berkeley 
arvates oleksid müsteeriumid ja asjassepuutuvad propositsioonid täielikult
19 2001. aasta kevadel Bermaniga sel teemal kõneledes see mulje üksnes süvenes.
20 Selle kohta vt. Jakapi, “Entry 720..
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inimeste moraalse palge täiustamise ja  loomuliku religiooni efektiivsema 
kehtestamise teenistuses, s.t. vajalikud üksnes selleks, et kutsuda esile teatud 
emotsioone, hoiakuid ja  tegusid ning kinnistada usku tõsiasjadesse Jumala ja 
tema atribuutide kohta, mida on võimalik avastada mõistuse valgel. Näiteks 
sõnab Berman:
Mitte miski ei pane inimesi nii efektiivselt kartma Jumala õiglust kui 
tulevase riigi müsteerium.
(Berman 1994: 147)
Berkeley ise ei ütle ses punktis enamat kui et “usk tulevasse riiki” on kurja teo 
ärahoidmisel efektiivsem kui teoreetiline kõne ‘vooruse ilust’ ning see ‘võimas 
toime’ põhineb kartusel tulevase karistuse ees (Vt. VII. 10; Works 3: 302-3)21. 
Siit ei järeldu kuidagi, et tulevasest riigist kõnelemise eesmärgiks on üksnes 
hirmutunde ja  moraalselt õigete tegude esilekutsumine. Kui Berkeley oli 
arvamusel, et propositsioonid tulevase riigi kohta ei anna inimkonnale teada, et 
meid ootavad ees tasud ja  karistused siin elus sooritatud tegude eest, s.t. kui 
need propositsioonid on vaid emotiivsed, mitteinformatiivsed ‘hüüatused’, nagu 
nad Bermani interpretatsiooni järgi on, siis tundub, et Berkeley oli seisukohal, et 
tegelikult pole midagi loota ega karta. Kõike eelöeldut arvesse võttes peaks 
selge olema, et ta arvas teisiti.
Kui kõnealused propositsioonid on ilmutuse instrumentideks, nõnda et (tõtt- 
armastav) Jumal annab nende kaudu midagi teada teispoolsuse kohta, siis on 
ilmne, et need peavad olema tõesed. Seega on need fundamentaalselt erinevad 
üksnes emotsionaalselt tähenduslikest, faktilise sisuta lausungitest loogiliste 
positivistide käsitluses.
Viimaks väärib märkimist, et Alciphron i kuuendas dialoogis kasutatakse 
müsteeriumide illustreerimiseks võrdpilte, näiteks võrreldakse Kristuse kahe, 
s.o. inimliku ja  jumaliku loomuse müstilist ühendust hinge ja  keha ühendusega 
(VI. 11; Works 3: 240-1). See näitab, et müsteeriumides on midagi, mida on 
võimalik mõista ning seega pole vastavad propositsioonid mõttekad vaid 
niivõrd, kui nad emotsioone esile kutsuvad.
Kokkuvõte
Arvan, et esitatud argumentide abil on mul õnnestunud näidata, et Alciphron is 
ei sisaldu (religioonilausungite) emotiivse tähenduse teooriat, mis oleks Ayer’ ja 
teiste omaaegsete loogiliste positivistide poolt esitatud samase teooria eel­
käijaks. Berman väidab, et Berkeley järgi on religioossed lausungid (Berkeley 
terminoloogias: propositsioonid), millest viimane Alciphron i seitsmendas 
dialoogis kõneleb, mitteinformatiivsed, ilma kognitiivse või faktilise sisuta,
21 Vt. ka neid kaht Berkeley esseed The Guardian' is (1713): nr. 55, ‘The Sanctions of 
Religion’ ja nr. 89, ‘Immortality’ (Works 7: 198-201, 222-4).
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emotiivsed, ja  võimalik, et ka tõeväärtuseta. Lähemal vaatlusel on aga selgunud, 
et Berkeley vaate seesugune kirjeldus on ebaadekvaatne, tekstilise kinnituseta 
ning viib uskumatute järeldusteni tema religioossete tõekspidamiste kohta. 
Ilmnes, et nimetatud religioonilausungid, täpsemalt, kristlikke müsteeriume 
väljendavad propositsioonid annavad Berkeley järgi inimkonnale midagi teada, 
on tõesed ning oma supranaturaalsusele vaatamata teataval määral mõistetavad. 
Berkeley skeemis saavad need propositsioonid ka tõeste ja informatiivsetena, 
või pigem just säärastena, olla aluseks usule, mille ilmseks tulemuseks on 
moraalses plaanis head või õiged tunded, hoiakud ja  teod.
Lõpetuseks üks üldisemat laadi manitsus. Filosoofia-ajalooliste paralleelide 
otsimisel ja  leidmisel tuleks olla ülimalt ettevaatlik, märgates sarnasusi tuleks 
teadvustada samas (mõnikord fundamentaalseid) erinevusi, mitte neid erinevusi 
ignoreerida, asetada samased vaated võrdluseks kõrvuti, mitte segada neid 
kokku. Nii saab hoiduda tahtmatult joonistamast filosoofia-ajaloolisi karika­
tuure ning arendamast nende põhjal karikatuurset filosoofiat.
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